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CONTENTS FOR MARCH 1940

- 96 CONGRESSMEN MAKE UP THEIR MINDS L. E. Gleeck 3
A realistic study, based on personal interviews, of the factors which determined the votes of 96 Members of Congress on embargo repeal.
- TRIBULATIONS OF A WAGE-HOUR ADMINISTRATOR Elmer F. Andrews 25
The first Wage-Hour Administrator reveals the problems he faced and what he did about them.
- TELLING THE STOCKHOLDERS Dickson Hartwell 35
Practical advice on the use of the stockholders report as a public relations device to consolidate the corporation's "first line of defense": the opinions of its stockholders.
- INFLUENCES OF WORLD EVENTS ON U.S.
"NEUTRALITY" OPINION Philip E. Jacob 48
A study of the shifts during the last three years in four kinds of American "neutrality" opinion: personal, commercial, military, financial.
- BOLSTERING NATIONAL MORALE IN WARTIME
FRANCE French Army Officer 66
A description of techniques used by the French Government to bolster the morale of soldiers and civilians.
- PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY
British Institute of Public Opinion 75
A fascinating record of current history consisting of answers given by British voters to selected questions related to the war issue.

(continued on next page)

Gallup and Fortune Polls 83

The only complete, quarterly compilation of Gallup and *Fortune* poll results . . . arranged topically, in chronological order, to show the trend of opinion on any subject.

Analysis of Poll Results

QUARTERLY COMMENTARY, by Saul Forbes Rae 116

LOOKING FORWARD TO PEACE, by Hadley Cantril and Donald Rugg 119

Panel Studies, by Paul F. Lazarsfeld 122

A discussion of the "panel" as a tool for measuring the effects of propaganda and promotional campaigns.

Problems and Techniques

WORDING QUESTIONS FOR THE POLLS, by Elmo Roper 129

THREE WORDS, by Edward G. Benson 130

WEIGHTED PROPORTIONS AND POLL RELIABILITY, by F. F. Stephan 135

COMMUNICATIONS

Press, Radio, Films, by O. W. Riegel 136

A quarterly survey of significant developments relating to the press, the radio, films.

PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES

Organized Groups, by C. B. Marshall 151

Reports on the legislative programs of major organized groups in connection with this session of Congress.

Government

COMBATTING U.S. "BALKANIZATION," by Thomas S. Green, Jr. 162

MUNICIPAL PUBLIC RELATIONS, by Elton D. Woolpert 164

WHO'S WHO IN GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY 168

Book Reviews 171

Bibliography, compiled by Bruce Lannes Smith 179

96 CONGRESSMEN MAKE UP THEIR MINDS

By L. E. GLEECK

Reported in this article is an ingenious study of the factors determining the votes of 96 Members of Congress on the repeal of the embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act, together with an analysis of Congressional mail on this subject. The author is attached to The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, as research assistant to Harold D. Lasswell.

Realistic analyses of Congressional voting behavior have been singularly few. Carping criticism and elaborate democratic dogma reminiscent of McGuffey's *Third Reader* hold the field. Skilled observers are agreed, however, that Congressmen come to Washington armed with the morality neither of *De Officiis* nor *The Prince*. Confusing the metaphor, we may say that the typical Congressman is neither the more venerable George Washington Plunkitt of Tammany Hall fame nor the Mr. Smith recently celebrated by the cinema, but rather your local lawyer, editor, or bank president (who served overseas). To the mind of the writer, these misconceptions are fraught with grave and lamentable implications for our democracy. Brought up on the pap of a high school civics text which declared that none but the brave and good may enter Congress, the ordinary voter suffers severe personality shocks when he views the Congressional show as an adult. Every "deal" is a barb in his soul. In the battle against lack of political sophistication, yeoman's service has been rendered by certain articulate politicians¹ and occasional textbook writers,² but the need (not yet

¹ Congressman T. V. Smith, Professor-politician from Illinois, for example. Here is a typical passage from his *Promise of American Politics*: "Our job is clearly not understood by those who disdain us. We represent clashing interests at the point where they must be peaceably compromised or forcibly suppressed. People who habitually disdain politicians are either ignorant of this crucial issue or they are dictators at heart—willing to suppress whoever disagrees with them. . . . We catch it from both sides, but were it not for our kind, eventually there would not be two sides." (Page 250 ff.)

² Herman Finer, in his *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (1934), pages 386 ff.: "The politician is . . . a broker . . . his function is to act, to fight, to seize advantages, not to meditate upon them. . . . Politicians are merchants buying in the cheap-

the demand) far exceeds the supply. The field of political biography is much more fertile in such insights,³ but a tendency to justify recorded action often paralyzes judgment. Studies abound which are efforts to correlate voting behavior with social origins or to describe legislative bloc voting,⁴ but these, though suggestive and sometimes brilliant, lack the vitality of dealing with the living flesh or are methodologically involved. The need is for studies which rely on ever more precise interviewing techniques, striving for scientific accuracy but not sacrificing communicability to methodology.

The relation of public opinion to the legislator has been investigated in a wide variety of ways, but the circuit of public-opinion-to-legislator-to-vote, though it invites comparable attention, has gone a-begging. Perhaps the oldest and stormiest quarrel of academician and practitioner alike in respect to the bases of democratic government is concerned with the theory of representation. Whether the elected legislator is in fact a representative, chosen by his constituency to exercise his own judgment as to the issues debated, or simply a delegate whose electors never suspend the operation of their own sovereignty and who rightfully expect him without modification to execute their mandates—this is a question that has never been finally settled.

This problem is of interest to the student of public opinion as well as political theorists, yet those who reflect on public opinion realize that it vastly oversimplifies the problem. Voting behavior typically illustrates neither theory of representation but almost certainly represents only the end product in an involved process which throughout is exposed to a variety of influences. The legislator certainly may be regarded as expressing an opinion by his vote, but whether it is his own, his constituents', his party leader's,

est market and selling in the dearest. It is not derogatory to the function and dignity of parliaments to say this. . . ."

³ See such classics as Blaine's *Twenty Years of Congress* and Champ Clark's *My Quarter Century of America Politics*, and more recently, the studies of American politicians by J. T. Salter and James Farley's *Behind the Ballots*.

⁴ See H. C. Beyle, *Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster Blocs* and especially the studies of Harold F. Gosnell.

a pressure group's, or that of a persuasive colleague—this must be determined by investigation.

The importance of a continuing assessment of the influences which determine a legislator's votes should not be underestimated. Such factors constitute the real dynamics of the political process and may be viewed profitably in terms of the effects they produce as well as in the circumstances attending their inception. This is the problem which we here seek to investigate.

SPECIAL SESSION OF SEPTEMBER 1939

An opportunity to undertake such a study with functioning public persons presented itself with the reassembling of the Congress in special session on September 21, 1939, to consider the repeal of the arms embargo. Investigation of both Senate and House votes was first contemplated, but the lateness of the hour and the fact that the House, where the process of voting is always cloaked in especial obscurity, might offer a more productive study, led to the decision to confine analysis to the latter group.

For thirteen Congressmen, data were gathered by personal interview. For a remaining eighty-three, the material was collected from persons who are presumed to be exceptionally accurate observers with respect to the behavior of particular Congressmen.

Of the thirteen members personally interviewed, seven are Democrats (three Southern Democrats and four New Dealers), six are Republicans. Their length of service varies from one to eleven terms, and the group average is 4.3 terms. Three are from the South, one from the Southwest, three from the Pacific Coast, three from the Middle West, and three from the East. The seven Democrats and one Republican voted for repeal of the Neutrality Law; five Republicans voted for retention.

It will perhaps be useful to recall the setting for our study. For several weeks preceding the actual call to reassemble, Congressmen and the nation had been exposed to newspaper and radio reports filled with the dramatic recital of the events moving so swiftly in Europe. The President's reaction and his expressed determination to see the repeal of the embargo were given wide publicity before the final announcement of the date set for the

reconvening of Congress. On that occasion (September 21) the President addressed Congress and the country, specifically asking repeal.

Most of the Congressmen, appalled by the complexity of the issue and moved as Congressmen seldom are moved, were dancing gingerly on the fence, anxiously observing first the public opinion polls and then their mail, which was approaching flood proportions. Meanwhile, they agitatedly sounded every visitor whose advice they respected. Even the professors of international law had their day—and proceeded to contradict one another with the usual vigor of skilled symbol manipulators. Rumor spread: the House, traditionally more responsive to their constituents than the Senate, was considering a bolt from the President's program. The columnists, heavy supporters of the President on this issue, swung into action, and the Congressmen's mail favoring retention was stigmatized as "inspired propaganda" or the effusion of ignorant hysterics. Congressmen were exhorted to do their duty; the polls were cited as indicating that the torrent of mail favoring retention was obviously unrepresentative.

Meanwhile, the mail (which we shall analyze in detail later) had several interesting results, one of which was to encourage the isolationists' fight and the other to influence the tactics of the forces managing the administration's bill—in the latter case to persuade those responsible for the bill's passage to relinquish less essential provisions of the bill and concentrate on lifting the arms embargo. The House membership received its greatest deluge of mail when the session first opened, and before the Senate had disposed of the bill, although there was another brief flurry when the bill moved from the Senate to the House. In the meantime, debate was desultory in the House until one Congressman read a prepared speech allegedly handed him by the State Department, precipitating a debate on international law, about which the member knew very little. A hot discussion ensued and, from that point on, debate waxed furiously if not cogently. After the bill came from the Senate, nearly everything had been said, either by the Senate or the House membership, and thus a few days of debate sufficed to bring

on the first votes on amendments, which clearly predicted the ultimate outcome.

CONGRESSMEN ARE HUMAN

Turning to the individual Congressmen, what factors do we discover to be most influential in determining their vote? One instructive truth to be derived from a study such as this is that motivations in the case of Congressmen are often as tangled and inscrutable as with other human beings. One realizes that the Congressman, with his agonized twistings, his "deals," his indecisions and his breast-beatings, simply mirrors the ill humors and doubts that rack the body politic.

Consider first by what steps the Congressman usually reaches his decision. Seldom is it an inductive process; on the contrary, the party system usually provides all but a select few who determine the party's position (when this is not laid down at the White House or the party's National Committee) with an orthodox answer. Thus the member's problem is rather less often to *arrive* at a decision than to *justify* a predetermined decision.

Likewise of some moment is the question often begged by the public opinion polls. Even without quibbling, can it be said that the Congressman really *knows* what factors have determined his vote? If the momentary bewilderment manifested by the different subjects interviewed may be attributed to anything more than surprise at the irreverence or effrontery of the question asked, it was certainly because it was difficult for them to state precisely, without benefit of rhetoric, the part played by the various factors that influenced their decisions.

On the basis of the data yielded by the interviews, seven categories of motivation were constructed, roughly representative of the types most frequently mentioned, both in popular speech and the interviews. The first three, (a) the "honest vote," or "voting one's convictions"; (b) the party line; and (c) pressure (excluding party pressure) are by all odds the most important. These classifications are by no means exclusive; in many instances they may be (and were) intertwined, but insistent interviewing can usually separate them. For the thirteen members personally interviewed, we arrive at the following results:

Factors Determining Congressmen's Votes

(Ranked as to Importance for 13 Members Personally Interviewed)

	<i>1st</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>3rd</i>
Independent Judgment	12	—	—
Constituents' Wishes	—	7	1
Views of Public Leaders	1	3	—
Public Opinion Polls	—	1	2
House Colleagues' Influence	—	1	3
Party Considerations	4	—	2
*Presidential Leadership	1	—	2

* Excluding party considerations.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that 12 out of 13 of those interviewed stoutly maintained the primary importance of independent judgment. As of secondary importance, a wider spread was recorded, 7 citing the wishes of their constituents, 3 the views of active and outstanding political leaders of the day, 1 the public opinion polls and 1 the influence of colleagues. Third in importance they ranked the influence of colleagues (3), the polls (2), party considerations (2), and Presidential leadership (2). One member did not admit the influence of *any* factor save his own pristine convictions; two others cited secondary factors but no tertiary ones. Considerations of space unfortunately limit the discussion of the various sub-elements which entered into the factors outlined ("Independent judgment," for example, was a compound of early training, nationality, war experience, etc., or in short, independent judgment was quite naturally compounded of all experiences to which the individual had been exposed.) "Presidential leadership" has reference to such leadership, excluding considerations of party.

Several points are of interest. The prominence accorded to the factor of independent judgment strains one's credulity. On the other hand, one might have expected the importance assigned to the views of constituents. Perhaps one of the most interesting points revealed by the table is the distinctly insignificant position assigned to the public opinion polls. The general tendency was to register interest in, but not reliance on, the polls. One reason for allegedly distrusting the reliability of the polls is obvious: if Congressmen avow publicly their belief in the accuracy of the polls,

they will soon be compelled to face the awkward realities of democratic theory and either accept as a mandate the opinion registered by the polls, or bluntly state their belief in the representative as opposed to the delegate theory of representation. This is politically un-circumspect. In the second place, it cannot be denied that no matter how scientific a poll may be taken, there is always present in the Congressman's mind the suspicion that any national or sectional percentage may not accurately reflect the opinion of the members of his own particular district. ✓

The remarkable insistence that independent judgment was the decisive element is probably natural when Congressmen are faced with an interviewer of dubious antecedents. On the other hand, such an interviewer may, by virtue of the uncritical judgment imputed to him by his subject, obtain considerable information not given to the ordinary correspondent, who is familiar with the subject's prejudices. One Republican, for example, characterized the motives of some of the Democrats very invidiously, and stated that "a secret ballot would show not more than 100 votes for repeal." Similarly, one Democrat slyly described the sad case of Republican Congressman X, who had been "high-pressured" by his party into voting against his own convictions and even the opinions of some of his most influential constituents.

Viewing the results of some of his personal interviews with no feeling of great assurance, the writer decided to check with outside observers on the four men whom he felt had not given him a frank statement of the way they arrived at their decision, since most of the vocabulary used by these members was rather obviously selected with a view to enhancing the dignities of their office. Additional testimony from the outside suggests that all four are regarded primarily in the House as good party men, and that considerations of party, though not necessarily to the derogation of their own honest judgment, played a considerable part in influencing their vote. Thus we might correct the picture as reported in the above table by stating that 7 of those interviewed may with assurance be characterized as guided chiefly by independent judgment (one subject interviewed almost certainly was self-deceived in ignoring the controlling influence exerted by Presidential leader-

ship); 4 were mainly influenced by party considerations, 1 by the statements of public leaders, and 1 by Presidential leadership.

THEIR CONSTITUENTS

Some impressionistic statements with respect to the character of the districts and constituents which the individual Congressmen represent and the possible relation of this factor to their vote will be of interest. In 10 out of 13 instances the members voted in accord with what may be anticipated to represent the national sympathies of their constituents. Those from predominantly Anglo-Saxon districts voted for repeal; those from German districts, for retention. The three who did not follow this pattern were Republicans from predominantly Anglo-Saxon, rural, traditionally isolationist, districts. A rough estimate of those districts chiefly concerned with producing articles for home consumption contrasted with those producing for the export market correlates in 7 out of 10 instances with the voting behavior of these members supporting retention and repeal, respectively. In the remaining 3 instances, a Democrat from a fruit-growing district and a Republican from a dairy farming district voted for repeal, and a Republican from a lumbering district voted for retention. We may likewise note a lack of high correlation between the mailbag and voting behavior. Two Democrats bucked their mailbags to vote for repeal; one Republican did the same. In two other cases, the mail ran nearly 50-50 on the issue. The number of pieces of mail received by the Congressmen varied from 17,000 in the case of a Congressman-at-large, or 5,000 for a member representing a regular district, to 25 (sic) pieces in the case of one Southern Congressman. The sentiment expressed by the mail received by the different members varied from 99 per cent against to 75 per cent in favor of repeal, the total bulk running heavily in favor of retention. Six out of 13 mentioned that a portion of their correspondence was inspired by Father Coughlin, but none credit him with evoking more than 15 per cent of that favoring retention. The activity of Gerald Winrod, Kansas Fundamentalist and Anti-Semitic preacher, was mentioned in 3 cases as inspiring a fraction (5 or 10 per cent at most) of the mail favoring retention, but in only one instance (Southern California) was his influence

important. The German organizations were characterized as influential along the East Coast from Connecticut to New Jersey, and were mentioned in three cases as accounting for a recognizable fraction of the retention mail. In 3 instances, members mentioned the activity of women's clubs on behalf of repeal, while Democratic (and probably Republican) clubs were cited as active in supporting their party's position—to speak loosely of the division that took place on the issue.

MORE DATA NEEDED

After reviewing the data assembled for this small group of personally-interviewed Congressmen, the investigator was driven reluctantly to two conclusions: (1) that with a sample of thirteen Congressmen, even if it were perfectly understood that they were to be regarded only as specimens on exhibition rather than definitive and typical examples, the description of one's experiences would be only a curiosity unless it offered some realistic basis for generalization as to the House membership's voting behavior in general; and (2) that one must devalue any illusions one may cherish as to the accuracy of the impressions obtainable from a personal interview with public persons with whom one is previously unacquainted. Therefore, after some thought, the writer selected two classes of people, both sophisticated in dealing with the legislative process, who, long experience suggests, would be competent to judge the motivations of individual Representatives. These groups consisted of the Congressmen's secretaries and the newspaper correspondents who were regularly assigned to specific members as a daily routine. From these people, further data, of a kind the investigator feels to be highly reliable, were assembled for eighty-three additional Congressmen.

The results obtained by this technique are of considerable interest. As might be expected, the influence of party was here more clearly revealed than in the case of the preceding group, and the explanation for this variation may be almost equally divided, we believe, between general reticence on the part of the first group of Congressmen and the fact (according to the general consensus) that those selected for personal interview were generally more in-

dependent than the majority of the House membership. For this second, and thoroughly representative, sample, we have the following results (tabulated by arbitrarily assessing the factor characterized as of major importance with ten points, that judged as second most influential with five points, the third most influential with three points, and the fourth with one point):

Influential Factors in the Vote of 83 Congressmen

(According to the testimony of secretaries and newspaper correspondents)

	<i>1st</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>3rd</i>	<i>4th</i>	<i>Weighted</i>	<i>Totals</i>
Independent Judgment	38 (380)	15 (65)	3 (9)	0 (0)	454	(41.5%)
Party Considerations	29 (290)	13 (65)	2 (6)	1 (1)	362	(33.0%)
Constituents' Views	13 (130)	14 (70)	4 (12)	0 (0)	212	(19.5%)
Congressional Debates	1 (10)	1 (5)	3 (9)	0 (0)	24	(2.0%)
Peace Lobbyists	0 (0)	1 (5)	2 (6)	0 (0)	11	(1.0%)
Public Leaders	1 (10)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	10	(1.0%)
Particular Newspaper	1 (10)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	10	(1.0%)
War Dept. Influence	0 (0)	2 (10)	0 (0)	0 (0)	10	(1.0%)
	<hr/> 83	<hr/> 46	<hr/> 14	<hr/> 1	<hr/> 1093	

The results, we can see by inspection, closely resemble the corrected totals of the other sample but for the heavy influence accorded to party. It should be added that the correspondents and secretaries, though possessing a reputation for cynicism and tough-mindedness, encountered as much difficulty as the Congressmen themselves in disentangling the elements active in the picture, as well as in assigning them primary, secondary, or tertiary importance.

The factor of independent judgment, we note, is still ranked as of the greatest importance, but party rises from the obscurity to which it was relegated by the preceding group to run a close second for this larger membership sample. Constituents' views are also ranked high, while the other factors cited are relatively insignificant. The table thus presents a picture which agrees very well with general expectations in the matter of voting behavior, even including the primary importance assigned to independent judgment, because, by the unanimous judgment of all observers, this issue was one of those in which an independent attitude was much more

general than is commonly the case. Finally, we note with astonishment that the public opinion polls are not even mentioned!

A few scattered crumbs of evidence as to the verbal justifications utilized by these 83 Congressmen may likewise be adduced at this point. Of those for whom we have a record, a handful of Congressmen saw the issue as demanding a decision which would favor either the forces of dictatorship or democracy. Another larger group was preoccupied with the symbol of keeping out of war. Traditional isolationist symbols appeared perhaps most frequently of all. Some members were chiefly responsive to symbols hostile to the British Empire and one or two imputed collusion between English and American heads of state: "England started this war with the assurance that we would remove the embargo." International law symbols circulated freely, but it is interesting to note that those who most skilfully exploited these symbols (including those introduced by the President and the State Department) were more frequently on the side of retention. Preferences for symbols assumed definite geographical patterns. Congressmen from certain areas of the South, for example, were almost unanimous in exhibiting a preference for the symbols of a reviving American economy which might occur with the lifting of the embargo; while representatives of the Mid-West were still the most vigorous champions of isolationist symbols. (But members from other places, notably California, also exhibited a decided preference for such symbols.) Anti-English symbols of course clustered about Boston as a center (though no member from that city is included in this report) and the German-Scandinavian areas of the Northern Mid-West.

LOOKING INTO THE MAILBAG

The problem of Congressional mail on this issue deserves special attention, and the writer has taken extraordinary pains to perform what, so far as he knows, are the first detailed piece-by-piece Congressional mailbag analyses. Owing to the popular interest generated as a result of various charges with respect to the "inspired" character of the mail on this issue, as well as the essential services to personality (communication, catharsis, externalizations

of fantasy, etc.) provided by this phenomenon in the American political system, it has seemed worthwhile to undertake the very long, tedious and complex task of piece-by-piece analysis for two Congressmen.

First speaking generally concerning the mail on the issue, however, we may note that there existed no consensus on Capitol Hill as to what the mail was supposed to reflect. There were the traditional theories: (1) All such mail originates with chronic letter-writers and cranks. This attitude is summed up in the triumphant question: "Now *you* never wrote a Congressman in your life, did you?" (2) All mail, excluding (1), is "inspired." In proof, it is submitted that many of those who write quite obviously do not understand the question at issue. A case cited is the man who wrote his Congressman, pleading with him to "keep the lumbargo." (3) The Congressman is just a convenient and prominent feature of the public environment, on whom one can displace all kinds of private motives, project one's aggressions or from whom one can extract recognition. (4) Finally, all admit that a small fraction of the correspondence is highly intelligent and often effective in influencing a member's rationalizations, sometimes even his vote. A complete theory of the meaning of Congressional mail would have to include all of these proposed explanations, for certain pieces of mail fit each description. Moreover, the writer feels that the last category has been limited indefensibly to expressions of opinion obviously deriving from educated correspondents.

What can be said as to the mail as a whole which the Congressmen received on this question? First of all, there was a great deal of it. One source reported that an all-time high of incoming mail was reached when Capitol postal authorities handled 487,000 pieces on September 19. On the basis of samples, it is estimated that the House membership received well over a million and a quarter pieces of mail in regard to the embargo issue—letters, postcards and telegrams. For the House as a whole, it probably ran about 5 to 1 in favor of retention. (Senate: 94 per cent for retention.) Estimates of the fraction of the total which was "inspired" fluctuated around 15 per cent to 20 per cent. The volume of correspondence originating in different sections of the country varied

tremendously. The Southern members of Congress, for example, received very light mail on this issue, and the great urban centers did not respond with the volume of mail that one has come to expect from them on burning issues. The Middle West, with its traditional isolationist complex reactivated, produced a tremendous volume of correspondence.

It is interesting to note, however, that this question evoked no greater mail response than at least two other issues raised by the present Administration. The general consensus is that member by member, during this Administration, the Supreme Court issue ranked first in the volume of mail it evoked, the Reorganization Bill second, Embargo repeal third, and probably the Utilities Holding Company Bill fourth. For those preoccupied with ancient history, we may record that even these great inundations may have failed to equal the mighty torrent that streamed forth on the questions of the League of Nations and the World Court.

Passing from general remarks to the two specific mailbags analyzed, we may note that the way in which the mail arrived described two obvious curves, the first, a steep one which rose to its peak on September 19 from a low only a week before. From this peak on the 19th, it dropped rapidly to slightly above normal in two weeks' time, fell even lower in the closing stages of the Senate debates, rose sharply but to no great height on October 27 as the bill went to the House, and then fell away steadily. This is the curve which House mail in general followed and it is true of the two mailbags which were analyzed individually.

THE GENTLEMAN FROM NEW YORK

The first mailbag for which detailed figures are available is that of a Congressman from metropolitan New York. This member received a total of 393 pieces of mail, representing perhaps twice that many persons. Seventy-nine per cent were in favor of the retention of the embargo, and 21 per cent favored repeal. The sex of the writer, contrary to popular report, apparently was not a factor in the position taken by the correspondents. Women constituted only 27 per cent of the correspondents; men and women

alike divided 85.5 per cent to 13.5 per cent for retention. The lachrymose refrain of I-didn't-raise-my-boy-to-be-a-soldier was not nearly so prominent as was alleged by the newspapers. Mothers, or those sufficiently preoccupied with their parental rôles to describe themselves as such, made up less than 1 per cent of the total.

Judging nationality of the writer by name, we discovered that national groups tended to form the pattern described by the newspaper reports—the pattern which would be anticipated on the basis of national origins and the present European alliances. German names deviated from the basic mailbag ratio⁵ by 13 per cent to the side of retention, and this difference has been calculated as statistically significant; Irish were off 8 per cent in the same direction. The greatest deviation was marked in the case of English names, off 25.5 per cent to the side of repeal. This difference was likewise statistically significant. Jewish names were off 6.5 per cent for repeal, Italian names off 16 per cent for retention. The few Czech-Polish names represented were 100 per cent for repeal.

The geographical origin of this mail is of considerable interest. In the first place, the great proportion originated outside the member's district, which is extraordinary. Favoring retention, only 4 per cent came from his own district, while 75 per cent came from the remainder of New York City; 9.5 per cent came from his section of the country, while 11 per cent originated in the rest of the United States. The reasons for this unusual distribution are probably (1) this member has a small district; (2) he is viewed as a special pleader for certain interest and national groups; (3) politically conscious New Yorkers frequently write all the Congressmen from New York City; (4) the presence of a substantial amount of "inspired" mail, from New York City but outside this member's

⁵ The "basic mailbag ratio" is simply the total proportion of letters for and against the embargo in each mailbag (in the case of this New York Congressman's mailbag, 79 per cent for retention and 21 per cent for repeal). If each of the factors for which the correspondence was analyzed (sex, nationality, income, etc.) played no part in influencing the writers' positions, we might expect to discover that the division pro and con for each of these categories divided in approximately the same proportion as the basic division by pieces of mail. Where deviations from this norm (basic ratio) occur, suspicion arises that an influential predisposing factor has been located. Simply for the sake of the record, deviations from the basic ratio have been noted in every case, even where not statistically significant by rigid mathematical standards.

district, has been ascertained. The mail favoring repeal followed the same general pattern except for that received from the member's geographical section and the rest of the United States, where there were noted 19.5 per cent and 7.5 per cent deviations from the basic ratio in favor of repeal.

Data in 95 cases were obtained as to the income status of the writers on the side of retention, and in 39 instances for those favoring repeal. The figures are trustworthy only for those of upper income status, since the more wealthy correspondents are in almost every instance impossible to mistake (on the basis of occupation, residential area, fine-stock monogrammed stationery) while the remainder, without further investigation by median rental areas, etc., cannot be rated accurately. Confining ourselves to those at the upper level, we may record the fact that there was a deviation of 8 per cent from the basic ratio in favor of repeal. This figure is by calculation likewise statistically significant.

Rather complete data were obtained on the apparent level of education represented by the correspondence on the basis of the investigator's subjective evaluations, guided by the vocabulary, spelling and conceptual analysis of the writers. On the side of retention, of the correspondents that could be classified, those at the upper educational level showed a deviation of 14.5 per cent for repeal; those at the middle level a deviation of 14 per cent for retention; those at the lower level a deviation of 12.5 per cent for retention. For those at the upper level only, however, is the difference statistically significant.

The symbols used by the writers in justification for their viewpoints offer a splendid opportunity to explore the fascinating problem of language and politics, but space limitations restrict us to a simple tabulation of the key symbols around which the supporters of retention and repeal gravitated. The 25 basic symbols here recorded were obtained by a consolidation of a schedule including some 200-odd arguments offered by the correspondents. Each letter was carefully read and each argument offered was checked under its heading on the schedule. Here appears only the consolidated tabulation by basic symbols.

Basic Symbols Appearing in N.Y. Member's Mail

(Number and percentage of letters mentioning these symbols)

	<i>Retain</i> *	<i>Repeal</i> †
Keep Out of War	183 (60%)	28 (33%)
Distrust of Administration	96 (31%)	10 (12%)
Evil of Credit	18 (6%)	1 (1%)
Fear of Propaganda	16 (5%)	—
Keep U.S. Bulwark of Liberty	53 (17%)	9 (11%)
U.S. is a Democracy	59 (19%)	2 (2.5%)
Necessity of Preparedness	7 (2.5%)	3 (3.5%)
Out with Partisanship!	4 (1.5%)	4 (5%)
Take Profits Out of War	61 (20%)	8 (9.5%)
(& other "radical" economic demands)		
Isolation the Salvation	90 (29%)	1 (1%)
<i>Strengthen</i> All or Part of the		
Embargo Laws	34 (11%)	8 (9.5%)
Pacifist, Christian Arguments	55 (18%)	—
Maintain Neutrality	69 (22%)	1 (1%)
100% Americanism	70 (23%)	27 (32%)
Follow International Law	—	6 (7%)
Trust the President	1 (—)	3 (3.5%)
Remember 1917!	65 (21%)	2 (2.5%)
I Speak for the Majority	24 (8%)	15 (18%)
War for Civilization	2 (—)	24 (29%)
Europe is Incurable	18 (6%)	3 (3.5%)
Perfidious Albion	29 (9.5%)	1 (1%)
Nazi Menace	3 (1%)	44 (52.5%)
GB, Defender of Democracy	—	23 (27%)
Internationalism the Salvation	3 (1%)	14 (16.5%)
Economically Beneficial	2 (—)	3 (3.5%)

* The percentages in this column indicate the proportion of letters advocating retention of the embargo which employed each type of symbol.

† The percentages in this column indicate the proportion of letters favoring repeal which employed each type of symbol.

THE GENTLEMAN FROM CALIFORNIA

Turning to the mail of the member from Southern California, of 1,116 pieces of mail (representing perhaps twice as many persons as letters), 78 per cent were in favor of retention and 22 per cent in favor of repeal (which established the basic ratio for this member's mailbag). This ratio, we note, is within 1 per cent of that recorded for the member from New York City. Tabulation by sex

of writer, however, reveals that for this district women were more heavily represented than is traditional with Congressional mail. Still, the final figures disclose that only 747 women as against 824 men were represented. Favoring retention, there were 660 women and 598 men, or a deviation from the basic ratio of 7.5 per cent to the side of retention. On the other hand, 226 men and 87 women are represented in favor of repeal. Thus women, instead of constituting 52 per cent of the writers (retention), now represent only 27 per cent, and deviate 7 per cent from the basic ratio to the side of retention. This is statistically significant by calculation. Of those women in favor of retention, only 2.5 per cent of the total stated they were mothers (though the presence of close relatives of military age was mentioned in 65 cases), while no mothers were recorded among those in favor of repeal. Thus, in contrast to the mail from the member from New York City, we see that women (though not necessarily mothers) markedly deviated to the side of retention.

National groups line up less perfectly according to our theory of natural sympathies in the case of this member's mailbag. The main outlines, however, are still clear. German names differ from the basic ratio by 9.5 per cent on the side of retention (this is statistically significant), but English are off only 2.5 per cent in favor of repeal. Polish-Czech names deviate 47.2 per cent to repeal, Italians show no deviation, and the traditionally less anti-British California Irish are off a fraction to the side of repeal.

The geographical origin of this member's mail exhibits striking differences from that of the New York Congressman. The overwhelming majority of the correspondence, as is normal, comes from within his district. From the district came 54.5 per cent of those favoring retention, 57 per cent of those favoring repeal; from adjacent districts, 31 per cent of those favoring retention, 34 per cent for repeal; from the member's geographical section, 8 per cent were from those favoring retention, 6.5 per cent from those for repeal; originating elsewhere, 6.5 per cent for retention, 3 per cent for repeal. The higher proportion of those supporting retention originating outside of his district may indicate, as other evidence suggests, that this Congressman was regarded by many as a po-

tential leader in the fight to retain the embargo. Such persons, even from outside his district, might hope to secure a favorable hearing on the basis of a common viewpoint.

Wealthy correspondents are again perceptibly more heavily represented in favor of repeal (8 per cent deviation from the basic ratio—a statistically significant difference), while the spread for those writers who could be classified on the score of education discloses the following pattern: upper level, 3 per cent deviation to the side of repeal; middle level, 3 per cent deviation off for retention; lower level, 4.5 per cent off for retention.

What were the arguments, who the saints and sinners, according to the symbols used by these correspondents? There are marked differences from the tabulation for the New York Congressman.

"INSPIRED" MAIL

In discussing the highly complex question of inspired mail, we must fearfully compress both theory and data. All mail, of course, is inspired by exposure to symbols somewhere. Frequently a Congressman who desires to oppose sentiment in his community without boldly declaring that he wishes to substitute his considered judgment for that of his constituents simply states that his mail is "inspired," or "does not reflect the true sentiment of his community." Putting aside, however, the whole question of the just part that inspired mail *should* play in influencing the Congressman, we may agree that "inspired" mail comprises only that mail, *maintaining a particular point of view, which would not have been written but for the specific urging of some person or persons unknown or suspected*. Some of the people and groups most frequently alleged to have been responsible for the flood of Congressional mail favoring retention have been Father Coughlin, the Communist Party, the German-American organizations, the peace societies, etc. Favoring repeal, however, other less active groups also functioned to "inspire" mail. The League of Women Voters, the League of Nations Association, the "munition makers," the Liberty League, etc., helped to swell the mail for repeal.

The publicity given to Coughlin-inspired mail has suggested an amount and influence which this investigator could at no point document for the House of Representatives. The usual means of establishing the identity of such mail is by correlating sudden deluges of mail with a Coughlin radio address, or by noting remarkable similarities of language. To establish any such proposi-

Basic Symbols Appearing in So. Calif. Member's Mail

(Number* and percentage of letters mentioning these symbols)

	<i>Retain†</i>	<i>Repeal‡</i>
Keep Out of War	242 (28%)	56 (25%)
Distrust of the Administration	97 (11%)	21 (8.5%)
Evil of Credit	35 (4%)	7 (3%)
Fear of Propaganda	21 (2.5%)	11 (4.5%)
Keep U.S. Bulwark of Liberty	44 (5%)	12 (5%)
U.S. is a Democracy	50 (5.5%)	9 (3.5%)
Necessity of Preparedness	14 (1.5%)	8 (3%)
Out with Partisanship!	8 (1%)	7 (3%)
Take Profits Out of War (& related "radical" economic demands)	128 (14.5%)	16 (6.5%)
Isolation the Salvation	127 (14.5%)	8 (3%)
<i>Strengthen</i> All or Part of the		
Embargo Laws	106 (12%)	13 (3.5%)
Pacifist, Christian Arguments	84 (10%)	4 (1.5%)
Maintain Neutrality	66 (7.5%)	5 (2%)
100% Americanism	40 (4.5%)	27 (11%)
Follow International Law	10 (1.5%)	17 (6.5%)
Trust the President	3 (—)	50 (20.5%)
Remember 1917!	69 (8%)	6 (2.5%)
I Speak for the Majority	46 (5%)	41 (17%)
War for Civilization	—	19 (8%)
Europe is Incurable	22 (2.5%)	1 (—)
Perfidious Albion	44 (5%)	3 (1%)
Nazi Menace	2 (—)	47 (19%)
GB, Champion of Democracy	—	50 (20.5%)
Internationalism the Salvation	—	14 (6%)
Economically Beneficial	2 (—)	12 (5%)

* 74 letters took no position on the embargo. They asked simply to be kept out of war.

† The percentages in this column indicate the proportion of letters advocating retention of the embargo which employed each type of symbol.

‡ The percentages in this column indicate the proportion of letters favoring repeal which employed each type of symbol.

tion convincingly, these factors must be considered together. In rare instances, more scientific data were available by checking a large volume of suspected Coughlin-inspired mail against districts of known Coughlin sympathizers. This technique, in a few scattered instances, led the investigator to believe that the generalization that the priest's followers are drawn heavily from the poorer and less educated classes apparently holds up under objective analysis; but the huge volume of mail attributed to his influence seems to be impossible to substantiate. In the two mailbags here closely scrutinized, we may state that in one (New York), only a dozen-odd letters almost certainly inspired by Father Coughlin could be detected, while in the correspondence of the Southern California member, the Coughlin influence was negligible. On the other hand, Gerald Winrod played an active part in inspiring a fraction of the mail favoring retention which may have run as high as 10 per cent in California, but his influence could not be detected in New York.

Inspired mail generally accounted for much less of the correspondence than newspaper accounts of the day suggested. In New York, 19 per cent in favor of retention (Coughlin, German groups, Communists) and 6 per cent in favor of repeal (unknown) were recorded as inspired; in the case of the member from Southern California, 13 per cent in favor of retention (Winrod, German groups, Hearst newspapers, Quakers and pacifist groups generally) and 29 per cent in favor of repeal (aircraft companies, international relations groups, Democratic clubs, etc.) were recorded as inspired. This very high proportion of inspired mail for repeal is attributable to a form postcard campaign of an airplane factory.

Another means, imprecise but suggestive, of determining how genuine the mail was on this issue was to note the proportion of *personal* letters, telegrams and postcards on each side of the question. (*Personal* refers to non-form correspondence signed individually by persons.) By this criterion, 71.5 per cent of the New York member's mail for retention, and 56.0 per cent of his mail for repeal, was personal. The California member's mail, classified in the same way, showed personal communications to represent 87 per cent of the mail supporting retention and 59 per cent of that

supporting repeal. Such classification, however, actually does not yield data on "inspired," but rather on "pressure" mail. These two kinds of mail, though both regarded as lacking genuineness, must be distinguished. Another way of recording the character of the forces opposed to and in favor of lifting the embargo is to note which organizations aligned themselves on each side of the issue. Thus, for the New York City member, organizations, in contrast to individuals, deviated 29 per cent from the basic mailbag ratio to the side of repeal, with, especially, business organizations heavily on the side of repeal. The mail of the Southern California member revealed that organizations deviated 15 per cent in the same direction, and that business firms were likewise especially active in favor of repeal.

Summarizing, we may cast a rapid glimpse over the field of both voting behavior and the mail:

One is driven to the conclusion that basically the mail was a sincere and accurate picture of how the letter-writing electorate felt about the lifting of the embargo. Those who wrote did not want the embargo lifted, basically because they thought it would lead to war, but likewise because they were not certain that all the blame lay on one side, and because they feared the effects, economic, political and moral, of a war boom. It is true that they did not seem to grasp that there was no necessary sequential order in the two phenomena of lifting the embargo and war. As usual, national origins apparently played some part in determining their attitudes. By and large the more wealthy and educated classes were relatively more favorably disposed toward lifting the embargo, but even within these classes, there were numbered more supporters of retention than repeal.

VOTING BY "CONVICTION"

There is no escaping the conclusion that the Congressmen were primarily motivated on this particular issue by personal conviction (whatever may be the character of the process that produces conviction). Nor can it be denied that Congressmen, like the majority of Americans, felt the prime desideratum to be that of peace for America. On the other hand, it is possible to exag-

gerate the weight of this consideration. Party, for example, played a much more vital rôle than one might have been led to believe by the suggestions of the early reports, when the drama of the situation was highlighted ("Every man a statesman") by press and radio. Party is always a potent factor, and may be expected to be the more so when issues are confused, as they were in this case. The amount of influence which on the basis of past experience mail was expected to exert, was overestimated. Probably more than half of the Congressmen voted against the expressed opinion of their constituents as judged by their mailbags, and many votes were based on little more than a slogan. Considering the bewildering complexity of the questions involved, it is with no sense of superiority but profound sympathy and understanding that we close by recording the fact that one member made his decision when a newspaper reporter wrote out a fifteen-word statement that looked so well in print and offered such a peaceful refuge from the agonies of indecision that the Congressman adopted and maintained it as his own.

The opinions of U.S. voters regarding embargo repeal are reported in another article in this issue, "Influences of World Events on U.S. 'Neutrality' Opinion."

THE TRIBULATIONS OF A WAGE-HOUR ADMINISTRATOR

By **ELMER F. ANDREWS**

From August 1938 until his resignation last October, the author served as the first Wage and Hour Administrator, responsible for the administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In setting up a new governmental agency, and enforcing a new law, he faced many problems involving public opinion and public relations. In this article he recounts some of these and tells what he did about them. The author is now associated with Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., as consultant on personnel practices.

“We believe in the principles of the Wage and Hour Act, but opposed its adoption because we considered it just another step in governmental interference with private industry.” Such was the tenor of comments the writer heard from most business men at the time of his appointment as the first Federal Wage and Hour Administrator. Usually these remarks were qualified by the undoubtedly wishful hope, “But it won’t be too bad if not administered too bureaucratically.” These same men offered the Administrator help and assured him of compliance.

Congress had appropriated only \$400,000 for the enforcement of the Act in the forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the territories. Of this sum, \$50,000 was allotted to the Children’s Bureau of the Department of Labor. Consequently, we of the Wage and Hour Division avidly seized the offer of assistance from business. Perhaps we proceeded from the start with the term “business appeasement” in mind. However, when we interpreted the Act so that it covered thousands of workers whom others claimed were exempt, there was enough criticism to assure us that we were not unduly pro-industry. Such interpretations had to do primarily with the exemption of workers engaged in the first processing of agricultural products in the area of production, the exemption of employees in executive, administrative and professional positions, and of workers engaged in seasonal industry. We were told by some Members of Congress—all of whom had voted against the

Act—that Congress had intended to exempt all white-collar workers; and by others that anywhere in the United States where nuts were customarily shipped to be shelled constituted an area of production.

When the author started work as Wage and Hour Administrator on August 16, 1938, there were already thousands of letters waiting to be answered. Some asked for interpretations of the Act. An even larger number asked for jobs, and most of the applicants were without civil service status, even though the Act requires that employees of the Division be taken from the civil service registers. This was a wise provision, but it did prevent setting up overnight an organization which could expeditiously handle this accumulation of mail. At least two weeks passed before there was anyone but the Administrator on the payroll of the Division. In the interim, his secretary, personnel officer, and several stenographers and clerks were loaned to him by other federal agencies.

PRELIMINARY EDUCATION

The Act was to take effect on October 24, 1938, which was only a little more than two months from the date the Administrator assumed his duties. Consequently, it was apparent that preliminary educational work for the benefit of employers and employees who would be subject to the Act had to be conducted on a mass-production basis. An Information Branch was established for this purpose. As the rules and regulations were promulgated and legal interpretations issued, this branch released them to the newspapers, which gave them generous space. Some of the news services carried a series of daily articles on the interpretation of the Act, usually in the form of questions and answers. So also did a number of trade journals. Realizing our shortage of funds and personnel, trade organizations and chambers of commerce printed or mimeographed much of our material for distribution to their members and others. Five million small booklets in question-and-answer form, prepared for the benefit of the workers, were distributed by labor and trade organizations, the U.S. Employment Service, the Social Security Board, the National Emergency Council, and state departments of labor.

The broadcasting companies were liberal in allotting time to the Division. Our requests for radio time were always granted and often the broadcasters themselves took the initiative in asking us to use the air. On October 23, 1938, the eve of the Act's effectiveness, two of the major companies gave us fifteen minutes to broadcast on a nationwide hook-up, while the third broadcast a program for us on October 24. The key men we sent into the field were encouraged to talk over local stations and some transcribed programs were broadcast.

In the early days of the Act, press conferences were held as often as twice a week. The Administrator appointed a committee of three correspondents assigned to cover the Wage and Hour Division to advise on the timing of press conferences, the news value of releases, and other matters relating to the press.

What influence this publicity had on public opinion is difficult to gauge. Known results were that requests for more simple interpretations of the Act fell off sharply and that the Gallup poll showed that 71 per cent of the voting public approved the Act in January 1939, as compared with 69 per cent when the Act was passed in June of 1938.

THE INDUSTRY COMMITTEES

The work of the industry committees brought the Division into closer contact with labor and industry than perhaps any other of its activities. The Act requires the Administrator to appoint industry committees as soon as possible to recommend minimum wages for the various industries which would be higher than the statutory rates but not to exceed forty cents an hour. There was about an equal demand from labor and trade organizations for the appointment of these committees. As an example of the complications encountered, employers in the battery industry wanted a small committee of nine appointed, which we were assured could meet and within an hour offer its recommendation for a forty cent minimum wage, the highest the Act allowed. Unfortunately the procedure of an industry committee is not as simple as that. Some of the economists thought that batteries might better be classified in the larger field of electrical goods.

One of the persistent problems was that of priority. There were so many things to be done, and so many forms of pressure to begin everywhere at once, while we knew we must concentrate on those industries with the largest number of low paid workers. Textiles naturally came to mind in this regard. So it was planned that this industry should have industry committee No. 1—just as in NRA days, when it adopted the first code.

A representative group of employers and employees from the cotton, rayon, silk and wool branches of the industry were invited to Washington in September to discuss the make-up of the industry committee and the classification of the textile industry. Under the Act the Administrator has the duty of defining and classifying the various industries, but representatives of the subdivisions of the industry were asked to advise. In the case of textiles, it was decided that the wool branch of the industry should have a separate committee, but several of its members also served on the general textile committee.

With due regard to geographical considerations, the members of the committee were then selected. It seemed sensible to create as small a committee as possible, so at first it was decided to limit the textile committee to eighteen members. However, to make certain that Southern cotton textile manufacturers were adequately represented, the number was later increased to twenty-one. Even so, a roar immediately went up because the Southwest had no employer on the committee, despite the fact that in an appeasement effort a public representative from Texas had been appointed and assurance had been given that the Southwestern employers would have ample opportunity to be heard before the committee during its deliberations. Had the Southwest, with less than 2 per cent of the spindles of the country, been given an employer representative, it would have been necessary to enlarge the committee greatly in order to keep the proper geographical balance.

LABOR REPRESENTATION

But if deciding on employer representation was difficult, that of appointing labor representatives was more so. The CIO insisted that all the labor members be chosen from its ranks, but to appoint

the first industry committee without any A.F. of L. members would have been, at the least, an un-neutral act. Then the question arose of the proportion of members from each union.

One suggestion was that some of the labor members be appointed from the unorganized ranks, but, short of asking employers to suggest non-union workers, the problem of selecting such representatives was a poser. Another idea was to appoint two industry committees simultaneously—textiles with all CIO members and tobacco with all A.F. of L. members—but the need for a tobacco committee was not as immediately pressing.

Fortunately when the make-up of the textile committee was finally announced, there was little public denunciation from labor or other organizations, although the writer has no doubt that neither the A.F. of L. nor CIO was particularly pleased with the amount of its representation on the committee.

In November of 1938 the Information Branch decided that the Administrator should accept some of the many invitations he had received to appear before business groups throughout the country. Before this he had made few public appearances and then only before meetings of organizations of nationwide scope, such as the A.F. of L. convention in Houston and a meeting of the Cotton Textile Institute in New York.

"ON THE ROAD"

Beginning Thanksgiving night, the western trip took about eighteen days. Fifteen major cities were visited by rail and air in the Middlewest, and the Rocky Mountain and Pacific States.

The first meeting was in Chicago, at a dinner given under the auspices of the Illinois Manufacturing Association, with about 1,600 in attendance. This occasion is mentioned because one of the employees who attended wrote to Washington several months later to inquire whether his employer should pay him for the time spent at the dinner under the Division ruling that workers must be paid for compulsory attendance at employees' meetings related to their work. Those who have heard the author speak will hope that this man got his money—and at the rate of time and a half for overtime.

The interest of business men in the Act was indicated by the large attendance at these various meetings, most of which were luncheons arranged by chambers of commerce and other business groups. Those in the Division who arranged the trip had asked that local labor leaders be invited by the sponsoring organization and they were always present. In several cases it was the first time that union men had entered the hallowed halls of a chamber of commerce.

The Wage and Hour men in the field at this time may have been few in number but they were strong in energy. Between speaking engagements they had planned meetings with labor and industrial groups, usually in hotel conference rooms. These energetic field men, as well as the National Emergency Council representatives in the various states, scheduled these meetings to begin the moment the writer and his assistant arrived in town and sometimes they would run until midnight. On one occasion a business group got on the train before breakfast to ride with us until they had discussed their problems.

At Spokane, where the train made a fifteen-minute stop, the Administrator was taken from the train to broadcast extemporaneously into a microphone set up in the station waiting room, while a group of high school students gleefully looked on.

Press conferences were usually held upon our arrival in each city and proved very helpful. From the newspapermen we could gain some idea of the relative progressiveness of the group we were to meet and also find out who the key men of the town were.

In Omaha the writer even learned from the press the section of the city in which his wife was born. At breakfast he met the news men and was photographed eating a grapefruit, which had become the standard pose of the trip. It occurred to him that it might be a good idea to let the news leak out that his wife had been an Omaha girl, but he had forgotten the street on which she had lived. So he asked the newspapermen which was currently the best part of town, and that became his wife's birthplace. When he checked up at home, he found that he had not been too far afield.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

We started the trip with a batch of "canned" speeches but, except when on the air, these were discarded in favor of the question-and-answer technique. Whether questions were to be written out or asked from the floor was left to the chairman who usually knew whether there were many speechmakers, as distinguished from questioners, in the audience. Those asking questions enjoyed trying to put the bureaucrat from Washington on the spot. In using the question-and-answer technique, the speaker knows that at least an audience of one—the questioner—is interested in what he is saying.

There is much to be said in favor of prepared talks, however. In Denver we discovered the harm that an extemporaneous remark can do if misinterpreted. The writer was asked what the Division would do if an employee worked overtime without the knowledge of his boss. "Well," I replied, "if the boss didn't know of it—it is unlikely that we would ever hear of it."

"That doesn't answer my problem," said the gentleman. "I mean, what should I do if an employee sneaks back to work without permission and then, after accumulating a lot of overtime, tries to collect time and a half for it?"

The reply was that this seemed to be a matter of management. If a worker insisted on quitting an hour early every day, against orders, he undoubtedly would be discharged. If one, contrary to instructions, worked overtime without the boss's knowledge in order, perhaps, to sue him later for overtime pay—he should be fired as well.

A local paper the next day had this to say on the story of the meeting: "Andrews says anyone who wants to work overtime should be fired."

When we returned to Washington the editorials about this were coming in and not one was complimentary. One columnist used all his space to deal with this shocking example of the loose thinking so typical of the New Deal. (These may not have been his exact words—but they give the idea.) The columnist went on

to say that it was men like the Wage and Hour Administrator who were stifling the initiative and ambition of the youth of America. Just think—a young fellow who wanted to make good with his employer by working a bit harder than the average should be fired for it!

COMPLAINTS OF LENIENCY

There has been criticism of the Wage and Hour Division for not cracking down harder on violators from the day the Act took effect. Some of this criticism was undoubtedly justified. However, it seemed unwise to threaten loudly when we were unable, because of the small size of our staff, to back up such threats with action. A number of statements were issued threatening to get after deliberate violators in order to protect employers complying with the Act from unfair competition. Repeatedly public attention was called to the right of employees to bring civil actions against employers violating the Act, with the possibility of recovering double the amount of the legal wages due under the Act. At the same time the Division asked labor unions to guard against hasty and ill-advised civil actions in order to prevent a poor test case from going up to the Supreme Court. Although no one in the Division had any doubt of the constitutionality of the Act, it was thought desirable to obtain a Supreme Court ruling as soon as possible in order to convince outside Doubting Thomases. Unfortunately, however, all the earlier violators pleaded guilty.

Critics of the Wage and Hour Division have also claimed that more industry committees should have been appointed and that the Administrator should have seen to it that the existing committees made their recommendations sooner than they did. To the first criticism, the limited staff is also an answer. We did not want important people coming to Washington without an adequate staff to give them proper service. As to the second point—that the Administrator should have hurried the committees—he felt that the law intended them to act independently of him and free of his influence, once they were set up and had gone to work.

PREMATURE ATTEMPT AT CHANGE

A mistake was made in trying to amend the Act early in 1939 through the Administration-endorsed Norton Bill, which would have corrected some of the more troublesome difficulties which had arisen in the administration of the law. Public opinion seemed to suggest the attempt, but the effort proved premature. When the Norton Bill was introduced, the general reaction to it seemed favorable. The press pointed to the Wage and Hour Division as one federal agency which was willing to admit that the administrative and other features of the Act could be improved and was not afraid to attempt to secure improvements at the first opportunity.

Opinion was that the Norton amendments would be passed by Congress, but that was before the groups posing as representing the farmers swung into action in opposition to the Norton Bill and introduced the Barden amendments. The Barden Bill would have exempted from the Act nearly all workers engaged in the first processing of agricultural commodities, whether in the area of production or not, and also all salaried employees earning more than \$100 per month, thus depriving an estimated 1,100,000 additional workers of the benefits of the Wage and Hour Act.

Even though the Barden Bill did not pass, it is evident that opening up the question of amending the Wage and Hour Act through the premature introduction of the Norton Bill resulted in a stalemate, fatal not only to the Barden Bill but also to the much needed Norton amendments. Thus the attempt to amend the Act at such an early date proved to be in error, in throwing the problem of amendments into the arena before the Washington and field staffs of the Division had the opportunity to enlist support for the Norton Bill from interested organizations throughout the country. Business groups favoring the bill also failed to give proper support soon enough after its introduction.

Some of the opposition undoubtedly arose from misunderstanding of the Norton amendments, which could have been cleared up by preliminary educational work. For example, we discovered an important group of fruit packers in California last August who had been badly and perhaps intentionally misinformed about the bill in order to gain support for the emasculating Barden amend-

ment. When the Norton hour provisions were explained to their representatives, they agreed that the exemptions provided in the Norton Bill were exactly what they wanted.

PATRONAGE AND PUBLIC OPINION

If Congressional, business and labor support is to be forthcoming, a large part of the time of those administering a new act and creating a new agency must be given to interviews with Members of Congress, industrialists, labor leaders, and applicants for key positions. We tried to schedule these appointments promptly and to hold them on time. Even though the Act clearly provided that employees of the Division must have civil service status, it was difficult to convince many Members of Congress of this fact when they sought jobs for non-civil service constituents. Those who did realize it, we are sure, had a more comfortable time with their constituents—particularly those who used standard form-letters setting forth the truth in replying to job seekers.

Life in Washington for legislators and administrators will be happier when Members of Congress and others interested in patronage leave the handling of it to the national committee of the political party in power. This is on the assumption that the principle of patronage is politically sound—a subject which the writer happily has not been asked to discuss. However, if patronage must exist, let the headaches connected with it be properly concentrated.

Seemingly trivial factors may have a profound influence on public opinion with respect to a new agency such as the Wage and Hour Division, and I dare not guess what effect may have been produced by the photographs of the Administrator and of the piles of accumulated correspondence in the early days of the Act. Some of these pictures actually made the author appear even more idiotic than an I.Q. test would indicate. A picture on the cover of *Time* portraying the Administrator with hand to head—a sort of scratching gesture—stimulated a number of expressions of sympathy, along with several perplexing requests for interpretations of the law.

TELLING THE STOCKHOLDERS

By DICKSON HARTWELL

The author urges that corporations employ reports to stockholders as public relations devices to consolidate the corporation's "first line of defense"—the opinions of its stockholders. Reports of leading corporations are examined and criticized and criteria for effective reports are suggested. The author has been engaged in public relations work for business, educational and philanthropic organizations for the past ten years and is now a partner in the firm of Hartwell, Jobson and Kibbee, New York and Chicago public relations counsel. He has written a number of articles on business and business practices.

John Brown lifted puzzled eyes from the small type of the annual report of the XYZ Company which he held in his hand.

"I'm sorry, Mary," he said. "I guess I'll have to go back to school. It's all Greek to me."

"Try reading it once more, John," said his wife. "Read it slowly . . . out loud. Maybe we'll get it then."

John sighed and began, intoning each word with the patient enunciation of a schoolboy.

The consolidated fixed capital is comprised of the combined property accounts of the subsidiary companies, which are stated principally at amounts recorded for properties acquired as entireties at various dates determined on the bases of cash paid, par or stated value of securities issued, liabilities assumed and retirement reserves and surpluses taken over, plus additions at cost, less retirements and, as indicated in Note 1 (b) above, \$15,931,530.77 representing the net excess at which investments in securities of consolidated subsidiary companies are carried on the books of the owning companies over the underlying book value thereof, exclusive of earned surplus since dates of acquisition.

"There," he said. "Now you tell me what *that* means!"

"John, you know what I think it means?"

"What?"

"It means that whoever wrote that report either didn't care or didn't want us little stockholders in on their secrets."

"Then why in Heaven's name print a thirty-two page booklet? The only thing I can understand is that the firm showed a profit last year. I don't know how . . . or why . . . or what with. I

don't even know whether it was a good year . . . or a lousy one. And they call that a report!"

The paragraph which perplexed John and Mary Brown was part of an explanation of the year's work sent by one of the most important corporations in America to over 100,000 of its stockholders. It is impressively titled "Report to the Stockholders." Another typical report makes the following facts clear:

To provide for the accounting adjustments above described all the corporate surpluses, both earned and capital, of ABC Company as of January 1, 1939, in the amount of approximately \$75,500,000, and the then existing reserve against certain investments, amounting to approximately \$6,500,000, will first be used, and then the new additional capital surplus created by the reduction in the stated value of the common stock, amounting approximately to \$134,700,000, will be utilized to the extent necessary.

That was printed, along with two solid pages of similar "information," in type so small that no sensible person would read it for long even if he could understand it. After a little bit of that, the average small stockholder is apt to say "hooey" to protests that business is being over-regulated or that the giant corporations really operate in the public interest.

The average stockholder in American corporations is a little man. The overwhelming majority own less than one hundred shares of stock; probably more than half own less than fifty shares and hundreds of thousands own ten or less. They are not financiers and only a very small proportion of them have offices in Wall Street. They are the John and Mary Browns of the country—the thrifty, anxious-to-get-ahead type of citizens who consider their few shares of common stock as much of an investment as their savings account. There are 15,000,000 of them.

FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

In its scramble for protection against tax burdens "imposed" by the federal government and to improve its not too healthy reputation with the public, big business has spent incalculable sums for lobbying, for advertising and on some attempts at public relations. But in doing so, big business has largely overlooked its first line of

defense against unjust attack—the stockholder—the millions of John and Mary Browns of the country who are the real owners of American industry. These people want to defend the political and economic system under which big business operates. Their wealth, however small, is bound up in it. But they have been given no weapons with which to stem the attack. Apparently, management has rarely even thought about them.

Fewer than 2,000 men are really responsible for the destiny of our first hundred corporations. They are called management. They receive salaries and bonuses totaling anywhere from \$25,000 to \$500,000 a year. They handle billions of dollars of business annually. They are the hardest-working, most aggressive and probably the most efficient businessmen on earth. And the most severely criticized. They are in the line of fire from state and federal government, from their employees and from the little, but articulate, stockholder who, not being able to understand the intricacies of corporate operation, as explained to him, must judge the management from the size of his dividend checks.

Although the bulk of the criticism shot at management during the past ten years has been entirely unjustified, management has made mistakes. Probably the greatest of these has been its failure to sell itself. Men who have been clever enough to change fundamental American habits in the course of a few years and thereby sell their products to millions of customers, haven't been able to sell their own integrity and ability even to the people who invest the money which makes development possible.

Instead of using the technique which has made public acceptance of their goods almost inevitable—the use of such slogans as: Ask the Man Who Owns One, They Satisfy, The Pause That Refreshes, It's Smart to be Thrifty, and Good to the Last Drop, for example—in selling themselves, they have consistently used language as involved as the two examples quoted at the beginning of this article. Instead of using the artistic pictures and photographs which make American advertising effective, they have wooed the stockholder with long, sleep-producing columns of figures and technical descriptions which only a financier can understand.

The annual report is management's major opportunity for communication with the people who hire it. The typical annual report consists of a consolidated balance sheet, a consolidated income and surplus account, a brief and usually utterly uninformative statement from the president, an auditor's certification to the financial statement, and a list of the officers and directors. Would an automobile salesman attempt to land a prospect merely by handing him an abridged and technical engineer's report of the car's mechanical construction? He would not. But that's what management does.

AUTOMOBILES

For several years the automotive industry has been the storm center of one of the greatest disputes in the history of labor. It's been a battle that has cost stockholders untold millions in dividends and one in which many of the issues have been completely obscured by emotion and drama. Yet how many motor companies have endeavored to sell their stockholders on their position through their reports? Except for the distinguished report of General Motors, in most of them the word "labor" has been conspicuously missing. It has been as if such a thing as the sit-down strike had never existed.

The motor companies have been remiss in other ways as well. The automotive industry is a key business; it is a sensitive indicator of prosperity and depression, but in the reports of the "motors" virtually nothing is told the stockholders about sales opportunities, new markets, foreign trade, decentralization, or any of the hundred and one factors of vital importance. General Motors, however, issues a report which, if it were illustrated, might serve as a model. It begins with a summary for those who must read and run. Then it takes up in clear, simple language such diverse subjects as Product Evolution, Labor Economics, Public Relations, Cooperative Plans, and Prices from an Economic Standpoint. On one large map the report shows how the company draws raw materials from, and thereby benefits, every state in the country. Neatly tucked away in the back, where they belong, are ten pages of statistics and

financial statements, important and interesting to possibly one per cent of G.M.'s 400,000 stockholders.

Anybody reading the General Motors report would feel well informed, and would probably be sympathetic to most of the corporation's policies. If he read it carefully he would be in a position to inform his friends on some of these policies and possibly convince some of the skeptics that the rôle of this "octopus" in American social and economic life is not only essential but high-principled and wholly for the best interests of the country.

RAILROADS

No group in America believes itself more maligned by governmental and public misunderstanding than the railroads. According to their story they must compete with free waterways, tax-financed governmental ventures, "unregulated" truck competition which uses tax-built and tax-maintained roadbeds; and yet their rates are determined by a group of men whose authority is absolute and who are not, fundamentally, railroad men. Recognizing the difficulties of their position, the railroads are financing an advertising program in an effort to "sell" themselves to the American public as others sell soap. That is splendid, but what direct and individual effort do they make to sell those who are most selfishly concerned—their stock and bondholders? None. Their reports are, almost without exception, voluminous tabulations of statistics. One report fills 60 pages, and not only lists the number of freight cars, but the actual tons carried of everything from "poultry, dressed," "flaxseed," "peanuts," "vegetables, dry, n.o.s.," and "phosphate rock, crude (ground or not ground)" to "Glass: bottles, jars and jelly glasses." Perhaps the average railroad stockholder waits with bated breath from year to year to learn how many jelly glasses were shipped over his line, but it is doubtful.

It is true that railroads must publish a considerable quantity of statistical material in connection with their annual reports. It is also true that they have up to 200,000 or more stockholders each, and that most of these stockholders do not give a continental for such statistics. Pages of tabulated figures are admittedly the world's best soporific, but the possibilities for romance and popular interest

in a railroad report are such that these stockholders should be among the best informed and most enthusiastic capitalists in the country.

TOBACCO

Unlike the railroads, which individually do not advertise extensively, the tobacco companies in America are among the biggest advertisers in the world. The advertising of Chesterfields, Camels, Old Golds and Lucky Strikes costs some \$34,000,000 annually. Only the cosmetic, food, and drug businesses advertise as much. But the reports of the tobacco companies as a group are among the least informative of any. Doing business up to \$300,000,000 annually each, and already carrying one of the heaviest peacetime tax burdens of any industry anywhere, they are constantly subject to the possibilities of further taxation. There is also the not too remote eventual possibility of laws prohibiting them from advertising on the grounds that they are unnecessary or unhealthful, yet no effort whatsoever is made in their reports to build up the intelligent appreciation of their position among the quarter of a million or so people who own their stock. Reports of major tobacco companies are all in Class D.

UTILITIES

For years the utilities companies have claimed that they are being gradually smothered by government competition and regulation. But like the railroads most of them have done almost nothing to utilize their annual reports to win their stockholders. But they have, many of them, sent urgent messages from time to time to their stockholders urging that protests be telegraphed to Washington regarding some proposed legislation. It is possible that these requests might have been less urgent, if needed at all, if a few years previously the nearly two million utility shareholders had been fully informed through annual reports on their companies' policies and practices.

EVEN THE MOVIES

These several groups are not exceptions. Even the top-flight corporations in the motion picture industry, prime press agents and

promoters, issue reports that are as dull as dishwater. So, too, do most of the great "blue chip" corporations which might be expected to be leaders in adopting the currently popular business slogan of "selling the public by telling the public." Not more than 10 per cent of the major corporations of this country issue annual reports which could in any sense be considered adequate for the purpose of winning the good will and understanding of a major proportion of their stockholders.

WHAT STOCKHOLDERS WANT TO KNOW

What is "adequate"? What does the average stockholder want to know? In the first place he wants to know how much money was made or lost during the year. Secondly, he wants to know how. Then he wants to know what the possibilities are for the future, and why. What he is interested to know after that depends upon the peculiarities of the business. He may be interested in labor policies, sources of raw materials, taxes, legislation, plant expansion or construction, pension systems, European conditions or shifts in population. He may want to know something about all these factors. He cannot get this information for himself. If management wants his good will and understanding, it is up to management to satisfy his interest and, if possible, to arouse it further.

In preparing a corporation report it is not sufficient to include merely the answers to these questions. The success or failure of a report depends in part on the way in which the material is presented, and in rating corporate reports this factor must be taken into consideration. It is probable that no two students of the problem would rate them in precisely the same way but for present purposes the following classification seems satisfactory:¹

CLASS A: Reports in this category are not merely the best, they must be excellent in every respect. For an "A" rating a report should include the following:

1. Illustrations, including charts and graphs which tend to simplify comparisons, statistical material and trends.

¹ The rating of these reports is based on a study of some 200 annual reports over a two year period.

2. Statements of policy on matters which may have changed during the year or which may have effect on the public. Examples: decentralization, war orders causing undue expansion, purchasing in home markets, etc.
3. Statement on employee relationships, pension plans, employee study courses, etc.
4. Outlook for the future, research problems and achievements, comment on competitive position if not confidential.
5. Financial information in unobtrusive detail but with explanatory notes which will make it understandable to the layman. The auditor's certification² should be in simple, clear and non-technical language.
6. By statement or implication, some indication as to how the corporation contributes to the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness of the American people. This can be much more effective in winning public approval than mere complaints about rising taxes.
7. A sales statement on the product. This is sometimes accomplished by implication but it is more generally effective if done frankly and forcefully.
8. An intelligent and artistic layout of material with a careful selection of type and paper. This means more than just a "good printing job."

CLASS B: While it may be fairly easy to define Class A reports, it is much more difficult to set up a standard for Class B. In general, Class B reports include those which qualify according to Numbers 3, 4, and 5 as described above and which make some attempt to cover some of the other elements of an "A" report. Usually they meet the standards of Number 8.

CLASS C: Reports in this division are usually those which include material on Numbers 3 and 5 only, although there may be partial mention of other points. They do not, however, meet the standards of simple and detailed interpretation which characterize the "A" reports. Sometimes reference to Number 3 is omitted entirely but the presentation of the financial information is sufficient to lift them above Class D.

CLASS D: Reports in this class contain only a financial statement (sometimes super-condensed, sometimes covering many pages), an auditor's statement and, in some cases, a brief and un-

² For a measure of stockholder ignorance on this point see "A Survey of Stockholder Opinion of the Functions and Responsibilities of the Auditor," Hartwell, Jobson & Kibbee, 1939.

revealing message from the president which discusses the finances in technical language.

It is to be noted that credit is not given on the length of a report. Our concern is necessarily more with what is said and the way in which it is said, rather than with how many pages it takes to say it. With these standards to go by, how do the reports of America's top-flight corporations compare? A random selection of eighty-five of the large corporations in the country would be classified³ as follows:

CLASS A

American Rolling Mill Company	General Foods Corporation
American Telephone and Telegraph Company	General Motors Corporation
Borden Company	Johns-Manville Corporation
	Owens-Illinois Glass Company

CLASS B

American Airlines, Inc.	Sears, Roebuck and Company (B+)
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.	Standard Oil Company
Eastman Kodak Company	(Indiana) (B+)
Gulf Oil Corporation	Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation
The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company (B+)	Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company
Radio Corporation of America	

CLASS C

American Can Company	S. S. Kresge Company
American Locomotive Company	National Cash Register Company
American Power & Light Co. (C—)	New York Central Railroad Company
Anaconda Copper Mining Company	Northern States Power Company
Armour and Company (C+)	Otis Elevator Company
Baldwin Locomotive Works (C—)	Pacific Gas and Electric Company (C+)
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.	Packard Motor Car Company (C—)
Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Company	Pennsylvania Railroad Company
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.	Shell Union Oil Corporation
Fisk Rubber Corporation (C—)	Stewart-Warner Corporation
General Electric Company (C+)	United States Rubber Company
International Nickel Company of Canada, Ltd. (C+)	Western Union Telegraph Company

³ Plus and minus ratings are included to indicate more than ordinary variations from the general classifications.

CLASS D

Abitibi Power & Paper Company, Ltd.	International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
Air Reduction Company, Inc.	Kennecott Copper Corporation
Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation	Lehigh Valley Railroad Company
Aluminum Company of America	Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company
American Cyanamid Company	P. Lorillard Company
American Tobacco Company	Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company
American Water Works and Electric Company, Inc.	Montgomery Ward
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company	National Biscuit Company
Bethlehem Steel Corporation	National Dairy Products Corporation
Chrysler Corporation	North American Aviation, Inc.
Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Company	Paramount Pictures, Inc.
Consolidated Oil Corporation	Procter and Gamble Company
Cord Corporation	Pure Oil Company
Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company	R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
Federal Water Service Corporation	Socony-Vacuum Oil Company
General Baking Company	Standard Brands Incorporated
Graham-Paige Motors Corporation	Studebaker Corporation
Inland Steel Company	Texas Gulf Sulphur Company
International Hydro-Electric System	Union Tank Car Company
International Mercantile Marine Company	United Gas Corporation
International Paper and Power Company	United Light and Power Company
	Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.
	F. W. Woolworth Company

The list of corporations rated above was not intended to include all types and kinds of business and it may be far from a complete list of American "big business," but the total assets that it represents are fairly impressive: \$32,716,000,000.

Getting the story of business, industry and finance over to the shareholder isn't difficult, provided always that the business is conducted honestly and efficiently. The stockholder is partisan to the company or he wouldn't have bought the stock. Discriminating selection of material for the annual report, intelligent use of illustrations, and simple clarity are fundamental requirements. A long report, covering every detail of a business, might defeat its own

purpose. Reports must be highlighted with material which will interest as well as inform the reader. Illustrations are essential because they can do the work of thousands of words. They are desirable also because they are often decorative. The idea of an illustration in an annual report is revolutionary to most businessmen. They might countenance a graph with a jagged line showing a trend, but a streamlined chart or a photograph—never! And yet it is sometimes possible to epitomize an entire message with one cleverly designed chart or striking picture.

But the essence of a good annual report must be clarity. Sentences must be short, words must be understandable and not technical, type must be large and solid blocks of it must be broken up with pointed headlines which provoke interest or convey part of the message. Items in financial tables must be explained. All the information one great company gives its stockholders regarding its assets in its report is consolidated in the following items:

Current Assets:

- Cash
- Accounts and Notes Receivable, less Reserves
- Marketable Securities, at Cost
- Inventories of Aluminum, Materials and Supplies
- Prepaid Expenses and Deferred Charges to Operations
- Investments in Subsidiary and Other Companies not Consolidated Herein
- Land, Water Rights, Plants and Facilities
- Less Amortization, Depletion and Depreciation

Those assets, incidentally, total nearly \$250,000,000. It would be a dull stockholder who did not wonder if there weren't more to say about them than that.

The stockholders in this country are alert, inquisitive and frequently articulate. But they are woefully and unhealthfully ignorant. Fortunately, the effect of this colossal and astonishing ignorance on the part of their stockholders has recently become apparent to a few of the great corporations. Directors of several seem to appreciate that this lack of understanding on the part of investors has been a contributing cause to the unhappy events of the past ten years.

As a result there has been a beginning of an effort to educate the stockholder. The report of an oil company, for example, wishing to call its stockholders' attention to the importance of the oil industry to America, contains this statement:

Second only to agriculture, petroleum can fairly claim to be the country's greatest provider of jobs. Directly it employs 1,000,000 people; over 700,000 more are engaged in marketing its products; and 800,000 more still in supplying machinery, pipe, ships, engines, drilling and refinery apparatus, etc. Almost two-thirds of ocean-freight carried under the American flag is petroleum and its products. About one-third of Panama Canal tonnage is oil tankers. The railroads get about one-tenth of their carload freight revenue from petroleum and its products. Finally, in every great oil field in the world will be found American-made oil country apparatus built by American labor from American materials.

Another enterprising company, anxious to show that it is managed by men with a desirable combination of youth and maturity, gives the age of its executives, adding:

Thus it is generally the practice of the business for the management to be selected from the ranks and made up of men of long experience, but still in their prime. This provides the creative force that is needed constantly to improve service to the public and working conditions for employees.

After describing its plant and equipment, one company adds this simple and direct statement of a fundamental truth:

Together with the working capital and other financial resources, these physical properties are the tools with which employees of the Indiana companies meet the demand of millions of customers for products and service. It is from the compensation earned with these tools for the industrial services performed for customers that wages of employees, bills for supplies of all kinds, taxes, and dividends to owners are paid. Every dollar of their value is useful in proportion to the work it does and the compensation it earns.

One of the leading companies in American industry, interested to show its 75,000 shareholders how it cares for the welfare of its employees, describes eight separate bonus and pension plans which are in operation in its plants, and stresses also its record of safety and its industrial health program. It would be difficult for

those who read this report, emotionally to side with labor in the event of a strike in that company.

One Chicago utility, a rare exception to the general rule, illustrates its latest report with several beautiful photographs of its plant. These pictures are not of the type which usually hangs in the office of the general manager. They are reproductions of real beauty, taken by an artist who understood what was wanted. Their effect on the women stockholders alone would surely have justified the action. And women own as much as 30 per cent of the stock of some big businesses. They are a real factor.

These corporations and a few others have begun a program of education designed to correct a condition of ignorance. They have quietly begun separate campaigns to teach their stockholders what big business is all about. They are taking statements like those quoted at the beginning of this article and streamlining them with simple language. They are giving brief and understandable explanatory notes to the various items which make up the columns of figures of assets and liabilities—figures which heretofore have been significant only because they invariably and magically resulted in the same total. They are using photographs and interpretive charts which tell a story of years of development at a glance. Every skill at the command of these companies is being called upon to prepare reports which not only can be understood by the little man—and his wife—but which also will capture and hold his interest.

This is a beginning. The reports which these few companies have recently sent to their stockholders are as interesting and informative as a popular magazine. This is an encouraging start but it is only a drop in the bucket. The job of stockholder education won't be accomplished overnight. Corporate operation and finance are difficult enough to comprehend for those who want to make it a life work. When you come to those who don't grow up with it—well, did you ever try to teach baseball to an Englishman?

INFLUENCES OF WORLD EVENTS ON U.S. "NEUTRALITY" OPINION

By PHILIP E. JACOB

This article is an interesting attempt to correlate the world-shaking events of the last few years with shifts in American opinion regarding four kinds of "neutrality," as measured by the American Institute of Public Opinion and *Fortune* polls. The author, an Instructor in the Politics Department of Princeton University, formerly served as Field Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, and Director of the Eastern Institute of International Relations.

American public opinion in regard to the foreign policy of the United States remained virtually unaffected by international developments from the fall of 1935 until after the Munich crisis in September 1938. Impervious alike to domestic and foreign pressures, it clung tenaciously to a new concept of neutrality—a formula for keeping out of war by restricting economic intercourse with belligerents, instead of a carload of traditional rights to be defended diplomatically and if necessary by force of arms.

This imperturbable stability was shattered during the course of the last year. Not only did the basic divisions of neutrality sentiment shift, but a remarkable amount of short-run fluctuation occurred. Once blasted from its accepted bases and principles, American public opinion has been tossed about from day to day at the mercy of each turn and twist of the world crisis.

In an effort to discover the effect of international politics upon American neutrality opinion in connection with European affairs, the results of the surveys conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion and by *Fortune* have been studied in relation to world events which preceded or accompanied the taking of particular polls.¹ The surveys cover five major aspects of the neutrality issue: (1) personal neutrality, (2) commercial neutrality, (3) military neutrality, (4) financial neutrality, and (5) control of neu-

¹ The chronologies of events in *The United States in World Affairs*, 1934-35, 1936, 1937 and 1938, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, in the *Bulletin of International News* and in the periodical *Events*, were used as check lists.

trality policy. The reaction of opinion to events has been strikingly different with respect to these different phases of the neutrality issue.

FOUR KINDS OF NEUTRALITY

The American public felt the impact of international political developments first upon its "personal neutrality"—its attitude of impartiality or indifference toward other nations. The boycott of German and Japanese goods and other indications of definite dislike measure the extent to which personal neutrality toward these countries has been forsaken.

Next to succumb before the pressure of international crisis was opinion on the "commercial neutrality" of the U.S. Should the U.S. maintain strict impartiality in its trade relationships with countries at war or should it discriminate in favor of one side by imposing an embargo on the other? Secondly, if the U.S. accords equal treatment to both sides, should it try to carry on unrestricted trade with all belligerents or should it impose restrictions on trade, especially in war supplies, and apply them equally to all belligerents?

These two questions have become intertwined and confused, especially since the outbreak of the European war. Technical neutrality on the basis of "cash-and-carry" trade with all belligerents has been rightly understood by large sections of the American public to mean in practice favoring the side which controls the sea. Opinion on the first question, showing a consistent, though generally declining, majority opposed to outright discrimination does not, therefore, adequately reflect the shift in American attitudes on commercial neutrality. We must, in addition, dissect the opinion of the increasingly large number of those who, since the Munich Conference, have opposed the arms embargo, considering unneutral those who have taken this technically "neutral" position primarily because of their eagerness to help England and France.

An overwhelming majority of the American people has stood for the "military neutrality" of the U.S., disapproving the participation of its armed forces in a foreign war. Steadily accumulating tension in the post-Munich world upset the remarkable stability of

opinion which had prevailed on this issue. During the last year it has fluctuated violently, although a few weeks after the outbreak of the war it returned to its normal proportions.

Opinion on two aspects of the neutrality issue has remained practically unmolested by the course of international politics. A large and relatively constant majority has favored a policy of "financial neutrality" for the U.S., opposing the granting of loans and credits to countries at war, at least to those which still owe us money from the last World War. The American public, in the second place, has consistently preferred Congressional to Presidential control of U.S. neutrality policy.

In brief, personal neutrality has proved the most sensitive to growing international tension. Attitudes on commercial neutrality were next affected, though, as we shall see, not so sharply or clearly. The most violent relative fluctuations occurred in opinion on military neutrality, but, unlike that on personal and commercial neutrality, it has regained its previous equilibrium. Opinion on financial neutrality and control of neutrality policy has varied little.

The analysis of the reasons for these changes insofar as they can be attributed to international events is the subject for the rest of the article. This study does not claim to establish a definite cause-and-effect relationship between specific events and given shifts in opinion. Prior to September 1938 the time intervals between the questions asked on the same issue in the polls are so large as to make hazardous even a general correlation between events and public opinion. Wording, a factor of importance in determining the results of a poll, has been identical on only a few of the ballots. Even if two ballots have been taken close together and worded identically, we must weigh the public opinion value of the different interim events. We cannot assume, merely because a given event correlates with a shift of opinion, that the event caused the change. For instance, many persons may not have been aware of the event in question. A shift in opinion, finally, may be brought about by the cumulative effect of events which occurred some considerable time before the taking of the poll, rather than by events immediately preceding the ballot. Extensive research is still needed

to determine which of the multitude of events in the past laid the foundation for a given opinion-change.

Nevertheless information now in hand makes possible a tentative association of changes in neutrality opinion with certain major periods of international crisis and in a few instances even with specific events.

PERSONAL NEUTRALITY

The American people surrendered their personal neutrality only after a long series of events which undermined their sense of personal and national security and repeatedly outraged their moral and humanitarian feelings.

In the fall of 1935, although Germany headed the list of countries disliked, more than half of the people interviewed in a *Fortune* Survey registered no emotions whatever toward foreign countries.² Two years later 62 per cent stated they were neutral in their attitude toward Germany.³ By that time she had already intervened actively in Spain, forged the Rome-Berlin axis, scrapped the Versailles Treaty by remilitarizing the Rhineland, persecuted the Jews severely, and started an intensive economic drive in South America.

The severe tensions of the first half of 1938 modified the indifference of American opinion toward Germany. During the May crisis over Czechoslovakia, which followed closely upon Hitler's annexation of Austria and saw the mobilization of Czech and French troops, 65 per cent hoped England and France would win if they became involved in war with Germany and Italy. Thirty-two per cent favored neither side.⁴ The change in opinion which

² *Fortune*, October 1935. Each date cited in connection with a *Fortune* survey refers to the issue of the magazine in which the poll data were published, rather than to the time when the interviews were made. The author wishes to express appreciation to *Fortune* and to Mr. Elmo Roper, who conducts the polls for that magazine, for assistance in the compilation of these data.

³ *Fortune*, October 1937.

⁴ American Institute of Public Opinion, May 27, 1938. For convenience, the name of the Institute's Director, "Gallup," will hereafter be used to identify the American Institute of Public Opinion's data. Each date given in connection with the Gallup polls refers to the day on which the ballot was sent to the interviewers. Interviews are usually conducted during the following ten days. Consequently events occurring during this period have been taken into account, as well as those which took place before the ballot was sent out. The author wishes to express appreciation to the Institute and to its Director, Mr. George Gallup, for assistance in the compilation of these data.

this apparently reflects should be discounted to some extent by noting that earlier polls revealed a positive sympathy with Britain which consistently placed her first as a national friend, whereas Germany had equally consistently merited a two-to-one mixture of indifference and hostility.

Events leading up to and following the Munich Conference on September 29, 1938, pushed into high gear the destruction of the American's personal neutrality toward Germany. By the end of September 56 per cent were willing to boycott German goods, although only 33 per cent wished for an official expression by the President of America's moral condemnation of Germany.⁵ Following November 10, when the anti-Semitic drive in Germany reached a new peak in the "Day of the Broken Glass," the boycott percentage jumped up to 61 per cent.⁶ After the absorption of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, 65 per cent said they would participate in the boycott.⁷ Since the spring of 1939, the proportion of Americans expressing antagonism toward Germany has remained relatively constant, despite the outbreak of the war. Once aroused, American antipathy has not been noticeably affected either by new crises or by the relaxation of tension.

COMMERCIAL NEUTRALITY

Public opinion supporting a government policy of commercial neutrality proved less sensitive to international events before the Munich settlement than was the case with attitudes of personal neutrality, but has varied much more sharply and uncertainly during the last year.

While the League of Nations in 1935 was considering sanctions against Italy as a result of the invasion of Ethiopia, 29 per cent on a Gallup poll felt the United States should join with other nations at least in economic and non-military measures to compel a nation to stop attacking another.⁸ By the end of the year, *Fortune* found that 48 per cent favored refusing to trade with the aggressor.⁹ That quite a number of these might not be willing to discriminate between the belligerents would be indicated by the results of a poll

⁵ Gallup, September 23, 1938.

⁶ Gallup, November 22, 1938.

⁷ Gallup, March 21, 1939.

⁸ Gallup, September 30, 1935.

⁹ *Fortune*, January 1936.

taken about a month earlier by the American Institute, when 84 per cent approved prohibiting either all trade or trade in war materials with all belligerents.¹⁰ This poll followed the proclamation by President Roosevelt of an arms embargo against both Italy and Ethiopia, in accordance with the Neutrality Act of 1935.

During the days of crisis leading up to the Munich Conference, September 29, 1938, opinion held steady in behalf of commercial neutrality towards European powers. Only 20 per cent were willing to sell arms just to England and France in case of war. Another 14 per cent would sell to both sides, while 66 per cent would sell to neither.¹¹

By the turn of the year disillusionment with the settlement had set in. The one-sided nature of the final agreement, granting virtually all of the German demands, the Jewish persecutions in Germany during November, Italy's tune of "Tunisia, Corsica and Nice," belied the "Munich spirit" which had been hailed as the forerunner of international security and a lasting peace. Disappointment proved all the keener because of the high hopes which had at first prevailed that the days of crisis were over. "Will this never end?" many people began asking themselves, while some grew hysterical over the "insidious" and "imminent" menace of totalitarianism to the Americas.

The growing suspicion that the ambitions of the totalitarian states were limitless, that the dictators could not be trusted, and that sooner or later the values and interests of the western hemisphere would inevitably become involved in the play of European politics, affected American neutrality opinion in a way none of the dramatic events and crises of the previous years had been able to. In the January 1939 survey, *Fortune* found that over 56 per cent believed "the democratic powers, including the U.S., should now stand firmly together at any cost to prevent Hitler from taking any more territory at the expense of other nations." Only 27 per cent however, condemned, in one way or another, the actions of England and France at Munich. Forty-seven per cent said it was too bad, but was the best thing to do under the circumstances.¹²

¹⁰ Gallup, October 19, 1935.

¹¹ Gallup, September 13, 1938.

¹² *Fortune*, January 1939.

In a Gallup poll sent out on February 2, 1939, 69 per cent thought we should do everything possible to help England and France win, except go to war ourselves, if they should become involved in war with Germany and Italy.¹³ The disclosure a few days before of the proposed sale of latest model U.S. Army airplanes to France and the reported statement (later denied) by President Roosevelt to the effect that our frontier was in France, should have aroused the fire of American isolationism to a white heat. Instead, on a direct question asked regarding the sale of airplanes and war materials to England and France, 65 per cent approved,¹⁴ while a few days later 44 per cent indicated they would distinguish between Germany and England and France in the sale of planes.¹⁵

American public opinion thus experienced a two-fold shift away from the previously accepted formula of commercial neutrality. A large majority now countenanced the sale of war materials to belligerents. Just under 50 per cent would make this sale discriminatory in favor of the European democracies.

Neither Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia on March 15, nor its repercussions upon the official policy of the democracies substantially modified American public opinion as it had developed before that move. The percentage of those willing to support England and France failed to increase after February. By April it had even subsided to 67 per cent.¹⁶ Only 57 per cent favored changing the Neutrality Law so that the U.S. could sell war materials to England and France.¹⁷

The replacement of the appeasement policy with the "peace-front" strategy by England and France, President Roosevelt's warning on Pan American Day to the totalitarian states to keep out of the western hemisphere, and his direct demand the next day for non-aggression pledges from Hitler and Mussolini to thirty nations, probably reinforced the trend away from commercial neutrality. But the aftermath of Munich, not the dramatic march into Prague, overturned American neutrality opinion, illustrating

¹³ Gallup, February 2, 1939.

¹⁴ Gallup, February 16, 1939.

¹⁵ Gallup, February 22, 1939 (63% Eng. & Fr., 19% Ger.).

¹⁶ Gallup, April 19, 1939.

¹⁷ Gallup, March 21, 1939.

the importance of the cumulative effect of world events on opinion in contrast to the influence of particular events.

During the summer of 1939 the public turned back somewhat to its earlier belief in non-discriminatory embargoes. By the middle of August, negotiations for a mutual assistance pact with Russia, vital to the "peace-front" drive of England and France, had bogged down repeatedly and seemed further than ever from successful completion. Congress had adjourned without taking action on revision of the 1937 Neutrality Law, despite all the pressure the Administration could exert to get the arms embargo lifted. In contrast to the attitude at the end of March when 51 per cent expected war during the course of the year,¹⁸ the great majority of the American people (74 per cent) now agreed with Senator Borah and other leaders in the fight against neutrality revision, that war was very unlikely in 1939.¹⁹ Whether because of impatience with the progress of the "peace-front" or because of reassurance regarding the continuance of peace, 57 per cent gave Congress a vote of confidence on the defeat of proposals to change the Neutrality Law.²⁰

The return to neutrality was short-lived. Increasing tension over Danzig and Poland in the last half of August, heightened by the Soviet-German pact on August 24 and highlighted by the appeals for peace by President Roosevelt and the Pope, reversed the summer trend. By the time war broke upon the world, the American public presented a perfect picture of confused indecision regarding the foreign policy which the U.S. should follow. A goodly majority was clear that trade should be stopped with the dictators, though even on this question 21 per cent registered "Don't Know."²¹ But on the vital question of whether embargoes should be applied equally to all belligerents, the public had not made up its mind. The question was asked: "If Congress does meet in special session should it change the present Neutrality Law so that the U.S. could sell war materials to England and France?" Fifty per cent said "Yes," 50 per cent "No."²²

¹⁸ Gallup, March 21, 1939.

¹⁹ Gallup, July 17, 1939.

²⁰ Gallup, August 8, 1939.

²¹ *Fortune*, September 1939.

²² Gallup, August 17, 1939.

IMPACT OF THE WAR

The outbreak of war seemed for a time so to sharpen the issues that the public rapidly swept aside its indecision. The percentage wanting to throw over the embargo on war materials rose. The number expressing "no opinion" declined. On a poll furnished by the American Institute of Public Opinion to its interviewers for use on the first day of the war, 63 per cent felt the U.S. should sell airplanes and other war materials to England, France and Poland, while 77 per cent said we should sell them food supplies.²³

By the middle of September, however, only 57 per cent favored the sale of planes and other war materials to England and France, though 78 per cent approved the sale of food supplies.²⁴ This poll was taken while Poland was being overwhelmed by Germany, and Soviet troops were marching in on the East to seal her doom. This unexpected Russian action probably confused some people. Meanwhile those opposing the repeal of the arms embargo had opened their attack, following the call for a special session of Congress issued by President Roosevelt on September 13. Borah on the 14th, Lindbergh on the 15th, and Vandenberg on the 17th all made nationwide radio speeches setting forth the isolationist view.

President Roosevelt can be credited, at least partially, with the following week's increase to 68 per cent of the proportion favoring the sale of war supplies, and with the rise to 62 per cent (an increase of 8 per cent) of those desiring Congress to change the Neutrality Law in accordance with their sentiments.²⁵ In opening the special session of Congress on September 21, the President had made one of his most forceful appeals to end the arms embargo.

Roosevelt's effect upon public opinion was not permanent, however, but acted like a temporary hypodermic. On a ballot sent out three days later, while 70 per cent approved the sale of war supplies, only 55 per cent now favored changing the law, just 1 per cent higher than before the President's speech.²⁶ The ballots were taken so close together that other events, such as the wind-up of the war in Poland, could not easily have occasioned the shift, as they were spread out over the taking of both ballots. Wording

²³ Gallup, August 30, 1939.

²⁴ Gallup, September 11, 1939.

²⁵ Gallup, September 19, 1939.

²⁶ Gallup, September 22, 1939.

in the two ballots was identical. The President's speech was thus quite well isolated. Its net effect seems to have been to offset the isolationist influence, but not to close the curious gap between opinion favoring revision of the Neutrality Law and opinion favoring the sale of war supplies. Here again we see the comparative ineffectiveness of isolated events, especially of specific propaganda appeals, upon the basic course of public opinion. Their maximum influence temporarily jars the opinions of a wavering fringe until counteracting appeals or events swing them back again.

By the first week in October, just after the Senate debates had opened, those favoring a change in the law to permit shipments of war supplies to belligerents had risen to 60 per cent.²⁷ From this point until the final passage of the revised Neutrality Act with the arms embargo repealed, Gallup polls show opinion as practically constant. The percentage favoring repeal of the embargo rises slightly. The number of those who "don't know" goes down a bit. But throughout October the proportion of those opposed to those in favor of the arms embargo does not vary more than 5 per cent, no matter when the question is asked or how it is worded. Congressional debates, newspaper comment, radio broadcasts, the activities of pressure groups, apparently had little effect upon the attitudes of the American public.

By the end of September, the first month of the war, the American people, in contrast to many members of Congress, had made up their minds about what they felt American foreign policy should be. A majority had clearly thrown over the embargo as a desirable instrument of U.S. foreign policy in wartime. After the adjournment of Congress 66 per cent indicated approval of its action on neutrality revision.²⁸ But both the *Fortune* and the Gallup polls show that a considerable part of this majority did not believe they were sacrificing a policy of commercial neutrality either technically or practically. Thirty-six per cent of those favoring repeal of the embargo in a Gallup poll said they would not do so if repeal would help only the Allies.²⁹ Thirty-five per cent of those urging repeal on the succeeding ballot gave as the main rea-

²⁷ Gallup, October 3, 1939.

²⁸ Gallup, November 8, 1939.

²⁹ Gallup, October 18, 1939.

son for their stand, "To improve business in this country," while only 22 per cent said "To help England and France" and 9 per cent "To defend democracy." Twenty-seven per cent felt repeal of the embargo would help keep the U.S. out of war.³⁰

Fortune showed a marked decline from September to November in the number who frankly took a discriminatory position on behalf of England and France, while those favoring cash-and-carry sales to all belligerents and those opposed to trade with any belligerents rose. After a careful breakdown in its December survey of the supporters of "cash-and-carry" to discover those who took this position primarily as a means of aiding the Allies, *Fortune* announced 54 per cent strictly neutral (embargo on all belligerents or unbiased cash-and-carry), 20 per cent taking a pro-Ally neutrality stand (remainder of cash-and-carry) and 17 per cent favoring immediate or eventual war on the side of the Allies.³¹

The American public therefore was loath to sanction the surrender of the commercial neutrality of the U.S. The disillusioning aftermath of Munich shook this determination considerably. The belief in the embargo on arms and war supplies, was not, however, finally abandoned by a definite, permanent majority until after the outbreak of war in Europe. The desire that our commercial policy be sincerely neutral, with or without the embargo, seems again to possess a majority of the public, though not as large a one as before the events of September 1939 aggravated the Munich "unsettlement."

MILITARY NEUTRALITY

Until after Munich, international events only slightly modified the conviction of the American people that the U.S. should not take a military part in another war abroad. With almost monotonous regularity the polls of the American Institute of Public Opinion showed 94-95 per cent declaring themselves against U.S. participation in case of another World War. Even in the final stages of the Munich crisis 95 per cent answered "No" to the question, "If England and France go to war against Germany, do

³⁰ Gallup, October 24, 1939.

³¹ *Fortune*, December 1939.

you think this country should declare war on Germany?"³² The only variations recorded from this unusually stable norm were the 9 per cent who supported the principle of military sanctions during the height of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis³³ and the 8 per cent who contemplated the possibility of going to war to help England in China just after the first series of incidents in the Far East.³⁴

Fortune has usually given a somewhat larger percentage who would forego military neutrality under sufficient provocation, but even so the figures are small. Eleven per cent favored military sanctions in the January 1936 survey. In April 1938 "only 16 per cent of the public would favor going to war with Japan, even under extreme provocation. And this was just after the *Panay* had provided a newsreeled foretaste with suitable emotional appeal of what provocation might be like."³⁵

The striking change in American opinion by February 1939 reflects the severity of the post-Munich disillusionment. Seventeen per cent, more than three times the number just before Munich, felt "we should send our army and navy abroad to fight the enemies of England and France" in case war broke out between them and Germany and Italy.³⁶ At the end of March the percentage had declined to 16 per cent,³⁷ bearing out the conclusion suggested earlier that American opinion had shifted before, not after, the annexation of Czechoslovakia.

By mid-summer the percentage had shrunk to 12 per cent paralleling the mid-summer reverse toward commercial neutrality already noted.³⁸ The parallel course continues through the middle of September with a drastic upsurge in the ranks of those foregoing military neutrality after the declaration of war. Twenty-one per cent declared we should help England and France by sending our army and navy abroad to fight against Germany. Forty-six per cent felt this action should be taken if it looked as though the Allies might be defeated.³⁹

³² Gallup, September 13, 1938.

³³ Gallup, September 30, 1935.

³⁴ Gallup, September 7, 1937.

³⁵ *Fortune*, April 1938.

³⁶ Gallup, February 16, 1939.

³⁷ Gallup, March 21, 1939.

³⁸ Gallup, July 8, 1939.

³⁹ Gallup, August 30, 1939.

But the middle of the month sees the return of the norm—only 6 per cent favored sending the army and navy abroad, while the number willing to consider this eventuality in case the Allies were being defeated was more than cut in half—to 22 per cent.⁴⁰

From this point on a steadily declining percentage of persons indicated willingness to give up the policy of military neutrality. By the October 24 ballot, only 2 per cent would have had us send the army and navy to fight.⁴¹

The *Fortune* surveys give somewhat different figures but show the same general trend. Shortly before the declaration of war, 3 per cent favored immediate U.S. military participation in case of war, 24 per cent if England and France were losing.⁴² The October supplement shows the first figure practically unchanged, but the second has dropped to 13 per cent.⁴³ The December survey records scarcely any change in either. Apparently American opinion on military neutrality has come home to roost after a wild and exciting year's fling.

Comments made on some of the Gallup polls immediately after the outbreak of war offer some explanation for this violent but temporary fluctuation from so well-established a norm. Most of the reasons given by those favoring U.S. military participation showed a definite sense of insecurity. The interests, the form of government, even the independence of the U.S. were felt to be threatened by Nazi Germany. On the other hand, most of those opposed to American participation indicated they felt U.S. security or interests were not at stake in the war and that we should postpone fighting until we were directly attacked. Willingness to fight and a sense of insecurity are closely joined. Conversely, security and refusal to fight go hand in hand.

That neutrality opinion varies in accordance with the sense of security of the American people is likewise indicated by trends of opinion regarding the probability of war and of U.S. involvement. *Fortune* shows that by January 1939, 66 per cent thought there would be a general European war in the next few years in contrast to the 47 per cent in July 1937 who anticipated a European

⁴⁰ Gallup, September 11, 1939.

⁴¹ Gallup, October 24, 1939.

⁴² *Fortune*, September 1939.

⁴³ *Fortune*, October 1939 Supplement.

or Asiatic war. Three-quarters of this 66 per cent (i.e. half of the total), thought the U.S. would be drawn in, compared with 22 per cent of the total in July 1937.⁴⁴ Gallup polls also show a heightened expectation of war in the first part of 1939 followed by a drop during the late spring and summer when, as we have seen, neutrality sentiment grew stronger. During January and February 1939, the American people were also more inclined to believe that the U.S. would be drawn into a war if one occurred (57 per cent), and that Germany would start a war against the U.S. if it should win one against England and France (62 per cent).⁴⁵ By October, the number of those fearing U.S. involvement was on a steady downward trend, while confidence in an Allied victory had risen from 85 per cent, upon the declaration of war,⁴⁶ to 90 per cent.⁴⁷

Evidently the "post-Munich world" promoted a profound sense of insecurity among the American people, and this reached its climax in the hysterical days of September 1939. People had been led to expect a *Blitzkrieg* in the west accompanied by ruthless and destructive bombing of Europe's large cities as the opening phases of the war. The dramatic sinking of the *Athenia*, the day after war was declared, seemed to many who recalled the *Lusitania* to herald the early involvement of the U.S., while the fate of thousands of Americans stranded in Europe must have weighed heavily on the minds of relatives and friends at home.

After the first ten days or two weeks, the sense of immediate insecurity was lulled. The *Blitzkrieg* failed to materialize except in Poland, the *Athenia* incident was not at once followed by others, the Russian invasion of Poland and Hitler's "peace offensive" somewhat confused the issues, and finally the war settled down to a long-drawn-out economic struggle. Those anticipating with perhaps an unconscious thrill a desperate, violent, dramatic cloudburst, were greeted instead with a dull, slow, calculating drizzle. As the sense of relative security returned, opinion about military neutrality likewise dropped back to normal.

⁴⁴ *Fortune*, January 1939.

⁴⁵ Gallup, January 1, 1939.

⁴⁶ Gallup, August 30, 1939.

⁴⁷ Gallup, October 24, 1939.

FINANCIAL NEUTRALITY

Of all the aspects of neutrality opinion, the most immovable, the least responsive to international events, has been the opposition of Americans to lending money to aid one side in winning a war. The number willing to extend credit to belligerents has been somewhat larger than the normal percentage of those willing to send troops abroad, but nothing like as much fluctuation in opinion on financial neutrality has been occasioned by events of the last year.

In January 1937, 15 per cent approved further loans "to our World War Allies in case they resume payments on the debts they now owe."⁴⁸ In April 1939, only 21 per cent said we should change the Johnson Act so that we might lend money to England and France in case of war in Europe, though 31 per cent on an alternative ballot said we should lend money to them to buy airplanes and other war materials in this country.⁴⁹ Comments showed keen skepticism as to whether the money would ever be repaid if lent, a Yankee shrewdness that would not permit the U.S. to be duped a second time into throwing dollars toward a supposedly idealistic goal.

In the middle of September 1939, only 10 per cent were willing to consider the sale of war supplies to England and France on credit.⁵⁰ In its survey of last December, *Fortune* found that 11 per cent favored repeal of the Johnson Act. Twelve per cent more indicated they would favor such action if England and France were losing. The Gallup polls, moreover, show that, on the average, 10 per cent more people have approved the sale of war supplies if the question included the words "for cash."

CONTROL OF NEUTRALITY POLICY

The vicissitudes of international politics have merely strengthened the conviction of the American people that neutrality should be a subject of Congressional, rather than Presidential, discretion.

Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China and the decision of the Administration not to invoke the

⁴⁸ Gallup, January 18, 1937.

⁴⁹ Gallup, April 19, 1939.

⁵⁰ Gallup, September 11, 1939.

Neutrality Act, 69 per cent declared that U.S. neutrality policy should be handled by Congress.⁵¹ By March 1938, after a full display of Presidential initiative in the Far Eastern conflict, 67 per cent still favored Congressional control, while 75 per cent said the Neutrality Law should not be changed to give the President a freer hand.⁵² While President Roosevelt was addressing a fervent plea on behalf of the U.S. to Hitler and Mussolini to avoid war in September 1938, 73 per cent of the American people, according to a Gallup poll, favored resting responsibility for neutrality policy in the hands of Congress.⁵³ *Fortune* in its November 1939 survey, found that 59 per cent thought Congress was right in its pre-war session "in refusing to grant the President the power to decide to what countries we would sell war materials in case of a war abroad." Twenty-one per cent thought it was wrong, and 20 per cent did not have an opinion. If computed in the same way as the Gallup tabulations (not counting the "Don't know" vote) 73 per cent felt Congress was right, exactly the figure reached a year before in the Gallup poll.

CONCLUSIONS

American public opinion, so often condemned as volatile, whimsical and irrational, exhibited a remarkable stability on the neutrality issue through periods of great international tension up through the Munich crisis in September 1938. Compounded not only of the deep-rooted tradition of isolationism, but of a strong emotional determination to stay out of war, it held tightly to certain rational concepts of how to implement neutrality, cherishing especially the embargo on war supplies to all countries at war.

The forces of international politics during the last year have severely shaken some aspects of neutrality opinion, while affecting others in only a minor or temporary way. At present American opinion is left in a curiously anomalous position. On the one hand, an overwhelming majority of the American public want the Allies to win the war. At the same time, the American people are more

⁵¹ Gallup, September 7, 1937.

⁵² Gallup, March 23, 1938.

⁵³ Gallup, September 23, 1938.

determined than ever to stay neutral as regards military participation or financial aid to those who have not paid their debts.

In the case of commercial policy, the public is torn between its desire to see the "menace" of the totalitarian states removed and its longing that this be done without involving the United States in war or financial commitments. Not quite a majority now feel that our trade relationships should be guided primarily by considerations of helping the "right" side win. A large majority are convinced we should not impose an embargo on war supplies as a method of preserving our neutrality. Added to those who would take this position as a practicable method of aiding England and France without infringing on our technical neutrality, are those who see in this return to the free-trade theory of neutrality, the promotion of good business for the United States.

Thus "personal neutrality," the first to be affected by international events since 1935, has been definitely thrown over by the American public. Its attitude toward "commercial neutrality," which was sharply modified as its personal neutrality became increasingly undermined, has wavered back and forth and now remains indecisive. The stand for "military neutrality," severely struck by the Munich aftermath and its final resolution in the outbreak of war in September 1939 has, at least for the time being, regained its normal equilibrium. The belief in "financial neutrality" has fluctuated only slightly throughout the whole period.

Specific events, even though of large significance in determining the course of international politics, do not seem to have exercised a major effect in shaping American neutrality opinion. The dynamic force back of changes in neutrality opinion has derived rather from the cumulative effects of a series of events stretching over considerable periods of time and affecting the sense of security of the American people.

The concept of American neutrality is itself the expression of the cumulative effect, on the one hand, of years of relative isolation, and, on the other, of the experiences of the World War as they gradually became fully known. It arose as a policy to safeguard "national interests"—political, commercial, and ideological—in a particular geographical situation which minimized poten-

tial threats to American security. The reformulation of the policy after the World War was designed to prevent the recurrence of the incidents which had led to U.S. involvement and to the destruction of the security we had previously enjoyed.

Fortified by confidence in the efficacy of the new policy, the American public looked with comparative equanimity upon the world-shaking developments of 1935-1938. Only when the accumulated uneasiness from these events was not resolved by the Munich conference, but instead heightened by its aftermath, did a large part of the American people begin seriously to question the security of our form of government, of our standards of life, and even of our territorial integrity. Germany, Italy and Japan came to be viewed by many as an insidious triangle threatening the framework of accepted institutions and ideas both from within and from without the United States.

With rising alarm for its security, the American public shifted violently away from its previous attitudes on personal, commercial and military neutrality and came to identify American interests closely with those of other democratic countries. From then on, neutrality opinion, instead of resisting, as it had before, the pressure of international politics, generally varied in accordance with the apparent implications of world events for England and France. So long as the American people feel the Allies, whose interests they now deem closest to their own, have control of the situation, so long do they plan to stay out of war. Once the belief in an Allied victory is thrown into question, one may look for further sharp fluctuations in neutrality opinion.

BOLSTERING NATIONAL MORALE IN WARTIME FRANCE

By A FRENCH OFFICER

Although the general objectives of the morale services of all belligerent countries are similar, details of strategy and minor tactics must differ widely to meet varying circumstances. In this article, written late in November, by an officer in the French Army, the *QUARTERLY* presents a description of the techniques of censorship, propaganda, and counter-propaganda employed in France today.

On September 3, 1939, France declared that she was at war with Germany. General mobilization had been proceeding for two days, taking five million husbands, fathers and sons away from their homes to man the country's defences. During the previous months, ever since the Munich episode, the French had become accustomed to the idea of a fierce, terrific war, with lightning blows on land, on sea and in the air; they thought they were in for the same kind of struggle to the finish which they had previously experienced, only even more gruesome and deadly. Anticipating the worst, they were fully prepared for it, and neither the Government nor the High Command were very much concerned at that time as to how the man-in-the-trench would behave when facing the ordeal.

To troops ready to put up with every sacrifice, the almost total inactivity prevailing on the Western Front during the first three months of the war came at first as a most welcome anti-climax. Men who had been sent to the Italian border, ready to face the first onslaught of Germany's partner in the Steel Pact, now found themselves peacefully basking in the Riviera sun. Others were not as fortunate, sleeping in barns and digging trenches day after day, their feet in the mud, but except for contact elements on the German border, very few of the five million men France had mobilized had as yet done any fighting or even been anywhere near the danger zone. As this is written they are safely barracked at strategic points all over the country, ready to be sent wherever they may be needed at a moment's notice, but at present doing nothing.

It is a commonplace among general staffs that, next to defeat, idleness is the greatest danger to the morale of the troops, and that a soldier must not be left brooding over his lot. This would seem particularly relevant when dealing with compulsorily recruited non-professional soldiers, as is mostly the case in modern warfare. Take the case of Monsieur Jean Durand, a middle-class middle-aged married man with three children. He has been mobilized as a private, with a pay of one and a half American cents per day. This man is no hero, but he knows he must play his part in the defence of the country and its institutions, and wants to play it wholeheartedly. He expects danger, or at least action, and to a certain extent is eager for it. But if he is allowed to stand by, aimlessly waiting for an emergency that fails to materialize, rendering no apparent service to his country, while his folk, deprived of his earning power, may be in a bad way, is it not possible that sooner or later he may question the need or the wisdom of the sacrifice he is called upon to make? Is he going to accept without grumbling the many small physical discomforts and hardships of his position? In short, is there not a chance that he may become disgusted with the war, and, together with like-minded fellow citizens, fall a prey to defeatist propaganda?

THE DANGER OF A "PHONY" WAR

During the last war, there had been lulls, dull periods when everything was relatively "quiet on the Western Front." But the enemy was occupying huge stretches of French soil, skirmishes occurred daily over a widely extended front, and the necessity for carrying the war through to victory was obvious even to the most muddle-headed Frenchman. Certainly no one, and least of all the soldier, should complain that the present war is not severe enough, and that too little bloodshed has occurred so far. But there is some danger in a "phony," or as it is called here, a funny war. Though the present temper of the French combatant is admittedly cheerful and wholesome, the cautious High Command is not prepared to run the risk, however slight, that through sheer idleness a low morale may be allowed to develop in the army.

Besides, had the Government taken the nonchalant view and chosen to keep aloof, other and more dynamic factors would have made it clear that the problem called for some kind of positive action.

In the first days of the war, French soldiers plodding their way through German territory were met by large posters carrying block letter headlines such as "LET US BE FRIENDS" or "WHY FIGHT? WE WANT TO DO YOU NO HARM. IT IS THE ENGLISH WE ARE AFTER." Loud-speakers placed on lorries and wheeled from one end of the front to the other kept shouting similar slogans. Once or twice German planes dropped leaflets containing friendly excerpts from Hitler's and Ribbentrop's speeches. Regular broadcasts from Germany in French, aimed both at the non-combatant and at the combatant at the rear or in trenches, sought to prove that the French were fighting England's war. "Where are the British soldiers? We have not met a single one yet," ran one of these broadcasts, repeated several times in accordance with the well-established technique of German propaganda. "France's man-power is fully mobilized, you are giving your flesh and blood whereas the English are merely giving their money. Don't you see you are just tools in the hands of Britain? The English want to destroy Germany and therefore we hate them. But we want to be friends with you and if you separate your cause from theirs, we can put an end to this senseless struggle."

More subtle were the attempts at disintegration from within, through the communistic cells in the country. When the war broke out, the Communist Party had 72 out of a total of 612 representatives in the French Parliament, and hundreds more in townships and local councils; it owned or controlled scores of daily or weekly newspapers; and it shared with the Socialist Party the leadership of the French Federation of Labor. Upon orders from Moscow, the whole party organization was immediately turned into a powerful propaganda machine, producing thousands of defeatist leaflets aimed at mobilized and non-mobilized workers and through them at the whole of French opinion. "The U.S.S.R.," it was said, "had always pursued a peaceful course, and the Soviet-German Pact was but the latest and most striking instance of that

policy. Stalin had kept Hitler from further expansion to the East and now that Poland had vanished into thin air there was no need to prolong the struggle any more. The war was now imperialistic in character, and the working class ought not to participate in it. It should be stopped instantly."

The awkward and sometimes pitiful situation resulting from the compulsory evacuation of civilian populations near the border, the delays in the exchange of mail and news between the front and the rear, the unequal condition of men mobilized in the trenches and men mobilized at the factory: all these potential sources of complaint and discontent were good enough material for surrender-propagandists, both internal and external, who sought to persuade France of the advisability of a quick peace on Hitler's terms.

Thus the French Government was directly challenged to act. Measures taken have been of three kinds. In the first place attempts have been made to stop propaganda at its source whenever possible. In the second place, propaganda that could not be stopped has been met by counter-propaganda. Finally, acting on the principle that germs of defeatist propaganda can grow only on a weakened and crippled organism, the Government has endeavored to keep the soldiers in such a sound moral and physical condition as will enable them to resist any microbes which do succeed in reaching them.

STOPPING PROPAGANDA AT ITS SOURCE

Probably the most perfected and ancient preventive technique against defeatist propaganda is the censorship of mail and newspapers, to which has recently been added the radio. Censorship in a country at war achieves a number of purposes, the first and foremost being to prevent the disclosure of information that might be of use to the enemy or the publication of articles that might have an adverse effect on diplomatic moves. But censorship is also used to prevent writings calculated to exert a detrimental influence on public morale from appearing in the press. The French fighting forces can get hold of practically all newspapers, mailed to them or on sale in the villages or hamlets in which they are stationed. But

these papers are devoid of "harmful" topics, i.e. alarmist articles based on a voluntary or involuntary distortion of facts; articles that start arguments about the nature of military operations and the wisdom of such and such a move; and articles likely to breed internal controversies through attacks on France's allies, or on racial or religious groups.

Needless to say, there is a great deal of arbitrary and sometimes evil censorship. But except for the two or three first weeks of the war, there has been little or no censorship of news as such. The Government has studiously avoided repeating mistakes committed in the last war, when bad news was hidden until it became so bad that it could not be withheld any longer, and had to be released *en bloc* with a shocking effect on public morale. Today the British and French High Commands publish important losses in full, as they have come to know that the best way to earn general confidence is through genuine rather than sanguine communiqués. Similarly, while fair prominence is given to news likely to affect morale favorably (for instance when French airmen flying Curtiss fighters defeated numerically superior German forces, thereby ending the legend of German air supremacy), yet here again a large amount of restraint is shown. Not much ballyhoo, sales-talk or *bourrage de crane* is indulged in; memories of the last war are still too recent and the French would immediately resent it. Great pains are also taken not to overemphasize the favorable aspects of certain international happenings lest the public be led to entertain hasty and unwarranted hopes. This has been especially apparent in the case of Italy's non-belligerency and also when the United States Congress voted the repeal of the embargo on arms and ammunition. (The debates in Congress had been closely followed in France but, as might be expected, not always very well understood; it is said that a peasant soldier who had just heard radio news of the lifting of the embargo called to his companions: "Hurrah! At last Embargo is on our side!")

Through preventive censorship of the mail, the press, and the radio, Communist propaganda was largely rendered harmless, but clandestine printing-machines still issued defeatist pamphlets which were circulated from hand to hand in factories or among

the troops. This activity led to the dissolution of the Communist Party and the imprisonment of Communist leaders who continued to advocate following the Soviet lead in home and foreign affairs. By that time the attitude of the U.S.S.R. had created a widespread and growing uneasiness among the rank and file of the party and a rapid decline in its membership, so that the arrest of the more extreme leaders did not evoke much opposition on the part of their former supporters.

MEETING PROPAGANDA BY COUNTER-PROPAGANDA

Preventive steps could be taken against propaganda at home, but as France was not prepared to threaten French people who chose to listen to German broadcasts with the death or any other penalty, other measures had to be adopted in order to deal with foreign propaganda. As has been said above, German broadcasts in French are based on the idea that the war is British in origin, not German or French; that the Germans want to do no harm to the French; that only the English stand in the way of a new era of understanding between the two great peoples; that proof of the devilish hypocrisy of the English is that they let the French do the mobilizing and the fighting, whereas they rest content with making profits and proffering credits and machinery.

The maneuver seemed clumsy and obviously doomed to failure, but the French Government knew that it could not simply be disregarded and ignored. The well-known hammering technique of Dr. Goebbels is that truth is made of a lie repeated the necessary number of times; the insinuations over the German radio were uttered by refined French voices in a gentle and persuasive tone and accompanied with all the modern paraphernalia of radio propaganda.

A first step taken by the French Government was to broadcast on the same wave-length as the German radio stations, thus making it more difficult for French listeners to hear the German appeals. A second step was to release damaging information about the French "traitors" participating in the German broadcasts, thus bringing them into disrepute. But nothing could be as effective as a refutation by facts.

The facts are well known. Every day French soldiers can watch well-equipped new British troops falling into line beside them. It is true that there are at present many more French troops in France than there are now, or will ever be, English troops. All Frenchmen between the ages of 20 and 45 are mobilized, whereas apart from the regular professional army the only Englishmen so far under arms are those between 20 and 22. But the French know that this is a temporary situation. Besides, they see hundreds of planes from the Royal Air Force protecting their lines, and they read in the papers that the losses of men in the British Navy have equalled the total losses in land and air of all French and British forces. The only thing that remained then to be done was to convey these facts to the sight and hearing of the ordinary French public. Speeches by members of the Government, newsreels, inspired articles emphasizing the British contribution to the common cause all helped to that effect. Recently a Franco-British show staged "somewhere on the front" was broadcast all over France. Maurice Chevalier and Noel Coward took part in it. One could hear and almost see the French and British soldiers seated elbow to elbow and distinguish the French laughter from the British. To millions of listeners all over France this was as good an antidote to the German propaganda as anything else. The suggestion that the British effort is not equal to the French is thus being refuted by facts, but the Government is alive to the need for seeing that these facts are made known and appreciated and that their full meaning is made clear to all.

As to the other point of German propaganda, that this is England's war, several official radio speeches have reiterated the reasons why France went to war, and unofficial polls within the fighting forces have always given the same reply, the one which Mr. Chamberlain stressed in the Commons: "*il faut en finie*," the sheer necessity of putting an end to an unbearable situation. So that there is for the present very little counter-propaganda, the only type being radio records stressing the broken pledges of Herr Hitler. "The friendly words that Hitler now finds for our country, he spoke once for Austria, for Czechoslovakia, for Poland. So judge for yourselves,"—that is the theme of such counter-action.

FIGHTING IDLENESS AND BOREDOM

But the most important item is to keep the soldiers physically and morally fit, and to fight against idleness and boredom which, if they were allowed to get a grip on the troops, would provide excellent ground for this same propaganda which at present has so little effect. A number of measures have been taken, each one seemingly unimportant and modest, but their total contributes to the same goal and is inspired by the same basic idea.

In the first weeks of the war, the disruption caused by the mobilization was so great that it took anywhere from one to three weeks for a soldier in the front line to receive news from his family, or vice versa. Not to get any mail at a time when letters were the only personal link between the rear and the front was particularly hard on the soldier. A personal investigation by the French Premier restored efficiency. Letters and parcels from and to the soldiers are now transported and delivered free of charge in record time.

During the last war, soldiers were not granted leave until after a year in the trenches. This time, the Government has decided that the soldier is entitled to a minimum leave of eight or ten days every four months and that he may be granted as many short supplementary periods of leave as the needs of his service permit. Special 30-day periods are granted to farmers for work on the land.

The soldier's pay is still extremely low, even though the front-line combatant receives a small daily premium. But if the soldier's family was dependent on his peace-time earning power, it is now automatically entitled to governmental allowances, so that to some extent the soldier does not have to worry too much about the well-being of his people. So far as he, himself, is concerned, the Army provides him with sleeping quarters, clothes, food and tobacco, and special instructions have been issued to the effect that every care be taken to make him as comfortable as the situation allows.

Theatrical tours are encouraged and the most popular moving picture stars and stage hits perform for the troops in countryside inns and village stables. Wherever he may be stationed the soldier now finds a branch of the "combatant's club," a place designed for his recreation and leisure, where he can play music and read books.

Military drills and outdoor sports keep him busy during the day-time.

Finally, commissioned and non-commissioned officers from the regular Army are under strict orders not to allow any laxity in the discharge of routine military duties and to enforce discipline, but tempered with good humor and constantly keeping in mind the soldier's well-being. And the High Command gives the example by refusing to spill the combatant's blood unless under imperative necessity.

All of these techniques, some of which are so different from those of the last war, are the means of keeping the French soldier in high spirits. That so far they have been found sufficient does not mean that they may not have to be developed, improved or altered as the war changes in character.

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

WITH this issue the QUARTERLY introduces a new section featuring measurement of public opinion by the "poll" and "panel" techniques. It contains the following departments: (1) BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION, reporting selected questions asked British voters by the British Institute; (2) GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS, a regular compilation of the poll data released by the American Institute of Public Opinion and by *Fortune* magazine; (3) ANALYSIS OF POLL RESULTS, containing a general, high-light commentary on the poll data and a detailed analysis of a single important question asked during the preceding quarter; (4) "PANEL" STUDIES; and (5) PROBLEMS AND TECHNIQUES.

In considering poll data, certain salient points of reference must be borne in mind. The American Institute and *Fortune* surveys are conducted by separate, independent organizations, similar in that both have a common interest in reporting public opinion by the use of objective, statistical methods, but differing in many details of method. Both surveys rely on the use of sampling procedures to reach voters in various social groups throughout the nation. Interviews are obtained from rich and poor, old and young, men and women, and other representative

groups, in the proportion in which these groups exist in the populations sampled. Both use interviewers strategically located in key sections throughout the country. Both pay close attention to wording, timing, cross-section, presentation, and a host of kindred problems. But since the measurement of public opinion is still in its infancy, it is clear that many points of method are by no means finally settled, but are subject to change and experiment.

The importance of the *time* factor must be stressed, particularly in interpreting the standing of political candidates and the trends of party popularity. The Institute poll is geared to the tempo of frequent newspaper releases, publishing its returns three times weekly in its subscribing newspapers. The *Fortune* Survey, on the other hand, is adjusted to monthly magazine publication. Since public opinion is demonstrably sensitive to events and organized pressures, each survey should be considered as a photograph of opinion *taken at a particular point of time*. All interpretations of these measurements of opinion must take this time factor into account.

Secondly, the observer must be aware that poll results can be interpreted only in the light of the specific question asked and, conse-

quently, that differences in the wording, phrasing or manner of presenting the question to the respondent cannot be ignored. Both the Institute and *Fortune* organizations are conscious of the importance of careful wording, although each relies on its own formulae for framing neutral questions. Differences resulting from wording and general questionnaire methodology must also be noted in making intelligent comparisons.

The third point to bear in mind is the composition of the sample population covered by each of these surveys. The Institute usually samples only eligible voters as the basis of its cross-section (e.g., excluding Negro voters who, for various reasons, do not vote in some states). In cases where the question seems to indicate it, the Institute uses a social cross-section (including Negroes in all states), instead of a political cross-section. The *Fortune* Survey also publishes some studies including only voting groups, and others including all adult groups in the population. It is important in examining these results to know whether the cross-section used was political or social.

Students of the surveys are already aware of the need to bear in mind the limitations of the sample method which requires that the significance of all results be considered in the light of the probable-error limit. For total surveys, as a result of size of sample, the most common probable error allowed on a "yes-no" basis is from 3 to 4 per cent.

One final guiding point must be mentioned. Institute returns are gen-

erally reported in terms of those expressing an opinion on the issue. Thus the total of "yes" plus "no" votes is considered as 100 per cent, and the percentage of "yes" and of "no" votes are calculated on that basis. The excluded "no opinion" vote is usually given as a separate, independent percentage based upon the total sample. On the other hand, *Fortune* follows the practice of including the "no opinion" vote within the total 100 per cent. Thus the percentages of various types of opinion votes are based on the total sample, rather than on the number of respondents expressing an opinion. The British Institute of Public Opinion sometimes follows one procedure, sometimes the other. To compare results on similar questions asked by different polls, the reader will have to make a simple arithmetic correction to allow for this difference in method of presentation.

The QUARTERLY wishes to express its appreciation to George Gallup and the American Institute of Public Opinion; to its affiliate, the British Institute of Public Opinion; and to Elmo Roper and the editors of *Fortune* for their cooperation in making these survey results available in convenient form to other students of public opinion.

This introduction was prepared, and the following poll results were compiled by Saul Forbes Rae, now associated with George Gallup, after work in the public opinion field in England, especially at Oxford University.

1. British Institute of Public Opinion

Herewith the **QUARTERLY** presents questions asked of British voters before and after the outbreak of war by the British Institute of Public Opinion, selected on the basis of relevancy to the war issue. Both because many of them have never before been published and because timing of interviews is so important, the dates given refer to the time ballots were sent to interviewers rather than to the time the information was released. Owing to the difficulty of communicating with the BIPO staff, dates have not been verified, but there is every reason to believe that they are at least approximately accurate.

1. BEFORE THE WAR

Do you favor compulsory military training? (Jan. '37)

Yes	25%	If so, up to the age of 25?	57%
No	75	Or up to the age of 35?	43
No op.	1	(No op. 3%)	

Should the manufacture of armaments be in the hands of the Government? (Apr. '37)

Yes	86%
No	14
No op.	1

Do you think it was a mistake to enter the World War in 1914? (May '37)

Yes	34%
No	66
No op.	1

If another major European war breaks out do you think Great Britain will be drawn into it? (Dates as indicated)

	Yes	No	No op.
May '37	83%	17%	1%
Jun. '37	75	25	4

Do you think this country should continue to support the League of Nations? (Jun. '37)

	Yes	No	No op.
Early Jun.	74%	26%	1%
Late Jun.	85	15	16

If you HAD to choose between Fascism and Communism, which would you choose? (May '37)

Fascism	49%
Communism	51
No ans.	46

Do you favor returning any of her former Colonies to Germany? (Nov. '37)

Yes	24%
No	76
No op.	2

(To men) If there were another war, would you volunteer? (To women) Would you urge your husband to volunteer? (Nov. '37)	Yes	38%	22%
	No	62	78
	No op.	6	12
Have you taken any precautions against air-raids? (Dec. '37)	Yes	7.5%	
	No	92.5	
Do you think that the Dominions will fight with the British people in case of another war? (Jan. '38)	Yes	71%	
	No	4	
	No op.	25	
Do you believe Mr. Eden was right in resigning? (Feb. '38)	Yes	71%	
	No	19	
	No op.	10	
Do you agree with Mr. Eden's reasons for resigning? (Feb. '38)	Yes	69%	
	No	19	
	No op.	12	
Do you favor Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy? (Feb. '38)	Yes	26%	
	No	58	
	No op.	16	
Should Great Britain promise assistance to Czechoslovakia if Germany also acts towards her as she did towards Austria? (Mar. '38)	Yes	33%	
	No	43	
	No op.	24	
A National Register could be made listing everybody available for Civilian or Military service in war time. Should this be done immediately? (Oct. '38)	Yes	78%	
	No	22	
	No op.	14	
Are you in favor of giving back any former German Colonies? (Oct. '38)	Yes	15%	
	No	85	
	No op.	13	
If "No," would you rather fight than hand them back? (Oct. '38)	Yes	78%	
	No	22	
	No op.	9	
Hitler says he has "No more territorial ambitions in Europe." Do you believe him? (Oct. '38)	Yes	7%	
	No	93	

BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION

79

In the present situation do you favor increased expenditure on armaments? (Oct. '38)

Yes 72%
No 18
No op. 10

Have you volunteered for any form of national service? (Dec. '38)

Yes 19%
No 81

If "No," do you intend to volunteer under the National Register System? (Dec. '38)

Yes 29%
No 37
No op. 34

If there were a war between Germany and Russia, which side would you rather see win? (Dec. '38)

Germany 15%
Russia 85
No op. 31

How should the increase in rearmament be paid for—by further taxation or by Government loans? (Dec. '38)

Loans 76%
Taxes 24
No op. 28

If you HAD to choose between Fascism and Communism which would you choose? (Jan. '39)

Fascism 26%
Communism 74
No ans. 16

Which of these statements comes nearest to representing your view of Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement? (Feb. '39)

1. It is a policy which will ultimately lead to enduring peace in Europe. 28%
2. It will keep us out of war until we have time to rearm. 46
3. It is bringing war nearer by whetting the appetites of the dictators. 24

(No opinion 2%)

Are you in favor of giving back any former German Colonies? (Mar. '39)

Yes 14%
No 78
No op. 8

If "No," would you rather fight than hand them back? (Mar. '39)

Yes 69%
No 19
No op. 12

Would you like to see Great Britain and Soviet Russia being more friendly to each other? (Mar. '39)

Yes 84%
No 7
No op. 9

Is the British Government right in following a policy of giving military guarantees to preserve the independence of small European nations? (Apr. '39)	Yes	83%
	No	17
	No op.	14

It has been decided to enlarge the British Army to 33 Field Divisions. Are you in favor of obtaining the necessary recruits on a planned and compulsory basis, or of leaving it to individuals to enrol voluntarily? (Apr. '39)	Planned	39%
	Voluntary	53
	No op.	8

Are you in favor of Mr. Winston Churchill being invited to join the Cabinet? (May '39)	Yes	56%
	No	26
	No op.	18

Do you think the risk of war has increased or decreased since last autumn? (May '39)	Incr.	30%
	Decr.	57
	No op.	13

In his speech last Friday Hitler said: "... the opinion prevails in Great Britain that no matter in what conflict Germany should some day be entangled, Great Britain would always have to take her stand against Germany. . . ." Do you think this statement is true or untrue? (May '39)	True	31%
	Untrue	58
	No op.	11

Do you approve of the Government's decision to apply conscription, or are you in favor of leaving it to individuals to enrol voluntarily? (May '39)	Conscrip.	58%
	Vol.	38
	No op.	4

Do you think the time has come for the "Peace Front" countries to draw up a detailed plan for world peace as the basis of a conference to which all countries would be invited? (June '39)	Yes	61%
	Later	19
	Never	11
	No op.	9

If there were an air raid today while you were at home, could you by foot reach a shelter in seven minutes? (June '39)	Public shelter	12%
	Own private shelter	12
	Arranged private shelter	4
	None	72

Are you in favor of a military alliance between Great Britain, France and Russia? (June '39)	Yes	84%
	No	9
	No op.	7

Which foreign country do you prefer? (and) Which is the foreign country you like least? (June '39)

PREFER:		LIKE LEAST:	
United States	33%	Belgium	1%
France	22	Sweden	1
Russia	12	Denmark	1
Germany	3	Holland	1
Switzerland	2	All others*	3
Norway	2	No opinion	19
		Germany	54%
		Japan	11
		Italy	9
		Russia	5
		Spain	1
		France	1
		No op.	19

(*Finland, less than 1%)

Conscription applies now to men between 20 and 21 years of age. Should it be abolished altogether, left as it is, or should the age limits be extended? (Jul. '39)	Abolished	18%
	Left as is	42
	Extended	34
	DK	6

If Germany and Poland go to war over Danzig should we fulfill our pledge to fight on Poland's side? (Jul. '39)	Yes	76%
	No	13
	DK	11

Do you, or do you not, think the British Government is doing its best to secure a pact with Russia? (Aug. '39)	Yes	50%
	No	30
	DK	20

2. AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Should a British Cabinet Minister be sent to Moscow now to discuss our future relations with Russia? (Oct. '39)	Yes	47%
	No	34
	DK	19

Apart from the Budget, have you, personally, had any change in employment or income as a direct result of the war? (Oct. '39)	Better	7%
	Worse	31
	None	62

Should Great Britain and France draw up and publish their war aims? (Oct. '39)	Yes	44%
	No	12
	Already explicit enough	29
	DK	15

Should the Allies and Germany tell President Roosevelt the terms on which they would make peace, to see if he thinks a settlement could be arranged? (Oct. '39)	Yes	48%
	No	41
	DK	11

Should the evacuation of children be made compulsory? (Oct. '39)	Yes	43%
	No	46
	DK	11

Do you think the Government's decision to compel parents to pay something for the upkeep of evacuated children is fair or unfair?	Fair	76%
	Unfair	18
	DK	6

(and)

Do you think parents will pay or will bring their children home? (Oct. '39)	Pay	32%
	Home	38
	DK	30

If Finland or Sweden, Norway or Denmark becomes involved in war with Russia, should Britain give them military assistance? (Nov. '39)	Yes	42%
	No	38%
	DK	20

Do you think that Russia intends to give Germany such help as will enable Germany to defeat Britain and France? (Nov. '39)	Yes	14%
	No	68
	DK	18

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the Government's conduct of the war? (Nov. '39)

	<i>Satisfied</i>	<i>Dissatisfied</i>	<i>Stop the War</i>	<i>No Op.</i>
Total	61%	18%	11%	10%
Gov't Voters	74	10	5	11
Oppos. Voters	46	31	14	9

Are you satisfied with Mr. Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister?
(Dates as indicated)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No Op.</i>		<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>No Op.</i>
Oct. '38	57%	43%	10%	May '39	55%	45%	4%
Dec. '38	56	44	9	Jul. '39	59	41	7
Mar. '39	58	42	10	Oct. '39	65	29	6

2. Gallup and Fortune Polls

This section contains a compilation, topically arranged, of poll results released by the American Institute of Public Opinion and by *Fortune*. It is complete for the time periods covered except for a few special surveys listed at the end of this section. The Institute results cover the period from August through December 1939. (Previous AIPO questions were reported in the July 1938 and October 1939 issues of the *QUARTERLY*.) The *Fortune* questions are those which appeared in the September, October (supplement), November and December 1939 issues of the magazine. Under each topic, all of the Institute data are given in chronological order, then all of the *Fortune* material, also in chronological sequence. Dates appearing in connection with AIPO questions are those carried in the date lines of Institute releases to subscribing newspapers; dates following *Fortune* questions indicate the issue of the magazine in which the information appeared. Institute questions are designated by AIPO; *Fortune* questions by FOR. "DK" stands for "don't know"; "no op." for "no opinion."

Part One: Domestic Issues

I. POLITICAL

CONGRESS

In general, do you think that the present Congress has done a good job or a poor job? (Aug. 27, '39—AIPO)

	Good Job	Poor Job		Good Job	Poor Job		Good Job	Poor Job
Total	57%	43%	Up. Incom.	60%	40%	West Centr.	59%	41%
Democrats	52	48	Mid. Incom.	61	39	South	55	45
Republicans	64	36	Low. Incom.	51	49	West	56	44
Farmers	62	38	Reliefers	45	55			
City Voters	56	44	New Engl.	62	38			
Small Town			Mid-Atl.	57	43			
Voters	58	42	East Centr.	56	44			

(No op. 25%)

Do you think Congress was right in defeating President Roosevelt's three billion dollar lending bill?
(Aug. 27, '39—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	68%	32%
Dem.	51	49
Rep.	93	7

(No op. 19%)

EMERGENCY CABINET

Do you think Roosevelt would do well to invite some of his political opponents, like Senator Vandenberg, Alf Landon, ex-President Hoover, and Carter Glass to join in a nonpolitical emergency cabinet now, or that he should continue as now with his regular Cabinet? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

Emerg. cab.	48.9%
As now	34.5
DK	16.6

PARTY STRENGTH

Which party do you think will win the Presidential election in 1940? (Oct. 15, '39—AIPO)

	Total	Dem.	Rep.	Jan. '37	Sept. '37	Apr. '38	Nov. '38	Apr. '39
Expect Dem. to win	65%	86%	26%	70%	69%	60%	50%	48%
Expect Rep. to win	35	14	74	30	31	40	50	52

(No opinion, Oct. '39, 27%)

Which party would you like to see win? (Oct. 15, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
Want Dem. to win	57%	49%	53%	53%	54%	77%	65%
Want Rep. to win	43	51	47	47	46	23	35

(No opinion, 21%)

Which party would you like to see win the Presidential election in 1940? (Nov. 19, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West	Total Oct. '39
Want Dem. to win	54%	44%	51%	50%	51%	77%	59%	57%
Want Rep. to win	46	56	49	50	49	23	41	43

(No opinion, 19%)

Which political party is more likely to keep us out of war—the Republicans or the Democrats? (Dec. 12, '39—AIPO)

	Rep. More Likely	Dem. More Likely	No Diff.
Total	21%	27%	52%
Dem. voters	5	48	47
Rep. voters	42	3	55

(DK 14%)

Which one of the following statements most nearly represents your idea of the Republican party? (Sept. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Prosperous	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Poor
a. The election of the Republican party in 1940 provides the only hope for saving this country.	10.3%	14.2%	11.5%	9.5%	8.8%
b. If elected in 1940 the Republicans could serve the country well, provided they find new liberal leaders who are in tune with the times.	28.7	29.8	34.4	29.7	20.1
c. The Republicans and conservative Democrats are about alike and it doesn't matter which elects a President, so long as there is a change from the present administration.	27.5	34.9	30.8	27.2	23.5
d. If the Republican party comes to power in 1940 it will be a calamity for the country.	16.7	12.4	11.7	17.1	23.4
e. DK	16.8	8.7	11.6	16.5	24.2

Believe of G.O.P. that:

- a. It is only hope
b. Could serve well with new leaders
c. It is like the conservative Democrats
d. Its election a calamity
e. DK

People Preferring for Presidency in 1940:

Roosevelt	Someone Else	DK
7.2%	86.2%	6.6%
31.1	59.6	9.3
17.2	72.3	10.5
78.6	15.0	6.4
54.2	18.1	27.7

ROOSEVELT POPULARITY

In general, do you approve or disapprove today of Roosevelt as President?
(Dates as shown—AIPO)

	APPROVE OF ROOSEVELT AS PRESIDENT				
	Aug. 22, '39	Sept. 21, '39	Oct. 26, '39	Nov. 21, '39	Dec. 26, '39
Total	56.6%	61.0%	64.9%	62.7%	63.5%
New England	51	53	59		
Mid-Atlantic	54	58	65		
East Central	51	59	61		
West Central	55	60	63		
South	70	72	76		
West	64	65	67		
Upper Income			46*	43	42
Middle Income			62*	60	61
Lower Income			78*	76	76

* Published Nov. 21, '39

Considering Mr. Roosevelt's six and a half years in office, on the whole do you approve or disapprove of: (Nov. '39—FOR.)

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Dis- approve</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>No Knowl- edge of</i>
ASSETS				
The CCC	83.7%	7.8%	4.1%	4.4%
His personality, as distinguished from his policies	82.1	11.7	6.2	—
His banking legislation	49.4	12.9	10.1	27.6
His stock-exchange legislation	28.6	10.9	14.5	46.0
The way he has guided U.S. foreign policy	48.5	18.5	14.4	18.6
The means by which his Administration has tried to aid the farmer	50.6	32.9	7.3	9.2
His relief program	52.3	37.4	7.9	2.4
His attitude toward labor and labor unions	40.1	32.0	12.1	15.8
LIABILITIES				
His attitude toward business and businessmen	35.1	37.3	12.5	15.1
His advisers	27.8	32.5	18.3	21.4
The way he has dealt with political opposition	27.4	34.9	14.5	23.2
His theory of government borrowing, spending, and lending for recovery	33.7	46.3	11.0	9.0
BALANCE				
His record as President	60.8	30.0	8.1	1.1

Do you think Congress was right or wrong in refusing to grant President Roosevelt's request to authorize the federal government to lend \$2,800,000,000 for its recovery program? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Prosperous</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>Negroes</i>	<i>Exec- utives</i>	<i>Factory Labor</i>	<i>Un- employed</i>
Right	55.1%	80.8%	39.9%	26.3%	74.9%	39.8%	33.6%
Wrong	25.4	11.9	31.8	44.3	19.4	37.9	43.1
DK	19.5	7.3	28.3	29.4	5.7	22.3	23.3

Would you like to see President Roosevelt reelected to office in 1940? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

Yes	34.4%	No	50.5%
Depends	9.9	DK	5.2

Which of the following statements most nearly represents your idea of the New Deal? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Under 40	Over 40
a. The New Deal has been the kind of government best suited to our times, and it should be continued without modification (whether under Mr. Roosevelt or someone else).	10.3%	10.3%	10.2%
b. Although the New Deal has not worked perfectly in many ways, it has done a lot of good and should be continued with some modifications and improvements.	44.9	50.2	40.2
c. The New Deal may have done some good, but it has done so many bad things that now we need a different administration.	20.9	20.2	21.5
d. The New Deal had a bad influence upon the nation, and it will take years of good government by others to clean up the mistakes.	16.2	11.5	20.5
e. DK	7.7	7.8	7.6

Under the circumstances, do you think it would be better to have a new President in 1940, or to have Roosevelt remain in office? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

December		September	
Keep Roosevelt	47.4%	Would choose Roosevelt	34.9%
New President	38.6	Would prefer someone else	53.3
DK	14.0	DK	11.8

THIRD TERM

(Young Democrats only, aged 20-29) If President Roosevelt runs for a third term will you vote for him? (Aug. 17, '39—AIPO)

If President Roosevelt runs for a third term will you vote for him? (Oct. 1, '39—AIPO)

% Yes in:	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West	No op.	Intensity Scale—Oct.:
Aug. '39	40%	32%	39%	35%	33%	57%	45%	8%	Strongly for 27%
Oct. '39*	43	34	45	32	37	61	47	9	Mildly for 16
									Strongly against 42
									Mildly against 15

*(Dem. voters: 66% yes; 34% no)

If the war is still going on next year, and if Roosevelt runs for a third term, would you vote for him? (Oct. 1, '39—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	52%	48%
Dem.	76	24
Rep.	10	90
Others	55	45
(No opinion, 10%)		

Do you think President Roosevelt will run for a third term? (Nov. 5, '39—AIPO)

	Yes	No
April '37	28%	72%
Aug. '37	37	63
July '38	36	64
June '39	48	52
Nov. '39	57	43
(Nov.—DK, 21%)		

Do you think he will be elected if he runs? (Nov. 5, '39—AIPO)

	Total	Democrats June '39	Democrats Nov. '39	Republicans June '39	Republicans Nov. '39
Yes	56%	61%	72%	16%	31%
No	44	39	18	84	69
(DK, 14%)					

Do you think the European war has increased Roosevelt's chances for a third term? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Prosperous	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Poor	Negroes	N.W. Plains*
Yes	50.6%	54.4%	53.9%	50.9%	48.3%	43.3%	39.9%
No	26.6	27.2	29.8	29.3	23.1	14.1	36.1
DK	22.8	18.4	16.3	19.8	28.6	42.6	24.0

*Major geographical variation.

PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS

(Democratic voters only) If President Roosevelt is not a candidate, whom would you like to see elected? (Dates as indicated—AIPO)

	Aug. 3, '39	Aug. 17, '39	Sept. 12, '39	Nov. 5, '39		Aug. 3, '39	Aug. 17, '39	Sept. 12, '39	Nov. 5, '39
Garner	46%	46%	45%	45%	Ickes				1
McNutt	13	13	21	18	Clark	1		1	1
Hull	12	12	10	13	Hopkins	3	3	1	
Farley	12	12	10	8	Murphy	3	3		
Murphy			2	3	Stark	1		1	
Smith				2	Wallace	1			
Barkley	1		1	1	Others	7	11	8	8
					No answer	54		54	63

A special survey of young Democrats (aged 20-29) yielded the following results to the above question (Aug. 17, '39—AIPO):

Garner	McNutt	Hull	Farley	Hopkins	Murphy	Others	No Ans.
41%	16%	15%	11%	4%	2%	11%	53%

(Democratic voters only) Whom would you like to see elected President in 1940? (Nov. 5, '39—AIPO)

Total		Roosevelt		All Others	
Roosevelt	83%	New England	88%		12%
Garner	8	Mid-Atl.	90		10
McNutt	3	East Cent.	81		19
Hull	3	West Cent.	77		23
Farley	1	South	76		24
Others	2	West	80		20
No ans.	35				

(Republican voters only) Whom would you like to see elected President in 1940? (Dates as shown—AIPO)

	Aug.	Oct.	Nov.		Aug.	Oct.	Nov.
	12, '39	12, '39	9, '39		12, '39	12, '39	9, '39
Dewey	45%	39%	39%	Lindbergh		1	1
Vandenberg	25	27	26	Lodge			1
Taft	14	17	18	Bricker	2	1	
Hoover	6	5	5	LaGuardia			
Landon	3	4	3	Others	3	3	4
Borah	2	3	3	No answer	44		49

Breakdowns published in connection with the Aug. '39 results tabulated above were as follows (Aug. 12, '39—AIPO):

	ECONOMIC GROUP			AGE GROUP			RESIDENCE		
	Upper	Middle	Lower	Under 30	30-49	50 & over	Urban	Farm	Small Town
Dewey	39%	46%	47%	56%	47%	38%	44%	40%	52%
Vandenberg	31	23	24	19	24	28	29	22	17
Taft	14	13	16	13	12	16	12	18	15

(Republican voters only) If it came to a choice between Robert Taft, Thomas Dewey or Arthur Vandenberg for President, which one would you prefer? (Nov. 9, '39—AIPO)

Dewey	44%
Vanden.	31
Taft	25
No op.	16

If Thomas Dewey runs for President in 1940 on the Republican ticket against Roosevelt running for a third term on the Democratic ticket, which would you prefer? (Dec. 5, '39—AIPO)

	TOTAL	PARTY	ECONOMIC GROUP			AGE GROUP		
			Dem.	Rep.	Relief-ers	Under 30	30-49	50 & above
Roosevelt	54%	88%	8%	33%	49%	66%	73%	57%
Dewey	46	12	92	67	51	34	27	43
		(Undecided 14%)		*Including "Reliefers"				

If you had your choice of candidates for President in 1940, would you choose Mr. Roosevelt or someone else? (Sept. '39—FOR.)

	Total	South-east	South-west	Negroes	Poor	Unem- ployed	Labor		
							Farm	Misc.	Factory
Roosevelt	34.9%	52.1%	48.1%	64.8%	49.1%	54.8%	54.0%	52.4%	48.9%
Someone else	53.3	38.4	40.6	18.6	37.0	35.6	29.7	38.1	43.5
DK	11.8	9.5	11.3	16.6	13.9	9.6	16.3	9.5	7.6

(If above answer "someone else") Can you, offhand, name your first choice for President?

	DK	Dewey	Garner	Vanden- berg	Taft	Hull	Hoover	McNutt	Landon	Oth- ers
% of anti-Roosevelt	63.8%	9.6%	8.0%	6.1%	2.2%	1.8%	1.1%	1.0%	.9%	5.5%
% of population	34.0	5.1	4.3	3.3	1.2	.9	.6	.5	.5	2.9

If you had to choose between these two men to succeed President Roosevelt in 1940, which one would you prefer, as you feel now? (Sept. '39—FOR.)

Taft	27.2%	Dewey	45.7%	Garner	51.0%	Hull	40.6%
Clark	14.9	Farley	27.8	LaGuardia	22.6	Vandenberg	24.4
DK	57.9	DK	26.5	DK	26.4	DK	35.0

2. ECONOMIC

BUSINESS

Do you personally expect business conditions throughout the country to be more prosperous or less prosperous during the next six months than they are now? (Aug. 27, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atlant.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West	Busi- ness	Farm- ers
More	64%	80%	66%	61%	55%	72%	63%	69%	58%
Less	36	20	34	39	45	28	37	31	42

(No op. or "about the same" 33%)

Do you think business would be more prosperous, or less prosperous, if we had a Republican President in the White House? (Nov. 30, '39—AIPO)

	Total	More	Less	No Diff.
Dem.	41	27	32	
Rep.	10	50	40	
	79	2	19	

(No op. 15%)

LABOR

Do you think labor unions should be regulated by the Federal Government? (Dec. 9, '39—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	79%	21%
Urban	78	22
Small town	77	23
Farmers	84	16
(No op. 17%)		

Are you in favor of labor unions? (Dec. 9, '39—AIPO)

Yes	74%
No	26
No op.	8

Do you think it would be a good thing for business if the A.F. of L. and the CIO got together? (Dec. 9, '39—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	93%	7%
Union mem.	94	6
(No op. 15%)		

Do you think it would be a good thing for labor if the A.F. of L. and CIO got together? (Dec. 9, '39—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	95%	5%
Union mem.	93	7
(No op. 13%)		

OLD AGE PENSIONS

Do you believe in government old age pensions? (Nov. 26, '39—AIPO)

Yes	90%
No	10
No op.	3

Do you think pensions should be given only to old people who are in need, or to all old people? (Nov. 26, '39—AIPO)

Needy only	77%
All old people	23
No op.	6

About how much per month should be paid to a single person? To a husband and wife? (Nov. 26, '39—AIPO)

Median:	Single	Hus. & Wife
Soc. sample	\$37	\$60
Polit. sample	\$41	\$65

RELIEF

Have you heard about the new law that requires all WPA workers to work an average of 30 hours a week? What do you think of this law? (Aug. 5, '39—AIPO)

Total*		WPA Workers		All Others	
Approve:		Approve:		Approve:	
Strongly	42%	Strongly	28%	Strongly	46%
Mildly	25	Mildly	25	Mildly	25
} 67%		} 53%		} 71%	
Disapprove:		Disapprove:		Disapprove:	
Strongly	19	Strongly	31	Strongly	16
Mildly	14	Mildly	16	Mildly	13
} 33		} 47		} 29	

(No op. 11%) * Approve: Rep. 79%; Dem. 62%

In general, how much money do you think WPA workers should be paid? (Aug. 5, '39—AIPO)	Less than workers in private industry 73%
	About the same as workers in industry 26
	More than workers in private industry 1
	No opinion 3

Pennsylvania has a law requiring all able-bodied people on relief (including WPA) to accept any job offered by a local government, no matter what kind of job it is. If they refuse to take the job, their relief is cut off. Do you favor this law? (Aug. 10, '39—AIPO)	Yes	No
	Total 81%	19%
	Penna. 84	16
	Reliefers 64	36
	Others 83	17
	(DK 7%)	

The government has tried out a food stamp plan which lets people on relief buy certain surplus farm products below their regular selling price. The government makes up the difference to the merchant. Do you approve or disapprove of this plan? (Nov. 23, '39—AIPO)	Appr.	70%
	Disappr.	30
	No op.	12

Would you approve of extending the food stamp plan to families earning less than \$20 a week as well as to persons on relief? (Nov. 23, '39—AIPO)	Yes	57%
	No	43
	No op.	13

3. SOCIAL

COMMUNIST PARTY

Which of these statements best describes your opinion about the Communist Party in the United States? (Nov. 28, '39—AIPO)

1. The Communist Party in this country takes orders directly from Russia.	25%
2. The policies of the Communist Party in the U.S. are decided on by Communists in this country in consultation with Russia.	27
3. The policies of the American Communist Party are decided entirely by Communists in the U.S.	9
Know nothing about the Communist Party and no answer.	<div> { National 39 City dwellers 35 Farmers 50 </div>

About how many members do you think there are in the Communist party in the U.S.? (Nov. 28, '39—AIPO)

DK 60%; median for those answering: 300,000.

DIES COMMITTEE

	Total	Dem.	Rep.
Do you think Congress should provide money to continue the Dies Committee for another year? (Oct. 31, '39—AIPO)	Continue 53%	52%	63%
	Discon. 14	16	11
	No op. 33	32	26

Should Congress provide money to continue the Dies Committee for another year? (Dec. 14, '39—AIPO)	Yes 75%
	No 25

What is your opinion regarding the Dies Committee? (Dec. 14, '39—AIPO)

1. Congress should appoint some other committee to do the work.	12%
2. Congress should provide money so the Dies Committee can continue for another year.	75
3. The investigations should be discontinued.	13
(No op. 17%)	

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Do you believe (1) That the great age of economic opportunity and expansion in the U.S. is over? or (2) That American industry can create a comparable expansion and opportunity in the future? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Executives	Factory Labor	Unemployed	Prosperous	Poor
Opportunity over (1)	13.1%	13.2%	16.7%	15.5%	11.4%	15.9%
Expansion ahead (2)	71.7	82.8	69.6	66.0	83.4	63.1
DK	15.2	4.0	13.7	18.5	5.2	21.0

MOST INTERESTING EVENT

Which of these news events of 1939 interested you most? (Dec. 31, '39—AIPO)

MEN

1. England and France declare war on Germany
2. Special session of Congress lifts arms embargo
3. Attempt on Hitler's life in Munich bombing
4. German *Blitzkrieg* in Poland
5. Russia's invasion of Finland
6. Scuttling of the *Graf Spee*
7. Germany seizes Bohemia and Moravia
8. Russo-German treaty of friendship
9. Dies Committee hearings
10. Yankees win fourth straight World's Series

WOMEN

1. England and France declare war on Germany
2. Special session of Congress lifts arms embargo
3. Scuttling of the *Graf Spee*
4. Visit of the King and Queen
5. Attempt on Hitler's life in Munich bombing
6. German *Blitzkrieg* in Poland
7. Russia's invasion of Finland
8. Roosevelt's Thanksgiving proclamation
9. Germany seizes Bohemia and Moravia
10. Sinking of submarines *Squalus*, *Thetis* and *Phoenix*

COMBINED

1. England and France declare war on Germany
2. Special session of Congress lifts arms embargo
3. Attempt on Hitler's life in Munich bombing
4. Scuttling of *Graf Spee*
5. German *Blitzkrieg* in Poland
6. Visit of the King and Queen
7. Russia's invasion of Finland
8. Germany seizes Bohemia and Moravia
9. Roosevelt's Thanksgiving proclamation
10. Russo-German treaty of friendship

MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM

What do you think is the most important problem before the American people today? (Dec. 3, '39—AIPO)

	TOTAL	PARTY		ECONOMIC GROUP		
		Dem.	Rep.	Upper	Middle	Lower
Keeping out of war	47%	47%	49%	49%	49%	43%
Solving unemployment	24	28	20	16	21	34
Recovery for business	6	5	6	6	6	5
Adjustment of labor problems	3	3	4			
Threats to democratic institutions	3		4			
Adequate relief	3	3				
Balancing the budget	2					
Farm aid	1					
Old age pensions	1					
Spiritual needs	1					
Others	9	14	17	29	24	18
(No ans. 5%)						

4. AMERICANA

BEST AND WORST CITIZENS

Of the people now in the U.S. who were born in foreign countries, which nationality would you say had made the best citizens? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Northwest				
		Northeast	Plains	Southeast	Mountain	Pacific
Germans	13.0%	12.3%	18.3%	13.1%	8.3%	8.8%
English	10.3	11.5	8.4	8.4	19.2	8.8
Scandinavians	9.7	9.3	23.8	3.8	9.0	17.2
Irish	6.4	10.1	3.2	5.9	1.9	5.1
Jews	2.8	2.2	.2	7.7	1.3	2.0
Italians	2.2	3.1	.4	2.0	1.9	6.6
French	1.8	1.6	.4	1.1	1.9	.9
Other	6.9	6.5	6.5	5.0	9.6	8.5
None	1.2	1.7	.7	.1	—	—
DK	49.6	45.9	46.1	53.9	53.2	46.4

GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

95

Of the people now in the U.S. who were born in foreign countries, which nationality would you say had made the worst citizens? (Multiple answers account for total of more than 100%.) (Nov. '39—FOR.)

Italians	22.5%	Japanese	2.5%	Greeks	1.4%	Other	4.0%
Jews	6.0	Mexicans	1.8	Poles	1.1	None	.9
Germans	4.1	Russians	1.5	Chinese	1.0	DK	55.4

FAVORITE MOVIE STAR

Who is your favorite movie actor? Who is your favorite movie actress? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

Rank	Present Rating		Rank
July 1937	Actor	Actress	July 1937
	Spencer Tracy	5.6%	4.6% Bette Davis
1	Clark Gable	5.1	4.4 Myrna Loy 4
	Tyrone Power	2.1	3.4 Jeanette MacDonald 3
4	Wallace Beery	2.1	2.8 Irene Dunne
7	Lionel Barrymore	2.0	2.6 Norma Shearer 2
	Paul Muni	1.9	2.3 Shirley Temple 1
2	Robert Taylor	1.9	1.7 Janet Gaynor 6
6	Gary Cooper	1.5	1.5 Ginger Rogers
3	William Powell	1.3	1.3 Claudette Colbert
9	Nelson Eddy	1.3	1.3 Joan Crawford 7
	Errol Flynn	1.3	1.0 Alice Faye
	Charles Boyer	1.2	1.0 Kay Francis 8
	Gene Autry	1.1	1.0 Greta Garbo 5
	Ronald Colman	1.0	1.0 Carole Lombard
	Bob Burns	1.0	1.0 Barbara Stanwyck
			1.0 Loretta Young
	All others	18.7	
	DK	29.1	13.2 All others
	Never go	21.8	33.1 DK
			21.8 Never go

If you had to give up either going to the movies or listening to the radio, which one would you give up? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

Movies	79.3%
Radio	13.9
DK	6.8

FREIGHT TRUCKS

Do you think freight trucks should be kept off highways during certain hours on Sundays and holidays? (Dec. 17, '39—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	67%	33%
Under 30	66	34
30-49	65	35
50 and over	72	28
(No op. 9%)		

GERMAN LANGUAGE AND MUSIC

		Yes	No
Do you think orchestras and bands in this country should stop playing German music? (Dec. 24, '39—AIPO)	Total	9%	91%
	Under 30	4	96
	30-49	8	92
	50 and over	13	87
	(No op. 6%)		

		Yes	No
Do you think American colleges and high schools should stop teaching the German language? (Dec. 24, '39—AIPO)	Total	12%	88%
	Under 30	6	94
	30-49	11	89
	50 and over	18	82
	(No op. 6%)		

HOLIDAYS

		Yes	No
Do you approve or disapprove of President Roosevelt's plan to change Thanksgiving day to one week earlier (this would be Nov. 23, instead of Nov. 30)? (Aug. 24, '39—AIPO)	Total	38%	62%
	Dem.	52	48
	Rep.	21	79
	Others	33	67

Would you approve or disapprove a plan to have all holidays—like the Fourth of July—celebrated on Mondays so as to make a longer weekend? (Sept. 3, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
Appr.	51%	58%	57%	51%	35%	41%	46%
Disap.	49	42	43	49	65	59	54

(No opinion 10%)

ROYAL VISIT

Were the impressions you got of the King and Queen of England during their visit here, favorable, unfavorable, or neutral toward them personally? (Sept. '39—FOR.)	Favorable	65.5%
	Unfavor.	3.2
	Neutral	31.3

Which of the following do you think was the real reason for the English royal visit in this country? (Sept. '39—FOR.)

1. They came to try to influence this country to go to war to defend England if trouble comes 23.9%
2. Their visit was mainly to help advertise British goods and British trade here 4.1

3. Their visit was no more than a token of friendship among English speaking people	58.1
4. DK	13.9
Do you think that President Roosevelt should return the royal visit by going to England? (Sept. '39—FOR.)	Yes 31.9% No 50.9 DK 17.2

MORALS

(Men only) Do you consider it all right, unfortunate, or wicked when young girls have sexual relations before marriage?

(Women only) Do you consider it all right, unfortunate, or wicked when young men have sexual relations before marriage? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

	Men answering about women			Women answering about men		
	TOTAL	UNDER 40	OVER 40	TOTAL	UNDER 40	OVER 40
All right	10.9%	15.0%	7.0%	9.7%	14.5%	5.3%
Unfortunate	52.4	54.6	50.3	35.4	38.4	32.4
Wicked	27.9	22.9	32.7	47.3	38.6	55.4
Depends	.4	.3	.5	.4	.5	.4
DK	8.4	7.2	9.5	7.2	8.0	6.5
		<i>All right</i>	<i>Unfortunate</i>	<i>Wicked</i>	<i>Depends</i>	<i>DK</i>
Cities over 1,000,000		28.6%	40.0%	17.1%	— %	14.3%
Rural		9.0	30.0	54.5	0.3	6.2

The recent public charges made by Governor Dickinson of Michigan have raised the question of whether businessmen and politicians in the East often have immoral relations with their secretaries. Do you think so? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Men	Women	Executives	Prosperous	Farm Labor	Negroes
Yes	19.4%	21.2%	17.5%	17.7%	20.5%	23.4%	21.2%
No	38.0	38.9	37.1	51.4	50.5	17.9	16.4
DK	42.6	39.9	45.4	30.9	29.0	58.7	62.4

Do you agree with him [Governor Dickinson] that liquor is what usually causes the downfall of young girls? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Men	Women	Under 40	Over 40
Yes	46.2%	39.3%	53.2%	40.8%	51.1%
Qualified yes	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.2
No	43.3	50.6	35.8	49.8	37.2
DK	9.4	9.0	9.8	8.3	10.5

Do you plan to visit the New York World's Fair this year? If not, why not? (Aug. 20, '39—AIPD)

Can't afford to go	63%	<i>Of those who have visited the Fair:</i>	
Can't get away	16	Liked it very much*	83%
Not interested	9	Liked it moderately	14
Saw Chicago Fair	3	Disliked it	3
Other reasons	9	*Women 90%; men 76%	

Do you want to go again? (Aug. 20, '39—AIPO)

Yes	84%
No	16

Do you think the Fair will open again in 1940?		
(Aug. 20, '39—AIPD)	Yes	44%
	No	13
	Uncertain	43

Do you or any members of your family expect to attend the New York World's Fair this year? (Sept. '39—FOR.)	Yes	21.9%	No	67.4%
	Have already	5.8	DK	4.9

Part Two: The War in Europe

DANZIG AND THE POLISH CORRIDOR

Do you think Hitler's claims to Danzig are justified? (Aug. 31, '39—AIPO)	Yes 13%	No 87%	No Op. 28%
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Do you think Hitler's claims to the Polish Corridor are justified? (Aug. 31, '39—AIPO)	Yes 14%	No 86%	No Op. 29%
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Would you like to see England, France and Poland agree to Germany's demands regarding Danzig? (Aug. 31, '39—AIPO)

	National	New Eng.	Mid- Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
Yes	12%	15%	13%	17%	5%	11%	6%
No	88	85	87	83	95	89	94

(No opinion 23%)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR

Which country or countries do you consider responsible for causing the present war? (Sept. 7, '39—AIPO)

<i>Germany</i>	<i>England and France</i>	<i>Versailles Treaty</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>All Others</i>	<i>No Op.</i>
82%	3%	3%	1%	5%	6%

Which of these reasons comes closest to describing your own idea as to the real cause of the present European war? (Please select only one most important reason if you can, but two if absolutely necessary.) (Dec. '39—FOR.)

1. The German people always want to have things their own way, even if that brings a war. 6.0%
2. Hitler's greed for land and lust for power. 54.0
3. Germany's (or Hitler's) desire to regain all possessions lost in the last war. 19.5
4. The Treaty of Versailles—it was unfair to Germany. 10.2
5. England and France are trying to keep Germany from becoming a really strong power. 6.0
6. The same old hatred between the peoples of Europe. 10.5
7. The overpopulation of Europe—a war is needed to thin them out. 1.5
8. Other 2.8
9. DK 4.9

Which of these statements comes closest to your own idea of Germany? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

1. The German people have always had an irrepressible fondness for brute force and conquest which makes the country a menace to world peace so long as it is allowed to be strong enough to fight. 19.6%
2. The German people are essentially peace loving and kindly, but they have been unfortunate in being misled, too often, by ruthless and ambitious rulers. 66.6
3. The needs of Germany's expanding population compel her to seek to conquer because other jealous powers try to keep her from expanding in a normal way. 4.2
4. The best way for peace in Europe is to allow Germany, with her great organizing ability, to integrate the small nations of Central Europe. 1.8
5. DK 7.8

2. NEWS AND PROPAGANDA

The British say that the transatlantic liner <i>Athenia</i> was sunk by a German submarine. The Germans say they did not sink it. Do you believe the Germans sank the <i>Athenia</i> ? (Sept. 26, '39—AIPO)	Yes	60%
	No	9
	No op.	31

Do you have confidence in the news from Germany at the present time? (Sept. 26, '39—AIPO)	Complete confid.	1%
	Some confid.	33
	No confidence	66
	No op.	5

Do you have confidence in the news from England and France at the present time? (Sept. 26, '39—AIPO)	Complete confid.	8%
	Some confid.	62
	No confidence	30
	No op.	5

Do you believe all, most, some, little, or none of the war news items from these cities? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

	Washington	London	Paris	Berlin	Moscow
All	13.6%	1.4%	1.3%	0.4%	0.4%
Most	35.3	10.0	8.8	2.0	1.7
Some	32.7	48.5	47.2	29.6	25.9
Little	10.3	26.9	27.6	41.1	33.3
None	1.9	5.5	5.8	18.0	20.9
DK	6.2	7.7	9.3	8.9	17.8

Which of the following statements do you believe to be true, which false?

	True	Qualified	False	DK
1. That the <i>Athenia</i> was sunk by a German submarine	66.7%		6.3%	27.0%
2. That the Germans have deliberately bombed the residential sections of defenseless cities	63.9	6.4%*	8.8	20.9
3. That German submarines are at large on this side of the ocean	37.4		29.3	33.3
4. That there is a strong undercover movement in Germany to overthrow Hitler	22.7	24.8†	20.6	31.9
5. That the British airplanes have wilfully violated the neutrality of Belgium and other neutrals	15.4	23.1‡	28.9	32.6
6. That the Poles have mutilated and slaughtered defenseless Germans within their borders during this war	10.5		59.8	29.7

* Not deliberately.

† No strong movement.

‡ Not wilfully.

3. AMERICAN EXPECTATIONS

DURATION OF WAR

About how long do you think the present war will last? (Sept. 17, '39—AIPO)	1 year or less	49%
	More than 1 year	51
	No op.	28

Do you think the people of Germany are in favor of Hitler? (Nov. 14, '39—AIPO)

	Total	Upper Income	Middle Income	Lower Income	German-Americans*
Maj. favor Hitler	34%	43%	34%	30%	36%
Maj. oppose Hitler	66	57	66	70	64

*German-Americans of the first and second generations.

Do you think the German people are prepared to hold out as long as they did in the last war, or not so long? (Nov. 14, '39—AIPO)	As long	23%	} 42%
	Longer	19	
	Not as long	58	
	No op.	17	

WHO WILL WIN

Which side do you think will win? (Sept. 17, '39—AIPO)	Allies	82%
	Germany	7
	No op. or qualified	11

As it stands now, if no further allies join either side, which side do you think will come out ahead? (Oct. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Men	Women
England, France, Poland and their friends	64.8%	71.6%	57.6%
Germany and her friends	8.3	8.4	8.1
DK	26.9	20.0	34.3

THESE BELIEVE THE WINNER WILL BE:

OF PEOPLE HOPING VICTORY WILL GO TO:

	Allies	Germany	Neither	DK
The Allies, etc.	73.2%	20.0%	33.5%	18.6%
Germany, etc.	7.4	53.3	8.6	10.1
DK	19.4	26.7	57.9	71.3

INVOLVEMENT OF U.S.

If England and France go to war with Germany and Italy what do you think our country will do? (Aug. 20, '39—AIPO)	Send troops	25%
	Send war materials but no troops	40
	Remain neutral	35
	No op.	17

If Germany should defeat England, France and Poland in the present war, do you think Germany would start a war against the United States sooner or later? (Sept. 28, '39—AIPO)		Yes	No
	Total	63%	37%
	Upper Income	55	45
	Middle Income	63	37
	Lower Income	68	32
	(No op. 7%)		

Do you think the United States will go into the war in Europe, or do you think we will stay out of the war? (Oct. 24, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
Go in	46%	50%	41%	45%	49%	50%	51%
Stay out	54	50	59	55	51	50	49
	(No opinion 13%)						

4. AMERICAN SYMPATHIES

Which side do you want to see win the war? (Oct. 22, '39—AIPO)	Allies	84%
	Germany	2
	No op.	14

In the present crisis are your sympathies with Finland or Russia? (Dec. 31, '39—AIPO)	Finland	88%
	Russia	1
	"Neutral"	
	or no op. 11	

In the trouble now going on in Europe, which side would you like to see win? (Oct. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Men	Women	Cities over 1,000,000	Villages under 2,500	Northwest Plains	South-east
Eng., Fr., Poland and their friends	83.1%	85.4%	80.7%	58.4%	90.4%	75.3%	92.0%
Germany and her friends	1.0	.8	1.2	2.1	.4	.6	1.4
Neither	6.7	7.0	6.5	23.4	4.4	7.1	1.1
DK	9.2	6.8	11.6	16.1	4.8	17.0	5.5

5. U.S. POLICY

LAST WAR

Do you think it was a mistake for the United States to enter the World War? (Nov. 7, '39—AIPO)	Apr. '37	Yes	No
	Nov. '39	70%	30%
		68	32
	(No op. 13%)		

Why do you think we entered the last war? (Dec. 3, '39—AIPO)

1. America was the victim of propaganda and selfish interests	34%
2. America had a just and unselfish cause	26
3. America entered the war for its own safety	18
4. Other reasons	8
No opinion or undecided	14

LUDLOW REFERENDUM

Should the Constitution be changed to require a national vote before Congress could draft men for war overseas? (Sept. 10, '39—AIPO)

	Total	Women	Men	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West	Dem.*	Rep.*	Total Mar.'39
Yes	51%	58%	44%	51%	50%	57%	56%	37%	47%	47%	52%	61%
No	49	42	56	49	50	43	44	63	53	53	48	39

(No opinion 9%) *Sept. 19, '39—AIP0

Do you think that any decision between war and peace for this country should be submitted to popular vote, even though it might mean a delay, or would you prefer to leave the war decision to Congress? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

	Men	Women	Under 40	Over 40	Total
Congress	55.4%	44.2%	47.4%	52.2%	49.8%
Referendum	40.0	45.3	46.0	39.4	42.7
DK	4.6	10.5	6.6	8.4	7.5

NATIONAL DEFENSE

Should the C.C.C. camps be permitted to give military training to the young men who want it? (Oct. 1, '39—AIP0)

	Total	Dem.	Rep.	Upper Income	Lower Income
Yes	90%	90%	90%	91%	89%
No	10	10	10	9	11

(No opinion 4%)

Do you think all able bodied young men twenty years old should be made to serve in the army or the navy for one year? (Oct. 8, '39—AIP0)

	Total	Under 30	Over 30	Upper Income	Lower Income	Dec. '38
Yes	39%	36%	40%	33%	45%	37%
No	61	64	60	67	55	63

(No opinion 5%)

Do you think the United States should increase the size of its (1) Army, (2) Navy, (3) Air Force? (Nov. 12, '39—AIP0)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West	4 Yrs. Ago	2 Yrs. Ago	1 Yr. Ago
YES:										
Army	86%	91%	88%	84%	79%	92%	84%	70%	69%	82%
Navy	88	95	92	88	79	92	85	72	74	86
Air Force	91	94	95	89	84	96	91	84	80	90

(No opinion 7%)

Would you be willing to pay more money in taxes to support a larger Army? Navy? Air Force? (Nov. 12, '39—AIPO)

YES:	Total	New Eng.	Mid- Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
Army	64%	65%	65%	62%	57%	71%	52%
Navy	67	67	68	65	60	73	67
Air Force	70	70	70	69	68	75	71

(No opinion 7%)

If Congress decides to increase the Army and Navy, should this increase be paid for by extra taxes next year or by borrowing more money? (Dec. 24, '39—AIPO)

	Total	Upper income	Middle	Lower*	Reliefers only	Rep.	Dem.
Extra taxes	58%	66%	60%	48%	44%	61%	55%
Borrowing	42	34	40	52	56	39	45

(No opinion 25%) *Including Reliefers

No matter what happens, do you think that we should immediately increase our:	Air Force?	Yes 88.3%
	Army?	Yes 84.8
	Navy?	Yes 86.8

Would you favor a term of compulsory military service for all young men of eighteen or nineteen? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Southeast	Northwest Plains
Yes	31.3%	40.9%	18.6%
Yes, if necessary	11.6	12.8	9.0
No	48.8	35.2	66.9
DK	8.3	11.1	5.5

People expressing themselves as opposed to general military training gave these reasons:

Don't believe in compulsion	21.6%
Not democratic—un-American—free country	11.6
Too much like dictatorship—like Germany	11.5
Too much like Europe	3.0
Not necessary, no immediate danger	19.7
Plenty of volunteers	3.9
Creates war spirit, makes youth war-minded	11.0
Too young	8.0
Interferes with education and career	3.8
Other	6.8
DK	2.0

Would you favor giving military training to the C.C.C. boys? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Men	Women	Under 40	Over 40
Yes	64.2%	67.2%	61.1%	63.1%	65.2%
Yes, if necessary	9.3	8.9	9.6	9.6	8.9
No	20.5	20.3	20.8	21.7	19.5
DK	6.0	3.6	8.5	5.6	6.4

ROOSEVELT FOREIGN POLICY

If war breaks out in Europe do you think President Roosevelt should call a special session of Congress? (Sept. 3, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
Yes	71%	79%	73%	62%	71%	80%	69%
No	29	21	27	38	29	20	31

(No opinion 17%)

Do you approve or disapprove of Roosevelt's policies with regard to the European situation up to now? (Asked Sept. 1939.) (Nov. '39—FOR.)*

	Partly Approve	Partly approve	Disapprove	DK		Partly Approve	Partly approve	Disapprove	DK
Total	69.2%	11.7%	5.8%	13.3%	Lower middle	70.2%	11.9%	5.8%	12.1%
Men	69.1	13.6	7.5	9.8	Poor	68.7	7.2	5.5	18.6
Women	69.2	9.8	4.1	16.9	Negroes	72.8	6.8	1.8	18.6
Under 40	70.0	11.2	5.6	13.2	Mountain & Pacific	54.3	20.5	7.5	17.7
Over 40	68.4	12.2	6.0	13.4	Southeast	79.8	7.7	3.2	9.3
Prosperous	63.9	18.0	9.3	8.8	N.W.				
Upper middle	67.8	16.0	6.8	9.4	Plains	60.8	10.6	6.1	22.5
					Mid. West	67.3	10.7	10.2	11.8

*Cf. pre-war FORTUNE question on Roosevelt's international policies, page 114.

NEUTRALITY

Should Congress change the present Neutrality Law so that the United States could sell war materials to England and France? (Sept. 3, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West	Dem.	Rep.	Apr. '39
Yes	50%	49%	52%	45%	49%	60%	51%	56%	47%	57%
No	50	51	48	55	51	40	49	44	53	43

(No opinion 15%)

Should the United States allow its citizens to travel on ships of countries which are now at war? (Sept. 14, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West	Dem.*	Rep.*
Yes	18%	16%	19%	14%	18%	16%	22%	17%	19%
No	82	84	81	86	82	84	78	83	81
	(No opinion 4%)		*Sept. 19, '39—AIPO						

Should our government allow American ships to carry goods anywhere, or should our ships be kept out of war zones? (Sept. 14, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West	Dem.*	Rep.*
Keep ships out of war zones	84%	83%	83%	84%	84%	81%	83%	85%	83%
Allow ships to go anywhere	16	17	17	16	16	19	17	15	17
	(No opinion 6%)		*Sept. 19, '39—AIPO						

Should England and France be required to carry goods away in their own ships? (Sept. 24, '39—AIPO)

Yes No No Op.
94% 6% 4%

If the Neutrality law is changed, should England and France be required to pay cash for goods, or should we give them credit if they cannot pay? (Sept. 24, '39—AIPO)

Require Cash Give Cred. No Op.
90% 10% 3%

Do you think the Neutrality law should be changed so that England and France could buy war supplies here? (Sept. 24, '39—AIPO)

Yes No
Total 57% 43%
Dem. 62 38
Rep. 54 46
(No op. 9%)

Do you think Congress should change the Neutrality Law so that England and France could buy war supplies here? (Oct. 3 and 10, '39—AIPO)

	Favor Change	Oppose Change	No Op.		Favor Change	Oppose Change
OCT. 3:				OCT. 3:		
Before President's speech	57%	43%	9%	Men	64%	36%
				Women	58	42
After President's speech	62	38	14	Under 30	56	44
				30 to 49	64	36
				50 and over	63	37

GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

107

OCT. 10:				Upper income	59%	41%
After first week of Senate debate	60%	40%	10%	Middle income	64	36
				Lower income	62	38
INTENSITY SCALE—OCT. 3:				New Eng.	56	44
Favor change strongly	41%			Mid-Atl.	65	35
Favor change mildly	21			East Cent.	57	43
Oppose change strongly	25			West Cent.	55	45
Oppose change mildly	13			South	77	23
				West	65	35

Do you think Congress should change the Neutrality Law so that England and France, or any other nations, can buy war supplies here? [and] In what country was your father born? (Oct. 15, '39—AIPO)

PERSONS WHOSE FATHERS WERE BORN IN:

	Nat'l Aver.	U.S.	G.B.	Rus- sia	Ire- land	Can- ada	Italy	Ger- many	Other Coun- tries
For change	60%	60%	68%	67%	61%	60%	55%	45%	58%
Against change	40	40	32	33	39	40	45	55	42
	(No opinion 12%)								

Same (Oct. 22, '39—AIPO): Yes 62% No 38%.

Do you think Congress should make changes in the neutrality law so that England and France or any other nations can buy war supplies, including arms and airplanes, in the United States? (Oct. 22, '39—AIPO)

	Total*	New Eng.	Mid- Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
For change	60%	56%	59%	57%	60%	75%	58%
Against change	40	44	41	43	40	25	42
	(No op. 10%)		*Published Oct. 29, '39—AIPO				

Same (Oct. 29, '39—AIPO):

For change 58% Against change 42% No op. 9%

Do you think the United States should do everything possible to help England and France win the war, except go to war ourselves? (Oct. 22, '39—AIPO)

Yes	62%
No	38
No op.	5

Do you think Congress should make changes in the Neutrality Law so that England and France, or any other nations, can buy war materials, including arms and airplanes, in the United States? (Nov. 2, '39—AIPO)

For change	56%
Against change	44
No op.	11

Do you think Congress should repeal the existing arms embargo in the Neutrality Law so that nations at war can buy airplanes, arms and munitions in the United States? (Nov. 2, '39—AIPQ)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
For repeal	56%	56%	59%	50%	51%	65%	60%
Against repeal	44	44	41	50	49	35	40

(No opinion 11%)

Do you think we should continue to trade with the dictator nations if they declare war against other nations? (Sept. '39—FOR.)	Yes	17.6%
	No	61.5
	DK or depends	20.9

Which of these courses of action comes closest to describing what you think the U.S. should do? (Oct. '39—FOR.)

1. Enter the war at once on the side of England, France and Poland and send an army to Europe.
2. Enter the war at once, but send only our navy and air force to help England, France and Poland.
3. Enter the war on the side of England, France and Poland only if it looks as though they were losing, and in the meantime help that side with food and materials.
4. Do not enter the war, but supply England, France and Poland with materials and food, and refuse to ship anything to Germany.
5. Take no sides, and offer to sell to anyone, but on a cash-and-carry basis.
6. Refuse any aid of any kind to either side, and refuse to sell anything at all to either side.
7. Find some way of supporting Germany.

	Total	Men	Women	Under 40	Over 40	Proseperous	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Poor	Negroes
No. 1	2.3%	2.9%	1.6%	2.2%	2.4%	1.1%	2.0%	2.3%	1.9%	4.2%
No. 2	1.0	1.5	.5	.8	1.2	2.7	1.5	.6	.8	1.1
No. 3	13.5	13.8	13.2	13.2	13.7	11.9	12.3	12.6	13.8	20.1
No. 4	19.9	20.4	19.4	19.8	20.0	20.0	19.4	20.5	21.0	16.4
No. 5	29.3	34.1	24.3	32.0	26.8	36.2	33.7	29.9	25.7	20.1
No. 6	24.7	20.1	29.6	23.2	26.1	21.7	23.9	25.1	26.2	24.0
No. 7	.1	.1	.1	.1	.1	—	—	.1	.2	.3
Other	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.3	3.5	5.3	3.4	3.3	3.3	2.3
DK	5.8	3.6	8.1	5.4	6.2	1.1	3.8	5.6	7.1	11.5

	Northeast	Middle West	Northwest Plains	Southeast	Southwest	Mountain and Pacific
No. 1	1.9%	.6%	.6%	4.9%	3.6%	1.2%
No. 2	1.1	.8	—	1.9	1.0	.4

GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

109

No. 3	9.6	9.9	4.5	23.0	24.1	9.8
No. 4	19.1	25.5	16.2	17.9	19.5	18.8
No. 5	30.5	28.7	35.8	27.4	22.8	32.1
No. 6	28.3	26.9	32.3	16.5	19.1	25.5

Do you think the recent Congress was right or wrong [during its prewar session] in refusing to grant the President the power to decide to what countries we would sell war materials in case of a war abroad? (Nov. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Prosperous	Poor	Negroes	N.W. Plains	Southeast
Right	58.9%	73.2%	46.3%	35.5%	65.0%	47.7%
Wrong	21.5	18.0	25.7	27.9	16.2	30.2
DK	19.6	8.8	28.0	36.6	18.8	22.1

Which of these courses of action comes closest to describing what you think America should do about the present European war? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

	October	December
1. Enter the war at once on the side of England and France.	3.3%	2.5%
2. Stay out now and for as long as we can, but go into the war on the side of England and France if they are in real danger of losing, and in the meantime help that side with food and materials.	13.5	14.7
3. Do not enter the war but supply England and France with materials and food, and refuse to ship anything to Germany.	19.9	8.9
4. Take no sides and stay out entirely, but offer to sell to anyone on a cash-and-carry basis.	29.3	37.5
5. Have nothing to do with any warring country—don't even trade with them on a cash-and-carry basis.	24.7	29.9
6. Find some way of supporting Germany.	0.1	0.2
Other	3.4	2.4
DK	5.8	3.9

If it should turn out in practice that only England and France got the supplies, would you still say this? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

Yes	87.3%
No	10.2
DK	2.5

If it should turn out in practice that Germany got a lot of these supplies through Italy or some other nation, would you still say this? (Dec. '39—FOR.)	Yes 65.6%
	No 28.4
	DK 6.0

(Breaking up the cash-and-carry answers according to opinions on trade helpful to Germany.)

No trade with any belligerents	29.9%	54.5% neutral policy
Cash-and-carry even though Germany may benefit	24.6	
Cash-and-carry only if Germany does not benefit	10.7	
Trade with the Allies and boycott Germany	8.9	19.6 pro-Ally neutrality
Trade with the Allies and go into war if needed	14.7	
Enter the war on Allies' side now	2.5	17.2 immediate or eventual war policy
Other	4.8	
DK	3.9	

Under the Johnson Act now in force, this country is forbidden to lend money to any of the countries whose debts to us have not been paid. England and France are among those countries. Do you think the Johnson Act should be repealed, so that we might lend money to England and France to buy supplies here? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

	PEOPLE BELIEVING WE SHOULD:					
	Total	Enter war now	Enter later if needed	Supply Allies only	Sell cash-and-carry	Sell to no one
Yes	11.5%	55.4%	23.4%	26.8%	8.9%	2.0%
Only if Allies losing	12.3	10.2	28.4	22.4	11.7	3.9
No	68.1	29.7	41.1	45.1	74.4	85.4
DK	8.1	4.7	7.1	5.7	5.0	8.7

If England and France want to buy here and have no more cash, should we provide them with funds by buying from them their possessions and investments in South America and other parts of the Western Hemisphere? (Dec. '39—FOR.)

	Total	Prosperous	Poor	Executives	Factory labor
Yes	44.6%	48.3%	42.6%	61.4%	52.2%
No	39.2	38.8	38.0	32.7	35.6
DK	16.2	12.9	19.4	5.9	12.2

GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

111

If Japan were to enter the war on the side of Germany, would you be more inclined or less inclined to give aid to England and France? If Russia? (Dec. '39—FOR.)	<i>If Japan If Russia</i>	
	More	60.4% 56.6%
	No difference	29.8 33.3
	Less	2.3 2.8
	DK	7.5 7.3

WOULD HELP IF JAPAN ENTERED WAR	PEOPLE BELIEVING THAT WE SHOULD—				
	<i>Enter now</i>	<i>Enter later if needed</i>	<i>Supply Allies only</i>	<i>Sell cash-and-carry</i>	<i>Sell to no one</i>
More	85.9%	85.3%	79.7%	67.5%	35.9%
No difference	9.4	8.7	12.0	25.8	51.7
Less	3.1	2.4	2.0	1.3	3.2
DK	1.6	3.6	6.3	5.4	9.2

U.S. PARTICIPATION

Should we send our army and navy abroad to fight against Germany? (Sept. 17, '39—AIPO)

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Upper Income</i>	<i>Middle Income</i>	<i>Lower* Income</i>	<i>Reliefers Only</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Dem.†</i>	<i>Rep.†</i>
Yes	16%	12%	15%	20%	21%	19%	12%	18%	13%
No	84	88	85	80	79	81	88	82	87
	(No op. 6%)		*Inc. reliefers		†Sept. 19, '39—AIPO				

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Dem.*</i>	<i>Rep.*</i>
If it looks within the next few months as if England and France might be defeated, should the United States declare war on Germany and send our troops abroad? (Sept. 17, '39—AIPO)	Yes 44%	46%	42%
	No 56	54	58
	(No op. 10%) *Sept. 19, '39		

Should we declare war and send our army and navy abroad to fight Germany? (Oct. 5, '39—AIPO)

PERSONS WHOSE FATHERS WERE BORN IN:										<i>Other Countries</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>Rus-sia</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Ger-many</i>	<i>Ire-land</i>	<i>Can-ada</i>	<i>Aus-tria</i>	<i>Eng-land</i>	<i>Po-land</i>	
Yes* 5%	5%	3%	4%	3%	4%	7%	7%	8%	11%	4%
No 95	95	97	96	97	96	93	93	92	89	96
	*Upper income 3%; lower income 7%. (No op. 4%)									

If Canada is actually invaded by any European power, do you think the United States should use its Army and Navy to aid Canada? (Oct. 8, '39—AIPO)	Yes 73%
	No 27
	No op. 7

If Cuba or any other country within 1,500 miles of the Panama Canal is actually invaded by any European power, do you think the United States should fight to keep the European country out? (Oct. 8, '39—AIPO)

Yes	72%
No	28
No op.	10

If Brazil, Chile or any other South American country is actually invaded by any European power, do you think the United States should fight to keep the European country out? (Oct. 8, '39—AIPO)

Yes	53%
No	47
No op.	13

If it appears that Germany is defeating England and France, should the United States declare war on Germany and send our army and navy to Europe to fight? (Oct. 19, '39—AIPO)

Total yes	29%	Total no	71%	No op.	8%
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INTENSITY SCALE:

Strongly in favor	13%	Strongly opposed	46%
Mildly in favor	16	Mildly opposed	25

Same (Oct. 22, '39—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng.	Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	West
Yes	28%	33%	27%	25%	26%	47%	28%
No	72	67	73	75	74	53	72

What should be the policy of the United States in the present European War—should we declare war on Germany and send our Army and Navy abroad to fight? (Oct. 22, '39—AIPO)

Yes	5%
No	95
No op.	4

Do you think the United States should do everything possible to help England and France win the war, except go to war ourselves? (Oct. 22, '39—AIPO)

Yes	62%
No	38
No op.	5

Do you think the United States should do everything possible to help England and France win the war, even at the risk of getting into the war ourselves? (Oct. 22, '39—AIPO)

Yes	34%
No	66
No op.	6

Do you think there are any international questions affecting the U.S. so important to us in the long run that our government should take a stand on them now, even at the risk of our getting into war? (Sept. '39—FOR.)

Yes	19.6%
No	54.8
DK or depends	25.6

If France and England go to war against the dictator nations, should we send our army and navy abroad to help them immediately, or only if it is clear they are losing, or not at all? (Sept. '39—FOR.)

Immediately	3.1%
Only if losing	24.5
Not at all	65.6
DK	6.8

See also FORTUNE questions on pages 108-110.

6. PEACE PROPOSALS

POLISH QUESTION

Hitler says that the Polish question is settled and England and France have no reason to continue the war with Germany. Do you agree or disagree? (Oct. 17, '39—AIPO)

Agree	14%
Disagree	86
No op.	13

PEACE CONFERENCE

Would you favor a conference of the leading nations of the world to end the present war and settle Europe's problems? (Oct. 29, '39—AIPO)

Yes	69%
No	31
No op.	10

If such a conference is called, should the United States take part in it? (Oct. 29, '39—AIPO)

	Total	Dem.	Rep.	Others
Yes	50%	52%	45%	54%
No	50	48	55	46
	(No op. 10%)			

PEACE TREATY

If England and France defeat Germany, should the peace treaty be more severe on Germany or less severe than the treaty at the end of the last war? (Dec. 9, '39—AIPO)

More severe	58%
Less severe	36
Same	6
DK	17

INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE

Do you think the time will come when there will be a strong international army or police force for maintaining world peace? (Sept. 5, '39—AIPO)

Yes	30%
No	70
No op.	20

How soon do you think it will be possible? (Sept. 5, '39—AIPO)

25 yrs. or less	60%
More than 25 yrs.	40
DK and indefinite answers	34

Would you like to see the United States join in a movement to establish an international police force to maintain world peace? (Sept. 5, '39—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	53%	47%
Dem.	55	45
Rep.	46	54
(No op. 14%)		

Part Three: Other International Issues

FAR EAST

At the end of six months, when the trade treaty expires, should the United States refuse to sell Japan any more war materials? (Aug. 29, '39—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total	82%	18%
Dem.	81	19
Rep.	82	18
Others	79	21
(No op. 12%)		

LATIN AMERICA

If Mexico or any South American country seizes property belonging to American business concerns, should the U.S. use force to protect the rights of those American companies? (Sept. '39—FOR.)

Yes	39.1%
No	38.6
DK or depends	22.3

MONROE DOCTRINE

See AIPO questions, pages 111-112.

PHILIPPINES

Should we get out of the Philippines and stay out, even if Japan seizes them? (Sept. '39—FOR.)

Yes	24.1%
No	50.1
DK or depends	25.8

ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY

On the whole, do you approve or disapprove of Roosevelt's international policy? (Published July '38; asked again August '39.) (Nov. '39—FOR.)*

	Approve	Disapprove	DK	Uninformed
July '38	50.0%	15.0%	11.9%	23.1%
Aug. '39	48.5	18.5	14.4	18.6

*Cf. similar post-war FORTUNE question, page 105.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Should the U.S. try to develop its own industries to the point where it does not have to buy any products from foreign countries? (Sept. '39—FOR.)

Yes	64.1%
No	23.6
DK or depends	12.3

WAR DEBTS

Would you like to see the U.S. trade the war debts which the English owe us for some islands near the Panama Canal (in the West Indies)? (Nov. 12, '39—AIPO)*	Yes 66%
	No 34
	DK 15

*Cf. FORTUNE question regarding purchase of British and French possessions, page 110.

NOTE

Because of space limitations, it has been necessary to exclude from the preceding tabulation certain special surveys based upon selective samples. A list of these follows:

American Institute of Public Opinion

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: Special surveys relating to party strength, third term, presidential prospects: of Illinois voters (Aug. 1, '39); Ohio voters (Aug. 5, '39); Michigan voters (Aug. 8, '39); Massachusetts voters (Aug. 12, '39); Wisconsin voters (Aug. 15, '39); Who's Who (Nov. 19 and 26, '39).

STATE GOVERNORS: Special survey of Wisconsin voters regarding Governor Heil (Sept. 10, '39); of Minnesota voters regarding Governor Stassen (Sept. 17, '39); of Pennsylvania voters regarding Governor James (Nov. 17, '39).

SOUTH: Special survey of 13 Southern states on question of whether it would be better to have two parties of about equal strength in the South (Sept. 24, '39).

NEUTRALITY: Special poll of Who's Who on changing Neutrality Act (Nov. 2, '39).

LOUISIANA: Special surveys of Louisiana voters regarding honesty of elections, influence of Huey Long, and gubernatorial campaign (Dec. 17, 19 and 21, '39).

Fortune

BUSINESSMEN. Special survey of opinions of businessmen on political, economic and social issues, entitled "What Business Thinks." (Oct. '39).

3. Analysis of Poll Results

Quarterly Commentary

POLL results during the last quarter clearly mirror the fact that American public opinion since early September has been focused squarely on the war in Europe and the crisis in world politics created by its outbreak. Domestic events and issues were muffled by the tramping of hobnailed boots in Central Europe, along the Rhine and in Finland, and by the impact of armed conflict on land, on sea and in the air. The gaze of the man-in-the-street was fixed on the battlelines, and when it shifted to the home front, domestic issues took their significance largely from their relation to the foreign scene.

Interest in political issues continued to be reflected in the studies of sentiment toward the major parties and their prospects in 1940, to possible Presidential nominees, to President Roosevelt, his administration, policies, third-term chances and personal popularity. Noteworthy in the political field was the strengthening of opinion endorsing the personal popularity of the President. Although previous surveys have always revealed a fluctuating majority behind the President, undoubtedly the war in Europe and the foreign policy pursued by his Administration have greatly strengthened this public feeling. From the summer low figure of 56 per cent recorded by the Insti-

tute's barometer in August, December ratings showed a sharp upswing rising after the outbreak of war to a seven-point gain, a tendency borne out by *Fortune's* analysis.

This phenomenon of increasing solidarity in the presence of external danger is even more apparent in the British experience where Prime Minister Chamberlain's personal popularity rose ten points between May and October to a high figure of 65 per cent approval.

The increase in President Roosevelt's popularity does not indicate public sanction for a third term, for which majority support has not yet been in evidence. It is significant that, although still short of a majority, the vote in favor of a third term increased and Roosevelt was still the 1940 choice of most Democrats who had formed opinions, with Garner, Hull, and McNutt as other possible Democratic candidates. The general upswing also advanced the prospects of the Democratic party for 1940, and a small majority indicated its belief that the Democratic party would be victorious in the next election.

Frequent "trial heats" conducted by both surveys revealed Dewey, Vandenberg, and Taft as most popular of the possible Presidential prospects in the minds of Republican

voters. Obviously, at this early stage, general political surveys can do no more than indicate tendencies valid only at the time the tests were conducted. Indeed, high "no opinion" votes may be conceived as an index that many voters are not "set" in their convictions. Future events and propagandas will undoubtedly change the political situation and the public opinion which ultimately crystallizes about candidates and party programs.

The popularity of the Dies Committee and the fact that a small majority believed there was some connection between the policies of the American Communist party and Soviet Russia must be seen against the background of the fears and insecurities induced by the conflicts abroad and Russia's activities in Finland. The desire to see a solution of America's labor quarrels between the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. is part of the same general attitude favoring more internal solidarity in the face of external strife and danger. Clearly, domestic questions, whether political, economic or social, took much of their significance between September and December from the threat of war.

War "Most Vital Issue"

Most striking indication that foreign politics overshadowed domestic issues in the minds of most Americans is their selection of "keeping out of war" as the "most vital issue" of 1939. Hitler's march into Poland, the assumption of military obligations on the part of France and

Great Britain and, more recently, the Russian attack on Finland, stimulated nationwide discussion and thought on the struggles in Europe, their causes and possible effects on American policy. Public opinion followed the ensuing events intently, with the awareness and interest which the democratic state demands of its citizens.

Certain basic attitudes emerge distinctly from the events and issues of the last stirring three months. A majority of American voters believed that Hitler's Polish action was completely unjustified; they placed responsibility for the outbreak of war squarely on the shoulders of the German leaders, in distinction to the German people, whom they viewed as misled and unable to voice effective opposition.

Believing that America's entry into the last war was a mistake, they strongly expressed their determination to remain aloof from the present conflict. Behind this opinion was the feeling that Germany, beset by internal difficulties and faced with the combined strength of the Allied forces, would be defeated more easily than in 1914-1918. The belief that America could and would stay out of the conflict, however, promises to lose some of its force if Britain and France appear to be going down to defeat.

An increased scepticism as to the reliability of foreign news sources and an awareness of propaganda did not prevent Americans from making certain distinctions. Greater faith in British and French sources than in

German and Russian was evident, but there was healthy doubt with regard to both. In regard to whether the war was essentially a democratic crusade or a struggle for power between rival imperialistic groups, public opinion appeared to be fairly evenly divided.

What about the rôle of the United States? What direction did public opinion want American policy to take? Strong sentiment was voiced for strengthening the national defence forces by increasing the preparedness of the army, navy, and air force. Although compulsory military service was not approved by a majority, indications were that more support would be found for this policy in the face of real necessity. Moreover, this attitude of favoring increase in the defence forces was not merely a general affirmation of public policy, for majority opinion also expressed a willingness to pay more taxes in order to finance this increase.

Neutrality

With the outbreak of the crisis in September, sentiment for a national referendum before Congress could draft men overseas declined rapidly and the public affirmed its faith in the ability of Congress and the President to cope with the problem of American neutrality. The Senate neutrality debates were closely followed by the general public, and although there were slight fluctuations in sentiment as different protagonists urged their cases for and against changing the embargo clauses, public sentiment consistent-

ly appeared to favor the decision actually taken.

In general, public opinion surveys revealed two basic attitudes: In the first place, an overwhelming desire on the part of the American people to avoid any participation in what was regarded as Europe's struggle—to "keep out of war." From this basic attitude stemmed the desire to keep American nationals and ships out of war-zones and to avoid any financial entanglements which might lead to war. On the other hand, and of almost equal strength, was the desire to help England and France in any way short of actual participation. In supporting amendment of the Neutrality Act, the majority of voters attempted to reconcile these two basic attitudes. The desire to stay out of war did not mean that America had become a pacifist nation, unwilling to fight under any circumstances, for public opinion was willing to implement the Monroe Doctrine with military measures if Canada, Cuba, or other countries in the American sphere of interest were attacked. Further, if future events were to bring Russia and Japan into the war against Great Britain and France, or if Germany appeared to be on the way to victory, sentiment for active participation, while not reaching majority-opinion proportions, would probably increase.

Finally, we may note a belief that the main war aims of the Allies have been clearly stated and, although a peace conference was favored, the bulk of Americans agreed with the people of Britain and France that

the conference must not be held on Hitler's terms. Would America participate in a world conference? On this point sentiment appeared to be evenly divided, since Americans were not sure that the end of the present conflict would bring a strong international organization into being.

On all of these questions opinion is not fixed. It is precisely because shifts of attitude have occurred and will continue to do so on various issues that the surveys can help to provide a continuing chart. The

British questions and results are highly interesting in so far as they furnish the first attempt to study public opinion in a nation at war by the poll mechanism. It is interesting to note that, although the personal popularity of the Prime Minister has risen steadily, and that there is almost complete solidarity on the main objects of the war, British public opinion even in war-time reserves to itself the democratic right to express criticism of the methods and conduct of government policy.

SAUL FORBES RAE

Looking Forward to Peace

IN this section of the QUARTERLY, a single question recently asked by one of the public opinion polls (American Institute of Public Opinion or *Fortune*) is analyzed to show the responses of different population groups and the relation between answers to this single question and others appearing on the same poll ballot and asked of the same respondents.

During the second week of November 1939 the interviewers of the American Institute of Public Opinion asked a representative sample of people all over the United States the question, "*If England and France defeat Germany, should the peace treaty be more severe on Germany or less severe than the treaty at the end of the last war?*" The alternative answers were "More severe,"

"Less severe," "Same," and "Don't know." When the respondent had answered this question he was then asked, "How strongly do you feel about this?" His answer was then checked as "Strongly" or "Mildly."

The final tabulation of the answers, reported by the Institute, showed that 16 per cent of the people did not have an answer to the question and that of those who did have an opinion, 58 per cent wanted a more severe treaty, 36 per cent a less severe treaty, and 6 per cent felt it should be about the same.

If respondents are classified by *economic status*, we find that the lower a person's place in the economic scale, the more inclined he is to want a more severe treaty. For example, only 47 per cent of the people in the high income brackets

want a more severe treaty, whereas 65 per cent of those in the lowest income brackets want the treaty more severe. There is also a much larger "don't know" answer among the lower income brackets.

Since this statistical classification, like most other such classifications, is only a substitute for psychological categories, we can only infer what the meaning of this difference may be. We know that a person's educational opportunities are closely related to his economic background. Educated people are more likely to understand the complex conditions that lead to war and the consequences of another Versailles; hence they are less likely to favor a more severe treaty.

Older people (over 40) tend to want a more severe treaty than younger people. Fewer persons in the older group give a "don't know" answer. When the sample population is compared by both age and economic status, we find a much greater spread of opinion among the older people than the younger.

There are probably several reasons for this: older people who lived through the last war are more likely to have lingering hatreds of their former enemy; older people also remember the failure of Wilson's peace plans, while younger people are characteristically more idealistic. But as the following figures show, age cannot itself be considered in a social vacuum—the economic status a person has is clearly more closely related to his opinion on this issue than is his age.

	<i>Over Under</i>	
	40	40
Want a <i>more</i> severe treaty		
High income	46%	50%
Low income	68	62
Want a <i>less</i> severe treaty		
High income	48	45
Low income	25	33

The greater range of opinion among the older group undoubtedly results from the fact that both economic and educational differences are greater among older people. And with the recent spread of compulsory education in this country, it is not unlikely that the older group is, on the whole, a less well educated group, especially since no opinions were asked of persons under 21.

When the direction of opinion is compared to its *intensity*, there is clear evidence that those who want a more severe treaty are more strongly of that opinion than are those who want a less severe treaty. This indicates that the more severe attitude assumes the nature of deep-rooted prejudice rather than a rational opinion devoid of emotional ties.

Other Questions

On the same ballot used by the American Institute during the second week of November, two questions were included which show significant relationships with the answers to the question discussed above. The first of these asked, "Do you approve the change which Congress made in the Neutrality Act

which permits nations at war to buy arms and airplanes in this country?" As we should expect, persons who wanted a more severe treaty tended more than others to approve the change in the Neutrality Act. Also significant is the fact that 36 per cent of the sample population had no opinion on the Neutrality Act question and that over two-thirds of these people wanted a more severe treaty. This confirms the hypothesis that persons wanting a more severe treaty are in general less sophisticated politically.

The second additional question showing a relationship to the attitude toward the peace treaty is, "Do you think England and France should explain more fully just what they are fighting for, or do you think they have already made their war aims clear enough?" Again we find a high "don't know" response—32 per cent of the population sampled not having an opinion on the clarity of the Allied war aims. Again, over two-thirds of these "don't know" people want a more severe treaty. Of those who do have an opinion of this question, however, a majority think the war aims are already clear. Those who want a more severe treaty appear more satisfied with the present statement of war aims than others, indicating again the more stereotyped character of this attitude and the lack of interest or ability to check the judgment with events.

The interviewers of the American Institute of Public Opinion were instructed to elicit comments on the question regarding the peace treaty.

These comments were analyzed by Donald Saunders of the Institute staff. His classification of comments indicates that those who wanted a more severe treaty tended to be vindictive and afraid of Germany while those who want a milder solution tend to blame the treaty of Versailles for much of the present trouble and to urge tolerance and moderation at the conclusion of the war.

*Reasons given by those who want a
MORE SEVERE treaty*

To prevent Germany from fighting again	31%
Germany has to be controlled	12
The German nation should be wiped out	12
To crush Hitlerism	11
To teach Germany a lesson	7
Lack of severity last time caused this war	7
To keep Germany down	6
Germany should be divided and small states created	5
Other reasons	9
	<hr/> 100

*Reasons given by those who want a
LESS SEVERE treaty*

The Versailles treaty caused this war	28%
The Versailles treaty was too severe	20
Punish the German leaders but not the people	18
Too severe treaties cause wars	14
To lessen the possibility of another war	10
More humane	3
Versailles treaty responsible for Hitler's rise	4
Other reasons	3
	<hr/> 100

HADLEY CANTRIL AND
DONALD RUGG
Princeton University

4. "Panel" Studies

STUDENTS of public opinion are showing increasing interest in the panel as a tool for studying the effectiveness of propaganda and, more especially, for gauging the effects upon people of specific promotional campaigns and devices. By re-interviewing periodically a representative sample of the people the promotional campaign is intended to affect, it is possible to discover what types of people are being reached by specific propaganda and what segments of the group, in what proportion, are registering changes in opinion regarding the subject matter of the promotional campaign. In addition, one can single out those members of the panel who register change, and by special interviews trace in detail how such changes in attitudes or behavior came about.

The panel as a tool for measuring public opinion has been described, and some of its advantages and disadvantages discussed, in a previous issue of the *QUARTERLY*.¹ This present report discusses some further advantages and possible defects of the panel technique, on the basis of experience gained by the Princeton Office of Radio Research in conducting several panels during the last two years.

The simplest form of panel consists in a single re-interview of people who have been interviewed once before. An opportunity for such a panel presented itself when a mem-

ber of the Psychological Corporation took a poll in Irvington, New Jersey, on the question of legalizing pari-mutuel betting, two weeks before a state referendum on the subject in the spring of 1939.² The Princeton Office of Radio Research then created a panel by re-interviewing, during the week after the election, 358 of the people whom Mr. Blankenship had polled. By comparing the opinions expressed by these people when polled with their statements as to how they actually voted (Table 1), it is possible to discover what changes in opinion occurred during two weeks of the campaign immediately preceding the election.

Table 1
SECOND INTERVIEW

FIRST INTERVIEW	DIDN'T			
	Yes	No	Vote	Total
Yes	80	21	70	171
No	11	80	51	142
Don't know	8	10	27	45
Total	99	111	148	358

The figures in the column at the extreme right, giving the total divisions on the first interview, and those in the bottom line, giving the total divisions on the second interview, are all that we would have if two

¹ Paul Lazarsfeld and Marjorie Fiske, "The 'Panel' as a Tool for Measuring Public Opinion," *PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY*, 2: 596-612 (October 1938).

² This study was conducted under the direction of A. B. Blankenship, now research director for Hartwell, Jobson and Kibbee.

polls, employing the customary technique of interviewing different samples of people successively, had been taken before and after the referendum. All the other information in the table was obtained by re-interviewing the sample originally interviewed. We can see, for example, that 160 people maintained their original opinions, whereas 32 reversed their opinions. The most important factor, however, in changing the "yes" vote from a majority in the first interview to a minority in the second was the fact that 121 people who originally had an opinion (70 of them "yes") failed to vote in the actual election. The reader will of course observe that the same initial and final distribution of opinions would be compatible with a very different internal relationship; for example, one in which many people reversed their opinions (especially from "yes" to "no") in the interim.³

Small but Reliable

From the point of view of technique, the most interesting aspect of Table 1 is the size of the sample. One of the main advantages of the panel is that it can be smaller than a corresponding series of poll samples and still have the same degree of statistical reliability. The reader will have noticed that between the first interview and final vote, there was a shift toward increased opposition to pari-mutuel betting. Originally, 55 per cent of the panel were in favor of legalizing it, but in the referendum only 47 per cent voted "yes." With so small a sample, such a shift is no greater than could be expected

by chance, so is not statistically reliable. If, therefore, successive polls had been made of different groups of people, a sample each time of 358 people would not have permitted the inference that a general change of opinion had occurred in the interval.

But because the same people are re-interviewed, more information is obtained. It is then possible to trace how the increase in "no" votes and the decrease in "yes" votes came about. This may be done by tabulating the losses of "yes" votes and the losses of "no" votes during the interval.

Table 2

	Loss of "Yes" Votes		Loss of "No" Votes
Yes to no	21	No to yes	11
Yes to don't know	70	No to don't know	51
Don't know to no	10	Don't know to yes	8
	<hr/> 101		<hr/> 70

³ As an example, the following table has been constructed arbitrarily to illustrate a situation with the same total distributions of opinion at the time of the first and the second interviews, but where the internal relationships within the table are entirely different. Here the general shift in opinion from "yes" to "no" resulted, not from the failure to vote of those who originally had an opinion, but from large-scale reversals of opinion (indicated by the size of the "yes-no" and "no-yes" boxes), in which the "no" side enjoyed a larger net gain.

FIRST INTERVIEW	SECOND INTERVIEW			
	Yes	No	Didn't Vote	Total
Yes	40	61	70	171
No	51	40	51	142
Don't know	8	10	27	45
Total	<hr/> 99	<hr/> 111	<hr/> 148	<hr/> 358

Thirty-one more "yes" votes were lost than "no" votes—and this difference is statistically reliable. We can therefore safely infer from the panel data that a general shift of opinion toward opposition to the referendum occurred in Irvington between the two interviews. Two polls of the same size would not have permitted this conclusion.⁴

Less Expensive

Since a panel sample need not be as large as successive poll samples to give statistically reliable results, an adequate panel is less expensive to set up than an adequate poll. In fact, it costs less to select a panel sample of a given size than successive poll samples even of the same size. Obviously the panel must be representative of the group for which it stands. The problems of sampling thus arising are the same as in any sampling procedure, including the poll, but with one important practical exception: the cost of recruiting a representative sample is very considerable. Since the panel sample need be selected only once, however, whereas poll samples must be selected repeatedly, the expenses of panel recruitment are substantially less than in the case of successive polls. And this is true even though, because the panel sample is used many times, the sample can be selected more carefully and painstakingly than the poll sample.

Difficulty of Re-Interviewing

Of course, this would not necessarily be the case if panel interviewers found it difficult or impossible to

find many members of the original panel when they wished to re-interview them. This problem arose when an arrangement was made with the American Institute of Public Opinion to re-interview, after the election, some of the people who had been polled during the Dewey-Lehman campaign for Governor of New York in 1938. The Institute approaches people on the street and in offices, as well as in their homes. Of the 331 people who were interviewed for the first poll, 42 refused to give their names. Of the remaining 289 who gave names and addresses, 109 could not be reached for re-interview after the election, either because they could not be found at the addresses given or were not at home. Thus, it was possible to re-interview only 54 per cent of the original sample.

This difficulty can be very much reduced, however, by making the original interviews at the homes of panel members. For example, in the case of the Irvington, New Jersey, panel, mentioned above, the orig-

⁴The writer is indebted to Professor Samuel A. Stouffer of the University of Chicago for assistance in the presentation of this result. It can best be understood by concentrating on the diagonal of Table 1, which indicates the number of people who did not change their opinions (the "yes-yes," "no-no," and "don't know-didn't vote" boxes). The more cases in these three boxes, the more significant will be a given total shift in opinion. Of course, it is easy to visualize a distribution of intended and actual votes in which the same total shift of opinion occurs, but, with a sample of only 358 cases, not even the panel technique could give statistically significant results. Such a situation is illustrated by the table in footnote 3.

Table 3

	<i>No Influence</i>	<i>Little Influence</i>	<i>Great Influence</i>	<i>Total Per Cent</i>	<i>Total Cases</i>
SEX					
Male	45	24	31	100.0	83
Female	21	38	41	100.0	72
EDUCATION					
Less than college graduate	26	30	44	100.0	77
College graduate or better	40	30	30	100.0	80

inal interviews were made at the homes of the respondents according to a random-sampling procedure. Of the 405 people selected for re-interview, only 47 could not be reached for re-interview. Thus it was possible to re-interview 88 per cent of the original sample.

Studying Cumulative Changes

The panel is most useful in studying cumulative changes over a period of time, especially when funds for setting up a large sample are not available, and changes between successive interviews are small. The panel can then be used to study accumulated changes which may be statistically significant when single influences are not.

For example, in a study of America's Town Meeting of the Air, after each of three programs two questions were asked regarding the effect of the program on the listeners. Some were subjective in character, such as, "Did the speaker make you aware of problems you were not aware of before?" Others were more objective, for example, asking what the respondent thought was America's greatest need before and after a program which discussed this very question. The respondents were then classified

into those who were not influenced at all, those who were influenced a little (i.e., those who answered three or less of the questions positively), and those who were greatly influenced. Table 3 gives the number of people in each of these categories, according to sex and two degrees of education. It will be seen that, despite the small size of the sample, the differences are statistically significant,⁵ indicating that women were more influenced than men, and that people without a college education were more influenced than college graduates.

Only by the panel technique of repeated interviews can the idea of "cumulative effects" be employed for the derivation of an index of influence sensitive to small changes.

Will People Admit Changes?

The question of whether people, when they are re-interviewed, will admit changes in their opinions is often raised in discussions of the panel technique. It might be sus-

⁵ The probability that some association exists between sex and "being influenced" is more than 99 per cent. For the second part of the table the significance is less; but the corresponding probability is still above 80 per cent.

Table 4

PROPORTIONS OF RESPONDENTS ADMITTING CHANGES IN OPINION

	<i>Justice Black Study</i>	<i>Irvington Panel</i>
No change of attitude	61%	52%
Acquired an opinion (positive or negative)	21	5
Shifted opinion (from positive to negative or vice versa)	12	9
Became undecided (shifted from positive or negative to no opinion)	6	34
Total per cent	100	100
Total number of cases	2,350	358

pected that people do not like to admit that they have changed their minds, hence that panel studies will not furnish material for further analysis of such changes.

The material on the Irvington, New Jersey, panel, summarized in Table 1, obviously throws some light on this question. It is retabulated in Table 4 to show the percentages of panel members who admitted changes of opinion of different forms. The same table also gives an example on a larger scale, drawn from a study made by the American Institute of Public Opinion. After Justice Black had assumed his seat on the Supreme Court and the turmoil in connection with his appointment had died down, the Institute asked more than 2,000 people how they had felt at the time of his appointment six weeks before, and how they now felt about it.⁶ Table 4 shows the percentages of the respondents who admitted different types of changes of opinion.

The table shows that almost half of the respondents in the two cases were willing to admit some kind of change in opinion, which certainly does not indicate a general impossi-

bility of discovering such changes through the panel technique and studying them further. Although some members of a panel do refuse to admit a shift in opinion, so that the panel may not provide an absolutely accurate index of change, nevertheless it permits the investigator to spot the large percentage of panel members who do admit a change and, through interview, to investigate further the causes of their shift.

Degree of Cooperation

One difficulty encountered in the operation of a panel is in members dropping out or failing to cooperate after they have promised to do so. This problem is most acute in the case of "action panels," where members are asked to do something between interviews concerning which they then express opinions. Such activities might consist, for example, in wearing certain dresses, trying certain foods, keeping expense ac-

⁶ A special analysis of this survey is reported in the author's paper "The Change of Opinion During a Political Discussion," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (February 1939).

counts, or listening to radio programs. In such cases, a new and important problem arises: how many panel members will actually do what they have promised? Our general answer is that very rarely will more than two-thirds cooperate at any given time. The best procedure is to organize the panel so that it contains at the start about twice as many people as are wanted after about five interviews. From the very beginning, some of the people who promise to cooperate will not do so, and there will be quite a bit of subsequent mortality.

For example, in two radio panels, one set up around America's Town Meeting of the Air and the other around the Chicago Round Table, about three-fourths of the people who agreed to cooperate listened to the program the first time, and about half of them the fifth time. This mortality can be slightly reduced by repeated reminders to panel members. No great reduction may be expected, however, as has been shown by experiments of the British Broadcasting Corporation, as well as our own experience. It is likely that, if panel members were paid for active participation, it would decrease this mortality, but the author has no evidence on this at present.

Self-Selective Bias?

This mortality within the panel raises the very important question of whether a self-selective bias becomes operative in an action panel as time goes on. Is the group which continues to cooperate still representative of the whole panel?

In considering this question, we must isolate the factors which affect degree of cooperation, to determine whether they act in the direction of self-selective bias and, if possible, to compensate for them. Our observations to date seem to indicate at least two such factors: the first might be called the "cultural level" of the respondent; the second, his interest in the issue regarding which the panel is organized. In "cultural level," we refer to a general attitude which has to be specified in each individual study and which may be estimated by a variety of indices, such as formal education, personal tastes in leisure-time activity, occupation, or kinds of magazines subscribed to.

To illustrate the influence of "cultural level" in a situation where formal education was used as an index, reference may be made to the panel organized to study America's Town Meeting of the Air, mentioned above. Cooperation in that study was measured by the number of questionnaires returned during the investigation period. It was found that, while only 55 per cent of the panel members without a college degree returned more than half the reports required, 67 per cent of the college graduates were equally cooperative.

There is, then, a factor of general intellectual accessibility which probably makes for a higher degree of cooperation. The other factor is interest in the subject matter. For example, in the Town Meeting panel, interest was measured by the number of programs to which the respondent had listened during the preceding year. Table 5 gives the percentage of

panel members who returned more than half the questionnaires according to the number of programs heard during the preceding year.

Table 5

PANEL COOPERATION ACCORDING TO INDEX
OF INTEREST IN SUBJECT MATTER

<i>Number of programs listened to during preceding year</i>	<i>Proportion of respon- dents return- ing more than half of questionnaires</i>	<i>Total number of cases</i>
0	50%	111
Less than 10	56	193
10 or more	76	100

Obviously the higher the interest in the subject matter of the panel, as measured by amount of previous listening to the Town Meeting program, the greater the degree of cooperation.⁷

It is quite likely that in special cases other factors will influence panel participation, but these two—general cultural level and interest in the topic—will always be present. It is the task of the panel director to reduce the rôle of these two factors to a minimum. He might, for example, ascertain at the start the degree of formal education of the respondents and obtain some index of interest in the topic. Special reminders might then be addressed to those sections of the panel which are most likely to fail to cooperate as time goes on. Also it might be well to select at the start a higher proportion of people of lower cultural level, and of those with less interest in the subject matter, than the director desires at the end of the study, in order to

offset the greater mortality among this group. However, despite all possible correctives, this selective mortality will always exist, and the panel director must bear it in mind in making interpretations of the data.

Effect of Panel Participation

The big problem yet unsolved is whether repeated interviews are likely, in themselves, to influence a respondent's opinions. Perhaps a distinction should be made between interviews dealing with issues about which the respondent is already concerned, and those based upon issues toward which he has no genuine attitude. It is in the latter case that repeated interviews probably make him more aware of the problems involved in the subject matter of the interviews. But it cannot be estimated in advance whether this will lead to greater changeability because the respondent becomes more susceptible to influences, or whether he will be more inclined as the result of the panel interviews to stick to his opinion, once acquired.

Despite such possible limitations, it is evident from the experience of the Princeton Office of Radio Research that, with proper safeguards, the panel is a most valuable tool in studying propaganda effects.

PAUL F. LAZARSFELD
*Director, Princeton Office of
Radio Research*

⁷ Several panels have yielded similar results, and tests have shown that the two factors of cultural level and interest are independently operative, one from the other.

5. Problems and Techniques

WORDING QUESTIONS FOR THE POLLS

THERE has been a good deal of discussion lately concerning the reliability of public opinion polls. Much of the criticism concerns the problem of sampling, the critics using as their stock argument, "I don't know anyone who has ever been interviewed." Some of these critics still do not understand the difference between the *Literary Digest* method of polling and the newer technique of selective sampling. The success of the polls in the past few years, together with the statistical fact that the representativeness of a sample is more important than its size, give ample evidence that the sampling technique is reliable, and that a small proportion of the population will adequately reflect the opinions of the whole population. To be sure, all the problems of sampling have not been solved. But these problems, compared to certain others, are relatively easy to settle with further experience and greater care.

One of the most important problems concerns the determination of the intensity or depth of any particular opinion. Two people may have the same opinion but one may have it strongly, the other mildly. And the behavioral consequences of these differing strengths of opinion may be important. In the *Fortune* poll we frequently try to tap this intensity of opinion by using an

attitude scale rather than asking a simple Yes—No form of question. For example, in the poll on Roosevelt, in 1936, we never asked people for whom they intended to vote but only tried to measure qualitatively their feelings toward Roosevelt.

A second major problem concerns the wording of questions. Opinion research men are well aware of the dangers involved in wording, and accordingly spend much time and money in trying to select neutral wordings. This is done by pre-testing the questions on a small population. One poll from our office went through fifteen complete changes in structure and arrangement before it was finally used. One of the individual questions was rewritten twenty times.

The obvious danger is that the poll administrator and those who help him design and word the questions cannot anticipate all the possible biases certain words may have when they are used with thousands of different kinds of people all over the country. No one would think of asking such a question, "In the current controversy between militaristic Japan and the brave democracy of China, on which side do your sympathies lie?" But, unfortunately, all the possible ways of eliminating errors are not so clear cut. We have found, for example, that if you ask

the question, "Do you think the United States should do everything in its power to promote world peace?" you get an overwhelming "yes" vote. But if you change the question to read, "Do you think the United States should become involved in a plan to promote world peace?" you reduce the "yes" vote by a considerable margin. "Involved" is a bad word.

In wording questions one must furthermore be very sure of the specific attitude one is trying to measure. For example, if one wanted simply to measure the extent of enthusiasm in the country toward the idea of malaria control, one would have to find out how to word a question in such a way as to indicate the presence of or the lack of enthusiasm for this particular effort. If, however, one wanted to get some idea as to how the public would react to a specific proposal that a fight against malaria be conducted by the Government, the problem becomes quite different and the identity of the author might be important. The following two questions would undoubtedly produce differing results:

1. President Roosevelt has asked

Congress for an appropriation of 25 million dollars to fight malaria. Do you think this appropriation should be made?

2. Do you think the Government should spend 25 million dollars in an effort to fight malaria?

Probably many people who felt they knew nothing about malaria or the need for its control might think they knew a great deal about Mr. Roosevelt and would be for—or against—anything he asked for.

In order to test this whole problem of wording systematically and on a representative basis, I have invited the editors of the PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY to furnish me four questions each quarter, each question to be worded in at least two alternate ways. These questions will be set by an advisory board of social scientists, will be tested by my interviewers on a national sample, and the results will appear in forthcoming issues of the QUARTERLY. It is my hope that this cooperation will help us to learn more about "danger words," and about the particular type of issues where danger words are most likely to appear.

ELMO ROPER

THREE WORDS

IN recent years, the terms "radical," "liberal" and "conservative" have been used quite generally by newspaper and other political commentators to describe political leanings or affiliations and often to classify leg-

islation. While these terms are in common usage by specialists in political comment, there has been little information about the extent to which they have become part of the vocabulary of the "man in the street."

The familiarity of the voting public with these terms was measured by the American Institute of Public Opinion in June 1939. The Institute asked voters to answer one of the following questions (each question was asked of about the same number of people):

"Please tell me in your own words what you consider a radical in politics."

"Please tell me in your own words what you consider a liberal in politics."

"Please tell me in your own words what you consider a conservative in politics."

The Sample

This experiment was conducted with a national sample of the voting population containing 3,054 cases. The sample has been broken down into smaller groups in order to study variations according to economic status, familiarity with the terms, and 1936 voting behavior. Some of these breakdowns contain only a relatively small number of cases.¹

Half the Voters Know

Of the three terms, "conservative" proved to be relatively the easiest to identify. Taking the three terms together in order to obtain an average, we found that a little less than half of the people interviewed were able to identify one of the three terms to a point that permitted us to assume that they understood the current usage of the term in political discussions. In classifying voters' answers, the Institute was careful to

give the voters the benefit of any reasonable doubt.

It was impossible in the case of about one-seventh of those interviewed to tell whether or not they were familiar with the terms "radical," "liberal" and "conservative." The remaining two-fifths either gave strictly incorrect definitions or were unable to give any answer at all.

As is generally known, there is a high correlation between amount of education and economic status. For this reason, perhaps, the American Institute of Public Opinion has generally found the widest interest in politics and in national affairs among voters in the top economic group and the least interest at the bottom of the economic scale. As might be expected, the voters who were the most successful in identifying these terms were those in the upper income groups. Table 1 gives an analysis of the results by income level.

It is common knowledge that in recent years the Republican Party has tended to appeal more to the upper economic groups in the country than it has to the poorer classes. In this

¹ In case of these small samples, of course, the probable error is relatively large. In view of this large probable error, it is impossible to be absolutely certain of the extent to which the variations are significant, but probably the significance of the results of this experiment can best be appreciated if it is remembered that the probable error, with three standard deviations, for practical purposes is an outside statement of the possible variations and that in a majority of cases, the deviation between the sample figure and the figure for the universe is substantially smaller.

Table 1

Correctness of Identification by
Economic Groups

	"Cor- rect"	"Doubt- ful"	"Incor- rect"	None	Cases
<i>Economic Groups</i>					
Upper	67%	15%	10%	8%	431
Middle	53	14	12	21	1545
Lower	35	12	17	36	1078

sample (ignoring the middle economic group), 24 per cent of the people interviewed who voted for Governor Landon in 1936 were from the upper economic group and only 21 per cent from the lower, whereas only about 10 per cent of the 1936 Roosevelt voters included in the sample were from the upper economic group, and 42 per cent were from the lower.

In view of the greater ability of the upper and middle economic groups to identify the words "radical," "liberal," and "conservative," shown in Table 1, it is to be expected that, as is shown in Table 2, these three terms were "correctly" identified by relatively more of the 1936 Landon voters than of the 1936 Roosevelt voters. The smallest percentage of "correct" identifications appears in the remaining group which consists for the most part of people who did not vote in 1936.

Self-Classification

On the same American Institute ballot, people were asked the following question: "In politics, do you consider yourself a radical, a liberal or a conservative?" (order of terms reversed on half of the ballots). This

Table 2

Identification by Political Groups

	"Cor- rect"	"Doubt- ful"	"Incor- rect"	None	Cases
1936 Landon voters	58%	15%	11%	16%	867
1936 Roosevelt voters	47	14	14	25	1491
Minor party or did not vote in 1936	40	12	15	33	696

question was answered before the one in which the voter was asked to describe a radical, a liberal, or a conservative, so that people had not been called on to test their own familiarity with the terms at the time that they identified themselves. Table 3, which gives a tabulation of the results on this question according to familiarity with one or the other of the terms, indicates a considerable variation in self-classification between people who are familiar with the terms and those who are not.

Examination of Table 3 brings out the following points:

1. Only about one voter in 50 classified himself as a "radical."
2. A substantial majority of the 1936 Landon voters considered themselves conservatives.
3. Among the 1936 Roosevelt voters who are familiar with the use of the terms "radical," "liberal," and "conservative," less than one-third consider themselves conservative, most of the rest considering themselves "liberals."
4. Of the more than one-half of 1936 Roosevelt voters who did not make correct identification, there is

a strong tendency to identify themselves as conservatives. In view of the fact that the bulk of these people are in the lower economic levels there is little evidence that most of them would actually hold the conservative point of view on current issues.

5. In the group that (1) voted for minor party candidates in 1936 or did not vote at all, and (2) made

"correct" identifications, the liberals outnumber the conservatives by about two to one. The people in this category who did not make "correct" identifications, show the same tendency to identify themselves as conservatives that was apparent among 1936 Roosevelt voters.

Table 4, which divides voters according to economic status, shows from another point of view the ten-

Table 3

	Self-Classification			No Classi- fication	% Conser- vative, Ex- cluding "No Classi- fication"	Cases
	Radical	Liberal	Conser- vative			
1936 <i>Landon</i> voters						
"Correct" identification	1%	23%	72%	4%	75%	503
"Doubtful" "	2	26	65	7	70	130
"Incorrect" "	2	34	53	11	59	94
No identification	1	14	47	38	76	140
Total	1	23	65	11	73	867
1936 <i>Roosevelt</i> voters						
"Correct" identification	1	62	30	7	32	696
"Doubtful" "	5	40	44	11	49	201
"Incorrect" "	2	30	46	22	60	214
No identification	1	21	26	52	54	380
Total	2	44	33	21	42	1491
Voted for Minor Party Candidates or Did Not Vote in 1936						
"Correct" identification	2	56	29	13	34	281
"Doubtful" "	6	31	46	17	55	82
"Incorrect" "	8	25	44	23	57	101
No identification	2	15	19	64	53	232
Total	3	35	30	32	44	696

Table 4

	Self-Classification			No Classi- fication	% Conser- vative, Ex- cluding "No Classi- fication"	Cases
	Radical	Liberal	Conser- vative			
<i>Upper economic group</i>						
"Correct" identification	—	42%	52%	6%	55%	289
"Doubtful" "	3%	35	54	8	58	65
"Incorrect" "	2	44	39	15	46	41
No identification	—	22	56	22	71	36
<i>Middle economic group</i>						
"Correct" identification	2	45	47	6	51	811
"Doubtful" "	4	36	49	11	55	218
"Incorrect" "	2	26	55	17	66	190
No identification	2	17	33	48	63	326
<i>Lower economic group</i>						
"Correct" identification	1	58	31	10	34	382
"Doubtful" "	4	30	55	11	62	130
"Incorrect" "	5	30	41	24	54	178
No identification	1	17	22	60	54	388

gency of people who are not familiar with usage of these terms to classify themselves as conservative instead of either radical or liberal.

This table also points to the following additional conclusions:

1. The lower the economic group, the higher the percentage of people who do not identify themselves with any one of the three labels.

2. Among those who "correctly" identified one of the three terms, 52 per cent in the upper economic group classified themselves as conservatives, whereas, only 47 per cent did so in the middle economic group and 31 per cent in the lower.

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WEIGHTED PROPORTIONS AND POLL RELIABILITY

In his article on "The Reliability of Public Opinion Surveys," published in the July 1939 issue of the *QUARTERLY*, Lucien Warner asks how the standard error of a proportion should be computed when that proportion is a weighted average of the proportions observed in two or more samples. He reports that apparently no formula had been published for this case and that no two experts agreed among several he consulted.

The standard error of weighted proportions, or, more generally, of weighted averages and weighted sums, is well known to mathematical statisticians although it is seldom mentioned in the standard textbooks and reference books. It is given, for example, by Bowley in his *Elements of Statistics* (page 316 in the sixth edition). If a sum is formed by multiplying each of several variable quantities, x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n , by weights, w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n , and then adding the products, we can write the sum as $y = w_1 x_1 + w_2 x_2 + \dots + w_n x_n$. Its standard error of sampling is then the square root of $\sigma_y^2 = w_1^2 \sigma_1^2 + w_2^2 \sigma_2^2 + \dots + w_n^2 \sigma_n^2$ where σ_1^2 is the error variance (square of the standard error) of x_1 , σ_2^2 the error variance of x_2 , etc. If the sum, y , is finally divided by some constant, c (usually the sum of the weights), the standard error of y/c is σ_y/c . It is often convenient to make the sum of the

weights equal to 1 so that this last division becomes unnecessary.

In the case of proportions, the i th x_i , x_p , is the proportion, P_i , observed in the i th sample and $\sigma_i^2 = P_i(1 - P_i)/N_i$ where N_i is the number of items in the i th sample.

In the example given by Mr. Warner each of three groups is given equal weight, $1/3$. Hence, $\sigma_y^2 = 1/9 (.0008) + 1/9 (.0025) + 1/9 (.00062) = .000435$. The standard error is .021, the square root of .000435, or 2.1 per cent.

It should be emphasized that this formula is valid only when the sampling is strictly at random, the sampling errors of one sample are independent of those of all the other samples, and the weights are independent of the errors. If the weights are chosen with an eye on the sample values actually observed, it is obvious that the weighted sum can be made to take any value the computer chooses. It is essential to remember that the standard error is a measure of the errors that will occur by chance in a long experience of sampling. It does not measure mistakes, bias, misinterpretation or other discrepancies between the sample results and the "true values" that would be determined by a complete and perfect investigation.

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COMMUNICATIONS

This selective survey endeavors to summarize leading events and situations in the various fields of communication that particularly concern problems of opinion formation and control. The period covered extends from September through December 1939. So far as possible, the survey seeks to bring together in a concise and convenient form not only factual data having public opinion implications but also summaries of current ideas and hypotheses regarding communicational activities, news of current research, and suggestions for desirable research projects.

1. Press, Radio, Films

International Communications

THE EFFECT of the European war upon both the physical network of communication and the form and content of communicated matter obviously has been a major focus of interest in the communicational field during the quarter. For students of communications, the war represents a military extension of a conflict of nationalistic communicational armaments and promotion, of "white wars" of propaganda, and of international jockeying for favorable communicational positions in the game of power politics. The character of this conflict was adequately described and the probable result in military action foreseen long before the outbreak of the "shooting war" in September. Of great interest, however, were such questions as the following:

To what extent would the outbreak of war between great powers prove or disprove certain hypotheses regarding the effect of general war upon the modern communicational network? To what extent would new forms of communication make their appearance? How adequate would the communicational system remain for supplying neutrals with information necessary for making adequate and satisfactory judgments regarding events and issues of the war? Closely related to these problems are the problems arising from the effects of war upon domestic channels of communication, such as American newspapers, radio, and motion pictures, which will be discussed later in the survey.

Transmission Continues

While no prophecy may be made for the future of a war which has not followed an orthodox pattern, the main fact in regard to international communications during the first four months of the war is that they have suffered little physical interruption. Prophecies of a *Blitzkrieg* on communicational armaments, with the destruction of cableheads and transmitters and the jamming of wireless and radio broadcasting have so far failed to materialize. Interference has been mainly political, arising from the censorship activities of the military and such governmental control bodies as the British Ministry of Information, the French Bureau des Informations, and the German Propaganda Ministerium.

The chief difficulties encountered by newsgatherers have included the strictness, inefficiency, and slowness of the censorship, especially in England; the inability to obtain information from responsible officials or to visit scenes of military activity or preparation; and the bottling up of certain lines of transmission, such as the cable and telephone lines between Paris and London, which were monopolized by military and governmental messages during the first months of the war. Some of these difficulties were given exaggerated publicity by journalists who seemed to continue to apply peacetime standards of news-gathering to the conditions of war. Much of the interference with news-gatherers arises from the fact that the belligerents are primarily concerned with defeating

the enemy, and not with supplying neutrals, or their own nationals, with a full and exciting account of the drama of war.

An excellent article in *Fortune* magazine ("Communications: The Fourth Front," Vol. XX, No. 5, Nov., 1939) describes the international communicational network (a map is included), the censorship and control bodies of the belligerent nations, and the early effects of the war upon the gathering and transmission of news. Since the *Fortune* article appeared, the British Ministry of Information has gone through a series of reforms, the French censorship has become less inept, and journalists have been allowed to visit the armies in the field. Some of the bottlenecks of electrical communication have also eased. American news-gathering associations such as the Associated Press and United Press continue to show great energy and ingenuity in rearranging their news-gathering centers in Europe and in devising transmission circuits that will decrease both the deletions and delays of political censorship. The communication systems of these agencies are complicated and often shift from day to day. In general, however, it may be said that many neutral cities, such as Amsterdam, Lisbon, Copenhagen, and Bucharest, have become important transmission centers, as news that formerly was gathered, edited, and transmitted from central news bureaus in Paris and London may now be handled more expeditiously from these scattered transmission centers in non-

belligerent countries. New York, as a matter of fact, has become an important clearing house for European news, as many correspondents now file direct to that city instead of to central distributing points in Europe. For competitive reasons, news-gathering agencies guard the secrecy of some of their lines of communication, but it may be said that all of the agencies are constantly experimenting with new circuits that will increase speed and accuracy, especially under volume demands. It will be recalled that in 1918, for instance, the United Press was able to gain priority in many instances by filing from the cablehead at Brest, thereby avoiding the bottleneck of censorship at Paris.

News-Gathering Costs

An important effect of war conditions has been the rise of news-gathering costs. Reasons for increased expense have included the large volume of war news, particularly in the early weeks of the war; the enlargement of European staffs; the increased volume of photographs transmitted across the Atlantic by cable or wireless; the increased cost of filing direct to New York from scattered relay points; and the fact that important news is filed at the fullrate instead of the slower press rate. While the cable press rate from London is 5 cents a word, the speedier fullrate is 18 cents; from Paris the press rate is 7 cents, fullrate 29 cents; from Bucharest, press rate 17 cents, fullrate 52 cents. When it is remembered that much of the news from Europe is urgent and filed

at the fullrate, and that multiple filing by as many as six routes (to assure delivery) is not uncommon, the economic effects of war reporting become obvious. The United Press estimated that it spent about \$125,000 above its normal budget during the six weeks from mid-August to the end of September. In September the Associated Press reported that its cable tolls alone were running more than \$5,000 a day, or about \$3,000 above normal. On October 1, the International News Service invoked a 15 per cent additional assessment on its clients, and on October 8 the United Press imposed a 12½ per cent service assessment. Several photo services asked clients to share the cost of transmission of pictures. Late in November the United Press suspended its war assessment and INS cut its assessment from 15 per cent to 7½ per cent. The official reason given was that decreased war activity decreased the costs of coverage, although it may be assumed that the perfection of new lines of communication after the confusion of the first weeks of the war, and more efficient techniques in the writing and routing of messages, had a good deal to do with the lowering of costs.

Information, in brief, becomes a more expensive commodity in time of war. Costs affect both the volume and accuracy of information available in neutral countries. Increased costs, while perhaps ultimately paid by the consumer, directly affect the financial stability, and ultimately the services, of such users of news as newspapers and radio stations. The

cost of news is therefore an important addition to the list of factors (given below under the headings "Press," "Radio" and "Motion Pictures") affecting the economy and services of communicational enterprises in the period of war. Costs of war coverage have already seriously shaken the newspapers of belligerent countries. An intensification of military activity, sufficiently protracted, might well dislocate the economy of newspapers and news services in neutral countries such as the United States.

An interesting sidelight on the effect of transmission costs upon news services and questions of monopoly is the protest of competing agencies against a Special Contract Press Service entered into between the Associated Press and the Western Union Telegraph Company for cabled messages between London and New York. This form of contract, which gives lower-than-ordinary press rates to a customer using a volume of 4,000,000 words per annum, for an initial period of three years, has been attacked by competing agencies as constituting unreasonable discrimination against the small user of telegraphic press services. The incident recalls the attacks on preferential contracts drawn up between the New York Associated Press and telegraph companies in the 1850's; these contracts were successfully opposed on the grounds that they tended to give the New York A.P. a news monopoly and interfered with "the freedom of the press." In the present instance, the Federal Communications Commission has agreed to review the Spe-

cial Contract Service at a hearing on January 22, 1940.

Broadcasting

With a few temporary exceptions, international wireless and radio broadcasting services have continued without interruption. Aural broadcasting in Europe can be turned into a complete Bedlam at any moment by "jamming" (interference on the same frequency). In spite of predictions that aural broadcasting would be immediately blocked-out with the outbreak of war, an eventuality which had been prepared for, especially in Great Britain and Germany, with large-scale installations of "wired radio" (transmission over telephone and electric power lines instead of by means of ether waves), interference has been spasmodic. One instance of interference followed the sinking of the S.S. *Athenia* on September 4, when British news announcements were blocked out by powerful band music from an unidentified station. Another instance occurred early in December, when a speech by the President of Finland, addressed to neutrals, was interfered with by a powerful station, presumably Russian. The absence of any considerable interference was confirmed in November by Raymond Braillard, director of the Control Center of the International Broadcasting Union, Brussels, who reported that both belligerent and neutral nations were observing their wavelength assignments with a minimum of upsetting of normal broadcast operations.

The absence of interference is probably due to the fact that jamming works two ways; it interferes with domestic aural services and would probably bring swift retaliation from abroad. Apparently no warring nation is yet willing to sacrifice its voice on the air. Radio propaganda attacks from abroad are being met in several ways: by making listening to foreign broadcasts a criminal offense, as in Germany; by increasing the power and range of national stations; by attempting to discredit the news and opinions transmitted by foreign stations; by trying to improve the efficiency of the nation's own propagandistic and culturally promotional broadcasts.

Awareness of Propaganda

No fact is more obvious during the past quarter than that the man on the street has become extraordinarily aware of both the mechanics and content of international communications. While this interest is unprecedented, it was prepared in part by the publicity given to propaganda during the past ten years by students of the subject and the propagandistic character of the ideological and territorial aggressions of the totalitarian states, especially since 1933. Popular magazines and newspapers have been prodigal with articles on such topics as "the war in the ether," "poisoning the world press," etc. The world public has followed with interest and amusement such verbal exchanges as those between "Lord Haw-Haw," the German announcer at Zeesen with the excruciating English accent, and the British announcers. Neutrality

problems and the Dies committee investigation have sharpened American sensitivity to propaganda.

Whether this perfervid awareness of propaganda is desirable or not, the quarter has produced a number of interesting devices, both descriptive and analytical, for coping with wartime problems of communication and propaganda. The *New York Times* and other newspapers print a daily reminder that news from belligerent countries is censored. The *Los Angeles Daily News* and *Evening News* use labels on European dispatches, OP standing for "official propaganda," SA for "seems authentic," and V for "verified." Of particular interest to students of public opinion are some of the special long-time studies of which the following are examples.

Monitoring of Broadcasts

The Columbia Broadcasting System began before the war to summarize foreign shortwave broadcasts, and to distribute these summaries in bulletin form to newspapers and interested individuals. News agencies and a number of the larger newspapers enlarged their shortwave monitoring with the sharpening of the European crisis. It was supposed that occasional scoops and the educational value of printing, side by side, the contradictory claims of belligerents, would justify the long vigils at receiving sets and the additional expense of hiring translators and transcribers. The *New York Herald Tribune* still prints a department entitled "Radio Reports from Abroad," and the *Chicago Times* prints a daily

column called "We're Listening," based on the all-day listening of B. E. Lucas, but most news agencies and newspapers have found little of value in the broadcasts to supplement their regular services, and have returned to normal monitoring. Radio programs based on shortwave monitoring have also appeared, the "Propaganda Roundup" of the Mutual Broadcasting System being typical. The British Broadcasting Corporation has announced that it is monitoring foreign broadcasts twenty-four hours a day, with a staff of 100 receiving and summarizing about 250,000 words a day, including 150 news broadcasts. Some of these programs are mechanically recorded. Other governments are probably doing the same thing, and there is a possibility that a fairly complete record of aural wartime broadcasting may eventually become available to post-war scholars.

Princeton Listening Center

On November 30, the Princeton Listening Center of Princeton University, with the aid of funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, began to monitor shortwave broadcasts from London, Paris, Berlin and Rome. Descriptive and analytical bulletins are published from time to time and may be obtained from the Director, Harold N. Graves.

Bulletins and Pamphlets

The multiplication of propaganda has brought into existence a large number of bulletin and pamphlet services which in themselves constitute an interesting and important channel of communication. These

vary from more or less objective analyses to frankly partisan propaganda sheets. Some were in existence before the war started, but have now focussed their interest on the channels of war propaganda. Among them might be mentioned the bulletins of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 40 East 49th Street, New York City; the bulletins debunking British propaganda published by Porter Sargent, 11 Beacon Street, Boston; the news-letter of the German Railroad Information Office, 11 West 57th Street, New York City; *Facts in Review*, published by the German Library of Information, 17 Battery Place, New York City; *News from Germany*, published by H. R. Hoffmann, Riedenerweg 1, Starnberg, Bavaria, Germany.

"Letters"

Letters, incidentally, have recently emerged as another interesting channel of communication. Pantographed letters denouncing the "yellowbritish," postmarked Chicago, have recently appeared in considerable numbers, and every American family seems to have a lady friend or relative in England who writes "such interesting letters," many of which eventually find their way into the news or Vox Pop columns of American newspapers.

Sponsored International Broadcasts

The first commercially sponsored shortwave radio program for foreign listeners broadcast from the United States was inaugurated on December 1 when the United Fruit Company began a daily quarter-hour out of

New York City over shortwave stations WNBI and WRCA designed for the Caribbean and Central America. The "goodwill" program, entitled "El Mund Al Dia," is devoted to a straight recital of Associated Press dispatches in Spanish. Under FCC rules no commercial wordage is permitted except identification of the sponsor and his product or business. Time is costing United Fruit at the rate of \$25,000 a year for seven evening quarter-hours a week. With the rapid growth of American cultural and promotional interest in Latin America since September, the appearance of sponsored radio may signify further economic and cultural penetration from the United States.

Press

ASIDE from the problems arising from wartime communications, the press has been particularly concerned during the quarter with questions of economy, prestige, and new forms of competition.

Economic Changes

It is expected that year-end compilations will show that about 50 daily newspapers were suspended or merged during 1939. Important losses during the quarter were the suspension of the *Atlanta Georgian* and the *Atlanta Sunday American*, formerly owned by W. R. Hearst, and of the *San Diego (California) Sun*, a Scripps-Howard newspaper. Among the chief reasons advanced by the industry for increased newspaper mortality during the past year are increased labor costs, rising news-

print prices, higher state and Federal taxes, loss of advertising business to competing newspapers and radio, and rising costs of news and feature services.

The significant fact for students of public opinion is that most of the suspensions and mergers involve so-called "second newspapers," and leave one newspaper or one newspaper corporation with a newspaper monopoly in the respective communities. While the increase in one-newspaper places may be desirable from the standpoint of the advertiser, who is not called upon to spread his money over so many media, it rouses grave apprehensions in regard to the newspaper's public and editorial functions. The cyclical movement toward concentration and standardization has apparently not reached its apex, and a mood of pessimism is distinctly observable in newspaper circles.

The War and Newspaper Economy

With Canadian newsprint mills operating at approximately only 60 per cent of their capacity, it is not expected that a cessation of importations from Scandinavia will bring any rapid price increase in newsprint during the next year. The price of newsprint for the first six months of 1940 has been announced as \$50 a ton, continuing the price asked during the last six months of 1939. War cancellation clauses are beginning to appear in contracts, however, and any large-scale diversion of Canadian pulp or wood products to Europe might cause a rapid increase in price, unless the new slash-pine newsprint

industry in the South can be developed adequately by that time. During the last World War, newsprint prices rose to \$120 a ton in this country, with drastic effects upon newspaper economy and services.

In belligerent countries in Europe the war is taking a heavy toll in suspensions, mergers, reduction of advertising with an increase in advertising rates, unemployment, and radical reductions in publication size. In England a peculiar dilemma arises from the fact that circulations of many national dailies and popular periodicals continue to rise in spite of reductions in size and reduction in the volume of advertising. The increase in advertising rates is apparently an effort to avoid the charging of production costs directly to the consumer in the form of higher subscription rates. The English government is attempting to peg the price of newsprint by fiat.

Newspaper Prestige

The quarter brought forth considerable discussion in the trade press and at publishers' meetings of the survey of public attitudes toward the press made by the firm of Elmo Roper and analyzed in the issue of *Fortune* for August 1939. While too detailed to summarize here, the survey indicates that the public believes newspapers to be prejudiced and influenced to a considerable extent by their friends and patrons, including politicians, friends of the publisher, big advertisers and business in general. The public not only rated radio news as being freer from prejudice than news in newspapers but also

indicated that if conflicting versions of the same story appeared in newspapers and in radio, it would be inclined to believe the radio version. Incidentally, the Associated Press tacitly recognized this situation last spring when it removed its ban against the sale of AP news by members to commercial radio sponsors. While the AP name may not be used on sponsored newscasts, the AP presumably admits in its change of policy that the public does not recognize the superior dependability of printed over oral news nor a superior cachet in the AP name over the names of other agencies serving radio stations and commercial sponsors.

To the *Fortune* survey, industry spokesmen have replied by attacking both the reliability of the polling techniques employed and the accuracy of the findings. An analysis of the survey by H. C. Bernsten, published in the form of a bulletin by the Pacific Coast Division of the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Association in September, declared that Roper sampled less than three-one hundredths of one per cent of Pacific Coast families and that therefore his findings are unsound and inadequate. Other spokesmen for the newspapers, including *Editor and Publisher*, argue that the maintenance of its circulation by the press in general is sufficient proof of reader confidence. In view of the large percentage of newspaper space devoted to entertainment features, and the dispute over the accuracy of such polls as the one presented by *Fortune*, the question of the relationship

between newspaper circulations and public confidence offers an interesting field for further investigation. Incidentally, the *American Weekly*, a Sunday magazine section published by W. R. Hearst, claims the largest circulation in the country.

Newspaper Circulation

A disastrous year from the standpoint of suspensions and mergers, 1939 nevertheless saw a significant increase in newspaper circulations. Audit Bureau of Circulation figures for 95 morning and 130 evening papers, representing about half of the total weekday circulation of the country, show an increase of 3.24 per cent for the first six months of 1939 over the same period in 1938. Figures for the last six months of 1939 will probably increase the percentage rise for the year. While some of this circulation increase can be attributed to interest in the war, an interest which has been whetted by radio broadcasts, a safe generalization on the basis of past experience is that a large part of any great newspaper circulation increase is permanently retained. An interesting question for speculation is when the saturation point of American newspaper circulation will be reached. Another is whether it will be possible to maintain large newspaper circulations under present and future economic conditions without passing along directly to the consumer more of the production cost of newspapers or launching daily newspapers revolutionary in form, such as papers produced by offset printing or papers produced by the facsimile process via radio.

War Periodicals

Press novelties which will be followed by students of communication channels are the new soldier and official military newspapers appearing in belligerent countries. Seven have already been reported from Germany, including the *Nachrichtenblatt für die ostpreussische Armee*, *Westwallbote*, *Soldaten Zeitung der Schlesischen Armee*, *Schlesische Frontschau*, *Soldaten Zeitung*, *Wacht im Westen*, and *Flieger-Funker-Flak*. British war periodicals, such as *Illustrated War News* and *War Pictorial*, priced at only 15 cents, have appeared in large numbers on American newstands throughout the country during the quarter.

Radio

IN ADDITION to the events summarized under "International Communications," above, the following effects of the war upon domestic radio services were noted during the quarter:

1. During the week of September 5, the three major networks adopted a voluntary code which seeks to avoid horror, suspense, undue excitement, unneutrality, and belligerent propaganda. It was agreed that all domestic and foreign propaganda regarding the war was to be labeled as such. A special committee has been appointed by the FCC to study the problems of wartime broadcasting.

2. Station WMCA, New York, was threatened with revocation of its license for claiming (falsely, as it turned out) that it was intercepting

and broadcasting military messages from England and Germany, a violation of Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. When evidence was brought forth that WMCA received its information from INS, the *Mirror*, and the *Herald Tribune*, all of which operate shortwave receiving sets, the station was let off with a reprimand.

3. Many individual stations, particularly those broadcasting in foreign languages, restricted news reports and attempted to avoid unneutrality in various ways. Station WHOM, Jersey City, went so far as to ban the name of Adolf Hitler.

4. In suspending two amateur licenses, the FCC warned the 53,500 licensed amateur radio operators in the country that the international situation has made it doubly necessary for amateurs to observe FCC regulations and that further unauthorized activities by amateur stations during the European war may bring about a curtailment of shortwave operations of amateurs generally. The FCC operates monitoring stations at Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Grand Island, Nebraska; Great Lakes, Illinois; San Pedro, California; and Portland, Oregon; as well as twenty-six field stations.

Frequency Modulation

Frequency modulation looms as probably the most portentous current development in radio. Stations on the commercial longwave band are now operating on an amplitude modulation (AM) system, in which sound is transmitted by rapid modulations of power. Frequency modula-

tion (FM) transmits sound by what has been described as a "wobbling" of its frequencies over a waveband.

The revolutionary character of FM is indicated by the fact that experts predict adoption of the system would make obsolescent the 40,000,000 radio receiving sets in the country and radio transmitting stations worth about \$75,000,000. Arguments for FM are that it requires less power than AM, reduces static and interference, and reproduces sound with extraordinarily high fidelity. Of special pertinence to the public opinion field are these two characteristics of FM: (1) Operating on shortwave frequencies above 25,000 kilocycles, it would greatly increase the radio spectrum available for broadcasting services. (2) FM shortwave stations can operate in relatively close proximity to one another (100 to 200 miles) without interference. Like (1), this will provide room for hundreds of new stations and make possible the democratization of the ether for which educational groups, governmental groups, and various kinds of special services have been clamoring.

The most complete discussion of FM for the layman may be found in *Fortune* magazine for October 1939. This article, entitled "Revolution in Radio" suggested that the FCC has been resisting the progressive revolution of FM because of the influence of vested interests in orthodox commercial radio services. Whether this charge is true or not, the FCC has called a hearing for February 28, 1940, when all of the arguments for and against FM will be aired. In the

meantime, 20 experimental licenses are already in operation and about 20 more have been authorized to begin operation within the next few months. Among the networks and stations either using or planning to use FM are CBS, NBC, WOR, the Yankee Network in New England, and WQXR.

Of further importance is the claim that FM will greatly facilitate the development of new channels of communication such as facsimile and television, which recently have been marking time.

Broadcasting Code

The Code of the National Association of Broadcasters was summarized and discussed in the October issue of the *PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY*, Vol. 3, No. 4. The effectiveness of code compliance is still uncertain. Eight stations resigned from membership in the NAB, but only in the case of the resignation of the four Texas stations operated by Elliott Roosevelt is a connection with code compliance clear. Agents for Father Coughlin, first target of the Code, have announced that he has lost only two of 49 outlets, WGBI, Scranton, and WTMJ, Milwaukee. On November 28 the Code Compliance Committee granted state autonomy to NAB members to determine "(1) when an individual becomes a legally qualified candidate for public office and qualifies for the sale of time under the code, or (2) to decide the date for the opening of a campaign for election of public officials or for discussion of public proposals

which are subject to ballot." Autonomy was granted because of differences in state laws regarding election procedures.

New National Network

A fourth national network, Transcontinental Broadcasting System, Inc., was scheduled to begin operations on February 1, 1940. Composed of 102 stations, mainly of low power, the network faces a number of difficulties which make its future uncertain. Several attempts in recent years to establish a fourth national network have failed. A report on the characteristics and success of Transcontinental will appear in the next quarterly survey.

Children and the Radio

Formation of the Radio Council of Children's Programs, sponsored by the General Federation of Women's Clubs, United Parents Association and the American Library Association, was announced on December 17. The aims of the Council are to audition all children's programs before they go on the air, disseminate information on the best programs, and endeavor to increase the time given to children's programs. A bulletin may be published later. The Council, through its vice-chairman, Mrs. Harold V. Milligan, announced that it had the cooperation of the three leading networks as well as the advertising agencies. It also claimed that five children's programs of the "blood and thunder" type, including Dick Tracy, had been withdrawn from national networks through its efforts. Whether these programs have

bobbed up elsewhere is not definitely known.

A survey of the listening habits of children has been made by Dr. John P. McKay, principal of the West Richmond Heights School, St. Louis. The survey was conducted for two weeks last February in 40 schools in the city of St. Louis and 17 in St. Louis County, and records were kept by 1,909 sixth-grade pupils. Listening habits are broken down into time of listening, types of programs preferred, and sex differences. Dr. McKay found that his subjects spent an average of fourteen hours a week at radio receivers.

Radio "Clipping Bureau"

Burrelle's Press Clipping Bureau has announced the establishment of a subsidiary, the Radio Reporter, which will endeavor to offer a service in radio similar to that offered by clipping bureaus in the field of periodical literature. The office is in the Herald Tribune building, New York City. Another radio "clipping" service is Radio Reports, Inc., which charges \$200 a month for a daily digest of network radio programs concerning industry. While both of these services are designed for business clients, primarily as an aid to public relations work, they suggest an interesting research tool for investigators who require actual transcriptions or summaries of the contents of radio broadcasting. It is a deplorable fact that students of broadcasting have no body of source material to which to refer comparable to the files of periodicals or depositories of films and still photographs.

Motion Pictures

WITH TELEVISION threats still somewhat nebulous and the effects of the European war less serious to motion picture economy than many had expected, the industry has been chiefly concerned during the quarter with two governmental moves to reform motion picture trade practices.

Neely Bill

The Neely bill, designed to prohibit the trade practices known as "compulsory block-booking" and "blind selling," passed in the Senate at the last regular session and was to be introduced in the House sometime after Congress convened on January 3. Block-booking refers to the trade practice which prevents independent motion picture theaters from renting individual films from a producer without signing up for a whole block of his product. Sometimes the films have not yet been produced, or are in the process of production.

Among the chief arguments against block-booking are the following: 1. Exhibitors often have to show films which they or their community do not want (often because they are vulgar or trashy) in order to show films which they and the community do want. 2. Producers occasionally keep out of blocks, and sell separately, especially good films. 3. Theaters owned by a particular producer often are not held rigidly to the producer's block system.

Chief arguments for block-booking are: 1. Exhibitors are often hypocritical; they want money-making

films, and if reform elements in the community complain, managers pass the buck to the booking system.

2. Many excellent films have a limited box office appeal and might never be shown if they were not included in blocks. 3. Block-booking is more economical than individual booking; with additional selling expense, producers would either have to reduce the quality or numbers of films or raise rentals. 4. The "community selection" which the Neely bill is supposed to make possible is really another name for "local censorship."

With the cooperation of the Hays office, the organized motion picture industry has been preparing a campaign during the quarter to familiarize exhibitors and the public with the potential "evil" effects of the bill and forestall favorable action on it in the House.

Anti-Trust Suit

The other major governmental attack on the industry is the civil suit being brought by the United States, through the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice, against eight leading motion picture producers and 25 of their distributing and exhibiting subsidiaries. In brief, the purpose of this civil action is to break up alleged monopoly and restore free competition to the motion picture industry by divorcing production and exhibition. Thurman Arnold has recently rejected a voluntary code proposed by the industry to correct some of the evils of block-booking and other trade practices, and the case of *United States vs. Paramount*

Pictures, Inc., et al., is scheduled to go to trial in the District Court for the Southern District of New York on May 1, 1940. The action is especially important because of the possible effect it will have upon a large number of other anti-trust suits against the motion picture industry now pending in Federal courts in various parts of the country.

Promotion and Propaganda Films

The outbreak of the war has thrown into sharper relief the question of the place of films of political or sociological content on the American screen. The argument is, of course, an old one, with leading spokesmen of the motion picture industry holding, on the one hand, that the function of the commercial screen is non-political entertainment, and various political- and social-minded groups arguing, on the other hand, that the screen is an appropriate and logical medium for the exposition of political and social data and discussion. The outbreak of the war has strongly emphasized two important factors, (1) public interest in political questions, particularly those related to the ideologies of belligerent nations, and (2) pressure from groups both within and without the industry to produce films congenial to those groups in political content. Along with these factors is an evident desire on the part of producers to avoid an excessive unneutrality in regard to the issues of war, which might lead to unfavorable notice from a government already attacking the industry on several fronts.

A cycle of political and sociological films was already under way before the outbreak of the war. *Confessions of a Nazi Spy*, *Juarez*, *Our Leading Citizen*, and a series of historical-nationalistic pictures of which *The Real Glory*, *Drums Along the Mohawk* and *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* are typical, reflected an interest in films more or less consciously loaded with political implications and propaganda. A franker bit of propaganda, *Hitler—Beast of Berlin*, met with a mixed reception, some states cutting it or banning it entirely, and other states passing it as harmless entertainment. Several films involving attitudes toward belligerents, such as RKO's *Nurse Edith Cavell*, were produced before the outbreak of the war.

The future remains uncertain, and the degree of political content of films will probably depend upon a number of as-yet-unknown factors such as the duration of the war, the character and intensity of American neutrality, the changing sympathies of the American public toward belligerents and political ideologies, and cyclical changes in public taste in entertainment. The *Motion Picture Herald* published an interesting record in its issues of October 7 and 14, 1939, of motion pictures, stage plays, vaudeville acts, songs and books that found favor with the American public during the years 1914 through 1918. The main deduction to be drawn from the record is that there was little effect of war and patriotism upon popular taste in entertainment. Whether American taste will follow

a similar pattern during the present war period is not yet clear.

Foreign Propaganda Films

Belligerent nations in Europe have begun to produce propaganda films based upon the present war. In England, Alexander Korda has released *The Lion Has Wings*, a film glorifying Britain's air defenses, and is currently at work on *Hunting of the U-Boat*. Other countries project similar films, many of which will undoubtedly be released eventually in the United States.

In this connection, the film censorship policies of belligerent nations offer an interesting topic for study. France, for example, has already banned, for the duration of the war, a considerable number of domestic and foreign films, including the American pictures, *All Quiet on the Western Front*, *The Road Back*, *The Big Parade*, and *They Gave Him a Gun*.

"Film Audiences for Democracy"

Formed last spring as an amalgamation of Associated Film Audiences and Films for Democracy, Film Audiences for Democracy is currently engaged in a program the object of which is to encourage "films that uphold American democracy, civil liberties and peace, that promote better understanding and improve neighborly relations between racial and religious groups, that present an accurate, undistorted as well as a socially useful portrayal of the contemporary scene; and to oppose all totalitarian trends, attacks on labor and films contrary to the Bill of

Rights." Frankly quasi-political, Film Audiences seeks to organize articulate audiences, sponsors lectures, film showings and forums, and attempts to bring pressure on Hollywood to produce congenial films. A monthly bulletin, *Film Survey*, containing reviews and general articles, is published. Henry Pratt Fairchild is president of the organization and Edward K. Kern director of activities. Offices are at 342 Madison Avenue, New York City.

"Documentary Producers"

The Association of Documentary Film Producers, Inc., now in its first year, announces that its main objectives are to develop the artistic and technical standards of independent, creative films and to publicize and promote the wider production and distribution of such films. It also seeks to act as a source of information on such films and to cooperate with other agencies in the compilation, dissemination, and exchange of such information. Joris Ivens is president of the organization and Mary Losey secretary. Headquarters are at 1600 Broadway, New York City. A British organization of a somewhat similar character is the Association of Realist Film Producers, 34 Soho Square, London W. 1., of which Paul Rotha is general secretary.

A New Critics' Group

Newspaper Film Critics of America, a national association of critics and editors, was organized late in

August with the announced purpose to "elevate standards of criticism and comment on movies, cooperate toward the advancement of the film department as an important factor in the American press and cooperate in the betterment of the film industry." Harry Martin, of the Memphis (Tennessee) *Commercial-Appeal*, was elected temporary chairman.

The association seeks to embrace all the film critics of the country, 900 of whom are on the records of the Hays office, besides more than 300 news and magazine writers commenting on films at Hollywood. The facts that the association was organized in the course of a junket to Scranton, Pennsylvania, financed by Universal to preview *Under-Pup*, starring the new child "find" Gloria Jean, and that the *Motion Picture Herald* hailed the new association as having potential usefulness as a "peacemaker" between newspapers and the motion picture business in disputes over such matters as increases in advertising rates and decreases of space for items about pictures and personalities, cast considerable doubt upon the organization's probable usefulness in raising the prestige of film critics.

Directory

A new directory of government films has appeared. Copies may be obtained from the United States Film Service, United States Office of Education, Washington, D.C.

O. W. RIEGEL
Washington & Lee University

PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES

This section reports efforts of organized groups and governmental agencies to influence public opinion and describes individuals and organizations engaged in such activities.

1. Organized Groups

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMS

IN reporting the activities and objectives of major organized groups, the *QUARTERLY* makes no attempt to evaluate the aims or methods of the groups considered. For the most part, information is compiled from literature and data issued by the organizations themselves and in some cases from interviews with their leaders.

The decisions of our National Legislature are affected in varying degrees by the pressures exerted upon Members of Congress by organized groups. With Congress now in session, the Editors believe it timely to present the following outline of the legislative programs of several major groups which will be attempting to influence legislation during the next few months.

The American Legion

Speaking for "a membership of well over 1,000,000 World War veterans" and "an Auxiliary of approximately one-half million," the Legion calls its 1940 legislative program "record-breaking." The 174 items adopted by the National Convention are being advanced under the guidance of the National Legislative Committee Director, Colonel John Thomas Taylor. In accordance with Legion practice, the entire program was sorted into major and secondary items by the National Executive Committee, meeting last November. Seven objectives are listed as "major." Two of these represent specific group interests. The others reflect the Legion viewpoint on general policy.

Termed "most important" by the Legion is the objective of furthering government protection for widows and orphans of veterans. A report to the National Executive Committee states: "As the law stands today, the widows and orphans of all veterans with a service-connected disability whether their death is caused by disability or from any other cause, are now entitled to care and protection. We are firmly of the opinion that the time has arrived when all widows and orphans are entitled to protection whether the deceased veteran was or was not suffering from a service-connected disability. Such protection is accorded the widows and children of veterans of all other wars. The discrimination against our widows and orphans should now be eliminated."

Legislation to "clarify and broaden" veterans' preference in the civil service—the other specific group-interest objective—is fifth on the Legion's seven-point program. The Legion complains that "the great majority" of existing preference "is contained in executive orders, subject to change at the will of the Chief Executive; that while considerable preference exists on paper, there are a vast number of government administrative officers who nullify it with no opportunity of redress."

Three of the Legion's objectives in the sphere of general policy deal with national defense. The program contains a pledge "unqualifiedly to support all legislation having to do with necessary increases for the Army, Navy, and Air Forces." The Legion pledges also to "continue unabated

our vigorous opposition to any and all so-called war referendum proposals," which it deems "dangerous to the Nation's welfare" and out of keeping with the representative form of government. The Legion reaffirms the aim of universal service legislation, feeling "that when men are drafted for war service, then industry, finance, and every other resource also must contribute to the fight for the Nation's safety without any opportunity for profiteering."

A "huge program pertaining to immigration, naturalization, and deportation" and "closely related to the foregoing, the continuation of the Dies Committee" round out the aims.

From Legion headquarters comes this exposition of methods:

"The American Legion functions efficiently, and, in the majority of cases successfully on its legislative program. . . . A *Legislative Bulletin* . . . is sent to all 'key' men in the organization which keeps them advised as to the progress of the Legion's proposals pending in Congress. In addition, the Director uses the organization's mediums of publicity, the main one of which is the monthly newspaper *The National Legionnaire*. Also, there are hundreds of newspapers of varying size issued by Departments, County organizations, and Posts.

"For instance, all mediums of publicity have already been employed to call upon the Legion and Auxiliary memberships to notify their Representatives in Congress of their desire to see the Dies Committee continued and sufficient funds allotted to it so

that it may perform its functions properly.

"During a session of Congress, there are numerous occasions when it is not possible to use the channels of publicity in the regular way because of insufficiency of time. In such cases, telegrams are sent by the Legislative Director to 'key' men in each State and these in turn pass the information along to the County organizations and Posts, thus reaching the majority of the membership within a short time. This action results in a flood of telephone calls, telegrams, letters, and postcards reaching the Senators and Representatives, and few of them are able to state, on any important issue in which the organization is interested, that he did not know 'the Legion's attitude.'"

National Council for the Prevention of War

Last fall this organization conducted a campaign "to stop our drift towards war" and to block repeal of the embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act. "The general opinion is that, while we lost the battle for the embargo, we won our main objective for the time being," says a report from Frederick J. Libby, executive secretary.

The report states that "neutral nations . . . are being penalized by this war to a degree that is fast becoming intolerable." It urges them to join in "patient negotiation" for a "lasting peace." The present aims are described as follows: "What next? To hold and strengthen the determination of our country to stay out

of war in Europe *and in Asia*, and to promote our second great objective, with which much progress has been made, we are now starting a fresh campaign for neutral mediation and a lasting peace around the slogan, 'Peace Now.'"

The report gives this synopsis of the fall campaign: "We helped leaders in 12 denominations to reach 76,000 Protestant ministers with a personal letter urging observance of October 22 as 'Peace-Makers' Sunday.' A copy of the first Lindbergh speech was enclosed with the letter or, in the case of the Methodists, the statement of the Methodist World Peace Commission which definitely advocated maintenance of the arms embargo and neutral mediation. We also sent a letter and speech of Senator David I. Walsh to 20,000 Catholic priests.

"Our farm department employed 25 farmers or farmers' wives to set at work as many farmers, young and old, as possible among the farm organizations of their vicinity, furnishing money only for gas, oil and telephones.

"Our labor department set 10 organizers at work in 15 States among the labor unions to promote the above objectives.

"We had written to 32,000 people on our mailing lists on the outbreak of the war in September, asking them to enlist for work and to contribute money for the campaign. We followed this in October with a letter to 20,000 who had not responded. From these two circular letters we obtained 1,000 new workers, who enlisted 'for the period of the emer-

gency,' and several thousand dollars. To the workers we sent a series of directions for action with appropriate literature.

"For these four campaigns approximately 800,000 pieces of literature of all sorts including letters were printed or mimeographed and distributed, including 200,000 reprints of Congressional speeches by Senators Borah, LaFollette, Nye, McCarran and others; 80,000 copies of speeches by Senator Walsh; 140,000 copies of the first Lindbergh speech; 80,000 pamphlets on the Neutrality Law by Florence Brewer Boeckel, etc., etc."

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Dr. Gertrude Carman Bussey, head of the philosophy department at Goucher College, leads the Women's International League as president. The League's "Christmas Bulletin" describes her as "born with a passion for reforming the world." A similar breadth of objective characterizes the organization, whose activities at Washington are directed by the executive secretary, Dorothy Detzer. A manifesto drawn up by the League's National Board calls "upon our citizens to accept the sacred duty to remain at peace that we may preserve the democratic ideal not only for the 130,000,000 people of this country but for all mankind" and "men and women everywhere to unite with us in establishing for the world freedom and lasting peace." The manifesto urges that "our country must not forfeit the present opportunity to use her power and prestige in helping to lay the founda-

tions of a permanent peace and to build a free and orderly world." Accordingly the League urges the calling by President Roosevelt of a conference of neutrals "to cooperate in effecting an armistice and in extending good offices to the belligerents by setting up a commission for continuous mediation," adding, "We further urge that this commission further plans for building a world-wide federation of nations."

Ancillary to the objective of setting a democratic example while keeping out of war, the manifesto warns against "mass misery and mass unemployment" and "unjust discrimination against race, religion, or sex." It also endorses civil rights.

"Pressure on Mr. Will Hays to check the production of propaganda films creating prejudice and arousing the American people to an unneutral attitude," is named among the branch activities. The branches are also requested to importune Representatives and Senators along the following lines of policy, indicative of the League's specific aims:

"Will you pledge that you will not vote us into a foreign war?"

"Do you believe in the strict observance of the present Neutrality Act?"

"Have you signed the 'discharge' petition [in the House] for the Ludlow war referendum amendment? If not, do you intend to?"

"Do you favor legislation to take the profits out of war?"

"Will you oppose any extension of credits to finance war trade?"

"Isn't money for housing and relief more important than for battle-

ships? If not, who do you think is going to invade us?"

Women's Joint Congressional Committee

This committee's literature describes it as "a clearing house for congressional legislative work of national organizations engaged in promoting federal measures of special interest to women. It does not itself endorse, promote, or propose any such measures. It merely provides the machinery by which the member organizations interested in a given measure can pool their efforts without in any way involving other member organizations which are not actively concerned in it."

Supporting organizations include: the American Home Economics Association, the American Medical Women's Association, the American Nurses' Association, the Association for Childhood Education, the Council of Women for Home Missions, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, the Girls' Friendly Society, the National Board of the Young Women's Christian Association, the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, the National Consumers' League, the National Council of Jewish Women, the National Education Association, the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, the National League of Women Voters, the National Women's Trade Union League, the Service Star Legion, Inc., the Women's National Homeopathic Medical Fraternity, the American Association of University Women, the American

Dietetic Association, and the American Federation of Teachers.

The names indicate varied facets of women's interests represented. Racial, maternal, educational, vocational, and avocational points of community constitute the respective *raison d'être*. Homogeneity is not great. The supporting organizations are national in scope, and each is interested in at least one federal legislative aim. Some of them stand for extensive groups of objectives. In contrast the American Nurses' Association lists only one aim—support of the Child Labor Amendment—with a note that its policy is "to support only those measures affecting nurses, nursing, and health."

The Women's Joint Congressional Committee's procedure is brought into play only when five or more member organizations endorse the same legislative aim. A sub-committee representing these organizations is then appointed to coordinate the activities of the endorsing members. At the present time eleven such sub-committees are in operation. They promote such legislative objectives as the following: adequate support for the Bureau of Home Economics and the Women's and Children's Bureau; federal aid for education with state and local administration (George Bill in the Senate; Larrabee Bill in the House); abolition of compulsory block-booking and blind-selling of motion pictures (Neely Bill); opposition to "the so-called equal rights amendment"; anti-lynching legislation (Gavagan Bill); amendment of the Social Security Act to iron out inequalities and in-

clude additional classes of employees; adequate support for the Food and Drug Administration and opposition to vitiating amendments to the Act; extension of the Trade Agreements Act without amendment.

Turning to the miscellaneous legislative programs of the Women's Joint Congressional Committee's members, one must make apologies and reservations for any generalizations about women's lobbying objectives drawn from an examination of the 1940 aims of the member organizations. Not all of the women's organizations are represented by any means; nor are all of the organizations represented exclusively for women. In only one instance do the aims listed represent mutually exclusive views on an issue. Some specific aims pertain to questions at the most vital centers of public policy, such as the Hull trade agreements; others constitute stands taken on the remoter barricades of public affairs, such as support for adoption of the metric system of weights and measures, listed by the American Home Economic Association, the American Medical Women's Association, and the American Dietetic Association.

For what it is worth, however, the conclusion is that the women are on the side of the angels—and incidentally on the side of aggrandizement of federal governmental power. Broad humanitarian concepts characterize the bulk of the aims. Specific feminine interests seem to be secondary. Public morals, welfare, civil rights, labor, education, foreign policy, politico-administrative problems,

consumers' interests, and interests of women qua women, constitute the sum of the concerns articulated.

Public Morals: Alcohol and legalization of lotteries worry the Council of Women for Home Missions and the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, the latter being specifically interested in a ban on liquor advertising. The National Council of Jewish Women wants uniform marriage and divorce legislation. Movies get the lion's share of attention; a law banning compulsory block-booking and blind-selling of moving pictures—thus to remove an obstacle to pressure along the lines of decency—is sought by the Association of Childhood Education, the Home Missions Council, the Y.W.C.A. National Board, the Girls' Friendly Society, the Parent-Teacher Congress, the American Association of University Women (A.A.U.W.), the National Education Association, the Women's Trade Union League, the Service Star Legion.

Welfare: Here is a wide variety of aims. The A.A.U.W. wants a "co-ordinated welfare program." The American Federation of Teachers (A.F.T.) champions WPA and housing—the latter, along with the Women's Trade Union League. Social security finds champions among the Home Missions Council, the Y.W.C.A. board, the Consumers' League, the Service Star Legion, the Jewish Women's Council, the Women's Trade Union League, the A.F.T., and the dietetic and homeopathic groups. A federal health program is favored by the Federation of Wom-

en's Clubs and the Consumers' League; the former, however, shies at health insurance, and the latter wants that left to the States. The parent-teacher congress stands for federal rural sanitation work. Maternity and infancy welfare gets support from the home economic and the Jewish women's groups.

The Child Labor Amendment is still supported by the nurses' group, the Home Missions Council, the Girls' Friendly Society, the Consumers' League, the Service Star Legion, the American Dietetic Association, and the Congress of Parents and Teachers; the last, however, wants "maximum local control in Federal child welfare legislation." Thirteen of the organizations are on the lookout for adequate appropriations for Federal bureaus dealing with women's and children's welfare.

Admission of refugee children is sought by the home mission council, the Y.W.C.A. board, and the Council of Jewish women.

Civil Rights: Interest here is apparently smaller. General expressions are found in the programs of the Consumers' League, the Women's Trade Union League, and the A.A.U.W. The A.F.T., the Y.W.C.A. board, the home missions council, the National Women's Trade Union League and the Council of Jewish Women favor federal anti-lynching legislation. The last-named group is also vigilant for aliens' rights and for opening naturalization to conscientious objectors.

Labor: Here again the numbers fall off. The Consumers' League springs

to the defense of collective bargaining and asks extension of the Wage-and-Hour Law to groups not now covered and legislation against industrial home work. It also wants adequate appropriations for the Wage-Hour Administration and the Labor Standards Division of the Labor Department. The latter aim is shared by the A.A.U.W. and the Y.W.C.A. board. Support for general activities of the Labor Department is expressed by the Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs.

Education: Federal aid for education is sought by the Association for Childhood Education, the Women's Trade Union League, the Service Star Legion, the National Education Association and the Jewish women's council. This plus a law to equalize educational opportunities is sought by the American Home Economic Association. The A.F.T. wants a federal Department of Education with a cabinet seat, along with the aid. So does the Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, though it holds out for a guaranty of state control. Federal aid specifically without control is endorsed also by the Federation of Women's Clubs and the National Congress of Parents and Teachers. Adequate appropriations for the federal Office of Education is sought by six groups. Aid for adult education is sought by the A.F.T. The Federation of Women's Clubs wants federal aid to equalize library facilities.

Foreign Policy: The Women's Trade Union League covers everything with a plank to foster better

international relations and to prevent war. The A.F.T. wants peace legislation; the Federation of Women's Clubs, a flexible foreign policy; the A.A.U.W., a policy based on international cooperation. In more specific terms, the National Council for Jewish Women, the A.A.U.W., and the League of Women Voters support the Hull pacts. The League of Nations finds a champion in the home missions council, which, along with the Jewish women's group and the Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, still goes to the aid of the World Court. The last-named group also is solicitous of adequate funds for the State Department. The Service Star Legion and the Jewish women's group want revision of the Neutrality Act (though it is not clear whether this want has already been met). The home missions council is worried about munitions. The National League of Women Voters is against the referendum on war.

Politico-Administrative Problems: The A.A.U.W., the parent-teacher congress, the Jewish women's group, the League of Women Voters, the Women's Trade Union League, and the Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs foster extension of the merit system. The League of Women Voters, the Women's Trade Union League, the Jewish women's group, and the American Medical Women's Association are solicitous for representation for the District of Columbia.

Consumers' Interests: The Consumers' League, the American Home Economic Association, the

American Dietary Association, the parent-teacher group, the Medical Women's Association, the Jewish women's group, the League of Women Voters, and the A.A.U.W. register sentiments in favor either of further legislation or adequate enforcement of existing law. Four groups want adequate support on extension of the Bureau of Home Economics.

Women as Women: One of the sub-committees of the Women's Joint Congressional Committee is set up to oppose the "equal rights amendment." It represents the Girls' Friendly Society, the Y.W.C.A. board, the Consumers' League, the Council of Jewish Women, the League of Women Voters, the Women's Trade Union League, the Service Star Legion, and the A.A.U.W. In favor of the amendment, on the other hand, stand the Federation of Business and Professional Women and the American Medical Women's Association. The A.A.U.W. opposes discrimination in government employment. The medical women want medical students of their sex admitted to R.O.T.C. training.

Farm Groups

THREE major organizations promote the interests of U.S. farmers: The National Grange, the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, and the American Farm Bureau Federation. In general objective (equality for agriculture) they agree; in advocacy of methods to achieve this ideal they disagree. This division of opinion springs directly

from the varied membership composition of the three groups.

The Grange, organized in 1867, is the oldest. It claims 800,000 members in 36 states. But its membership is largely concentrated in the North East—the “industrial states” of New England, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Ohio—and on the Pacific Coast. It includes many non-farmers, living in small towns and villages, who are interested in the organization’s fraternal, community and social activities. Of the farmers, most are fruit and vegetable growers, dairy- and poultry-men. The Grange, understandably, is the “conservative” farm group.

On the other hand, the 36-year-old Farmers Union, which has heavily stressed cooperative marketing and cooperative purchasing, is the “radical” of the trio. Its putative membership of 500,000, scattered through 24 states, is heavily concentrated in the Dakotas, Nebraska, Montana, Oklahoma and Kansas. The chief commodities its members produce are wheat and cotton, corn and hogs. Most of its members live in the hard-pressed drought area. Suffering from poor crops, low prices, sub-standard incomes, high freight charges, its members have tended to abandon traditional economics. Desperate conditions, they feel, demand drastic remedies.

The Farm Bureau, organized in 1919, is largest of the “Big Three.” It claims 1,500,000 members in 41 states, about three-fourths of whom live in the Mid-West and South. It

has, however, 40,000 members in New York State and 25,000 in California. Chief commodities represented are grain and livestock (Middle West), cotton and tobacco (South), dairy products, fruits and vegetables. Representing both the conservative farmer in the East, and the Farmers Union type in the West, with all intervening shades of opinion, the Farm Bureau, of necessity, stands for a “middle-of-the-road” farm policy; its objective is “to give farmers a national voice that all groups can unite on.”

On basic agricultural legislation, the three groups are in disagreement. The Grange supports some of the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, opposes others. It believes in soil conservation and crop insurance. It supports temporary continuation of compensatory payments to farmers as an emergency measure, but opposes production control.

The Farmers Union supports most of the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, but considers them inadequate. It demands that farmers be guaranteed complete parity payments or cost of production, whichever is higher. It backs the Income Certificate Bill, which would require processors to pay producers the difference between the current market price and the parity or cost-of-production figure. It stands for stronger protection for the ordinary, family-sized farm.

The Farm Bureau took a leading part in the enactment of the Agricultural Act. It supports acreage and

surplus control and the "ever-normal granary." It demands that Congress appropriate sufficient funds to give farmers full parity, since it views parity payments as the only practical answer for corn-hog producers. If new enactments for raising such money are necessary (e.g. general manufacturers sales tax or income certificate plan), it will support such measures, but has not as yet indicated favor for any particular financing plan.

At the present writing, the farm groups have been stymied by the Congressional economy bloc. The House has slashed President Roosevelt's budget request for agricultural relief from \$900,000,000 to \$722,000,000. The Senate farm bloc is organizing in an attempt to add at least \$200,000,000 for parity payments and \$72,000,000 for additional surplus crop purchases to the House-approved figure.

On the trade agreements issue, there is a clear-cut split between the farm groups. The Grange is strongly in opposition and urges the protective tariff policy. Its Master, Louis J. Taber, bitterly attacked the Hull plan in a recent America's Town Meeting of the Air broadcast. The Farm Bureau and the Farmers Union, on the other hand, endorse the trade agreements program, provided the Act is amended to require that agreements be approved by the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce, as well as of State, and that no agreement have the effect of holding farm prices below parity levels.

The Grange and the Farm Bureau agree in their stand regarding the Fair Labor Standards and National Labor Relations Acts. The wage and hour act they believe should be amended to clarify (and extend) exemptions relating to the processing of agricultural commodities in the area of production and to seasonal, perishable products. Similarly, they urge that the exemption of "agricultural labor" from the NLRA be clarified. They believe in collective bargaining, they say, but do not think that the provisions of the Act are applicable to agricultural labor.

The Farmers Union is somewhat more liberal in its attitude toward labor legislation. It has opposed and declares it will continue to oppose those amendments to the Wage-Hour and Labor Relations Acts which it believes are sponsored by what it calls "the processing trust . . . the corporation-farmer crowd."

The Farmers Union favors the Wagner Health Bill. The Farm Bureau supports "its objectives"—on the ground that rural areas with greatest need lack revenue to care for citizen health without assistance. The Grange opposes what it calls "State medicine," but approves "group health insurance on the voluntary basis."

All three farm groups are keenly interested in problems of monopoly; they believe it a great factor in the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices. They have urged effective legislation to curb monopolies but have not as yet endorsed specific monopoly controls.

Labor Unions

OUTSIDE legislative halls, A.F. of L.-CIO rivalry is widespread, open and bitter. Before Members of Congress, however, overt disagreement during this session will be largely limited to amendment of the National Labor Relations Act. The A.F. of L. feels that, under the NLRB, the CIO has garnered too large a share of labor's gains. Therefore, the present Board must be scrapped and a new one of five members—more sympathetic to the A.F. of L.—created, as a means of accomplishing "a complete housecleaning of the biased board and its biased personnel."

Doubtless the CIO will oppose this move, but itself advocates three amendments to the Act: (1) to provide criminal penalties for employer infringements; (2) to prohibit awarding government contracts to employers violating the Act; (3) to prevent the NLRB from "carving up any industrial units established by the industrial unions of the CIO."

Undisputed points in the A.F. of L. legislative program are: "adequate appropriations" for unemployment relief; restoration of prevailing wage principle in administration of relief; creation of a national advisory council to coordinate unemployment relief activities of government, industry and agriculture; continuation and extension of Federal housing and slum clearance programs; five-day week; six-hour day, etc.

The CIO also advocates "a conference of the responsible leaders from the government, industry, labor and agriculture" to consider the un-

employment problem. It urges a public works program providing at least 3,000,000 jobs; it opposes amendments to the Wage-Hour Act, which, it says, are "sponsored by the large processors of agricultural commodities who are merely using the guise of farmers to exclude from the Act industrial workers who are subject to the most severe exploitation"; it favors an ambitious national health program. The government, according to the CIO, should take steps "to expand the construction of houses from the present low level of 450,000 per year to not less than 1,000,000 per year." (Apparently the CIO hopes to organize workers employed in residence construction, a majority of whom are not members of A.F. of L. craft unions.) The CIO also favors "a drastic revision of the tax structure," including substantial reduction in the burden on consumer groups and wage earners, and additional revenue "derived by tapping the large concentrations of income and savings," in order "to readjust the flow of national income. . . ."

On the matter of U.S. participation in the war, the two organizations are in complete agreement. The CIO states that "the United States must not become involved in foreign wars." The A.F. of L. urges "a judicious policy" in international affairs to avoid American entanglement.

C. B. Marshall of Harvard University prepared the material on "Organized Groups," with the exception of the reports on farm and labor organizations, for which latter the QUARTERLY's staff is responsible.

2. Government

COMBATting U.S. "BALKANIZATION"

TODAY a large proportion of the American people knows that trade barriers exist between the several states. Yet less than twelve months ago this situation was not generally recognized. It was believed that the United States was an unrestricted free-trade area; that the principle embodied in the commerce clause—"Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce . . . among the several states"—was an actuality; that the states limited their jurisdiction to goods shipped in intrastate commerce. This concept of a free-trade area had become an integral part of our political and economic ideology; to it had been largely attributed our rapid industrialization during the past century, our economic prosperity and political unity, and our "high standard of living." Domestic "free trade" had become a strong symbol of positive and favorable appeal. Among all groups it was one of the few aspects of economic practice which remained in the realm of the non-controversial.

This general belief did not reflect the existing situation, however, for within the last few years hundreds of barriers to commerce between the states have been erected. Intended to subsidize local farmers, producers, and residents, their ultimate effect is to harm the consumer, for prices are

likely to rise in the local markets and quality become poorer.

This trend, with its possible consequences, was brought to the attention of the Council of State Governments¹ about a year ago. The Council was asked to do something about it. The approach was obvious. Since the public was unaware of the problem, and state legislators and administrators—those responsible for trade barriers—did not understand the national significance of their acts, the first move was to bring the situation to public attention.

Interest and response were immediately forthcoming. News releases were picked up by newspaper press services and syndicates, and distributed to papers all over the country. Editorial syndicates capitalized on this subject. Articles appeared in most of the magazines of large circulation and in numerous trade journals and smaller publications. Cartoonists pictured the states barricading themselves against each other. Radio commentators and prominent individuals discussed and condemned trade barriers over the air.

¹ The Council of State Governments is a governmental agency of the forty-two states which have established Commissions on Interstate Cooperation. It serves as a clearing house for these Commissions and as the secretariat for the Governors' Conference, the National Association of Attorneys-General and the National Association of Secretaries of State.

First Research

While newspapers in all parts of the country published stories sent out by the Council, it conducted a program of research which furnished an objective picture of the nature and extent of trade barriers. These studies were distributed to a large number of state officials, who, shortly thereafter—in April 1939—gathered in Chicago for a National Conference on Interstate Trade Barriers. Over four hundred state officials and other delegates attended. Seven governors were present. A number of federal departments sent representatives and one, the Marketing Laws Survey of the WPA, made available in form appropriate for the occasion the results of months of research and compilation.

This conference, the first constructive effort to face the problem, focused public attention on trade barriers. Three characteristics—nationwide representation, prominent public officials, and a subject which in itself was dynamic—contributed to its success. When a few months later a survey was released indicating that in the forty-four state legislatures meeting in 1939, scores of proposed trade-barrier bills had been defeated and a number of such laws repealed, news again was made, for this pointed to a sharp reversal in the previous trend.

The appointment of a Federal Interdepartmental Committee, to coordinate the research activities of the federal departments and to cooperate with the Council, increased

the importance of the situation in the public eye.

Thus, in the short period of three or four months, the American public as a whole became aware of the existence of this growing localism in our domestic commercial relationships.

Why did this situation meet with immediate public interest? Probably the outstanding reason is to be found in the conflict with traditional ideology that was created in most minds. It had been accepted as fact that the United States was an unrestricted free-trade area, and, as previously stated, this "free trade" symbol had acquired positive, favorable appeal. Many concepts about the past and future of our national economy had been built on this premise. The premise was now being refuted and the inviolability of the symbol questioned. Moreover, at a time when economic insecurity and uncertainty were widely prevalent, this new and unwelcome fact offered itself as something toward which resentment and indignation could be projected. Here was a causative factor to which might be attributed some of the more pressing economic woes.

The "Balkanization" Symbol

That trade barriers are a non-controversial subject is another reason for the success of the publicity. This, coupled with an effective use of such phrases as "Balkanization of America," which carried with it many connotations of prosperity stifled in Europe by high tariff barriers, brought about unconditional

opposition on the part of the American public. Though many favored certain local barriers which were to their immediate advantage, when speaking in terms of national unity and prosperity there was general condemnation. To attack interstate trade barriers was to attack a symbol of a common hate. Public officials did not hesitate to capitalize on this, and newspapers felt eminently safe in referring to it.

Though non-controversial themselves, trade barriers were forced into the arena of controversy when it was maintained that the states, by erecting them, had shown themselves incompetent to regulate their commercial relations. Many saw not only a chance for the states to redeem themselves by solving the problem through their own action, but also an occasion to insist on the retention of the full force and scope of their jurisdiction. Trade barriers in the minds of some momentarily symbolized the centralization-decentralization argument, and as such attracted much attention.

These various response factors helped to make interstate trade barriers a "natural" from the publicity point of view. The subject could be dramatized through all the media of publicity. Emotional responses were easily tapped.

Newspapers featured the subject as "National Trade Seen Periled by State Barriers," "State Trade Barriers Blow to Consumers," "Against Balkanization of America," "States at War," and "Forty-eight Kingdoms." News releases were localized with incidents, yet generalized so that no one felt himself the butt of the attack. Editorials could be generalized and filled with indignation and protest. Cartoonists had a new subject, well adapted to caricature.

Through the use of these several media, the Council of State Governments quickly focused public attention upon a crucial issue.

THOMAS S. GREEN, JR.
Staff Member, Council of
State Governments

MUNICIPAL PUBLIC RELATIONS

MUNICIPAL governments, like private corporations, have become increasingly conscious of public relations in recent years. Evidence of this is abundant. The National Association of Housing Officials published during 1939 a special report entitled "Public Relations of Local Housing Authorities." The International City Managers' Association released a list of specifications for municipal re-

ports;¹ its magazine, *Public Management*, is publishing a series of twelve articles on municipal public relations. Magazines in the field of local government have featured the subject of public relations in articles, editorials, and news items. Conferences and conventions of municipal

¹ Clarence E. Ridley and Herbert A. Simon, *Specifications for the Annual Municipal Report*, 1939, 59 pp.

officers—mayors, city managers, police chiefs, finance officers, personnel officers and others—have all included some public relations topics in their programs.

To date, however, there has been more talk than action. It is generally agreed that good public relations are essential to effective municipal government, but there is less agreement as to how they can be achieved. So far there has been a tendency to think of public relations as synonymous with publicity, and most of the activities of municipal governments have been along the line of reports and publicity.

Polling the Citizens

One interesting development has been the venture of city governments into the field of public opinion sampling.² In Montclair, New Jersey, citizens were sent postcard ballots giving them an opportunity to express their preferences among a number of proposals for reducing municipal expenditures. For example, they were asked, "Do you favor reduced health services?"; "Do you favor reduction in garbage, trash, and ash collection from three to two per week?"; "Do you favor increased fees for tennis court use?" Accompanying this postcard ballot was a two-page printed digest of the report of a citizen budget committee. Twenty-five per cent of the 9,600 cards were returned.

A few months earlier, the village of Winnetka, Illinois, similarly questioned the public about a \$3,500,000 grade crossing separation project. A penny postcard ballot was accom-

panied by a five-page printed bulletin discussing the pros and cons of the proposal. In Winnetka, 45 per cent of the 2,245 cards were returned.

Public Relations Agencies

The year 1939 also witnessed the establishment of public relations agencies in several city governments. Rochester, N.Y., established a central license bureau in its Division of Public Relations. This "one stop service" is part of the Division's program of making it easier for citizens to obtain city services.

A new municipal publicity office has been established in Buffalo, N.Y., charged with "the duty of advertising the city of Buffalo within and without its borders."

The last year also saw further progress, both quantitative and qualitative, in municipal publicity and reporting. More cities than ever before are now issuing annual municipal reports and other publicity matter. The attractiveness of these publications is steadily improving. Of great interest is the new emphasis on content as well as form.

Radio and Films

Innovations have not been confined to printed matter. There has been an increasing use by municipal governments of the radio and the motion picture as publicity and reporting devices. Rochester's Division of Public Relations inaugurated a

² Cf., "Advisory Post Card Poll Informs Council on Policy Matter," *Public Management* (January 1939), p. 21. Also, Stewart M. Weaver, "Public Opinion by Post Card," *Public Management* (May 1939), pp. 138-40.

weekly radio feature entitled "A Day at City Hall," the purpose of which was to give the citizen a glimpse of the machinery of municipal government by explaining the duties of various divisions and describing their methods. A direct line was installed between the city hall and the radio station, and all broadcasts originated from the city office under discussion. The general plan of these programs was to have a city official answer questions which citizens frequently ask.

A local radio station in St. Paul, Minnesota, installed broadcasting equipment in the mayor's office for use every morning at 9:30 by various city officials in five-minute broadcasts on city affairs. The city of San Francisco inaugurated a series of Sunday night radio programs, describing municipal functions and services directly from the centers of municipal activity. The use of sound effects helped make the listener feel that he was being taken behind the scenes in city government. Broadcasts were by delayed transcription, which allowed several days for making and editing the recording.

Among the cities using film publicity during the year were Portland, Oregon; Sewickley, Pennsylvania; Providence, Rhode Island; and Fort Dodge, Iowa. Early in the year it was reported that in Portland a silent color film had been shown to some 50,000 people, with solid bookings for three months ahead. The city manager of Sewickley has been using films made with his own 16mm. camera to portray progress in municipal undertakings to the council.

When subjects covering most of the city's functions have been shown to the council, a composite film is to be prepared for the public. The Providence fire department produced a fire prevention film that was shown in all of the city's junior and senior high schools. Movies explaining the work of the city engineering department of Fort Dodge were reported to have increased citizen cooperation, and complaints have been reduced 50 per cent.

In addition to these city-sponsored films, a highly significant venture into "institutional" publicity and education was the four-reel documentary entitled "The City," released by the American Institute of Planners. This film, contrasting the best with the worst in urban development, is available for showing in commercial theaters and before civic groups in all parts of the country.

Special Events

Other reporting and publicity media were used by a number of cities throughout the year. The practice of holding "open house" at the city hall was continued by a number of cities and extended to a few more during the period. Municipal exhibits in World Fair displays in San Francisco and New York also provided excellent opportunities for informing out-of-towners as well as local citizens about the activities of municipal government. A particularly interesting development in this connection was the marked preference of fair goers for those exhibits that were dynamic rather than static. The interest in demonstrations of

police alarm systems, the solution of a crime depicted in a playlet, and other moving exhibits contain a lesson for city officials who have in the past placed their faith in graphs and pie charts.

Manitowoc County, Wisconsin, celebrated May 21 as "Citizenship Day," which was set aside to emphasize to the 700 young people who had just reached the age of 21 the importance of their status and citizenship, and to reaffirm in adults their faith in democracy. Since early January, Manitowoc County citizens had been learning through radio, lectures, and newspaper stories about their local government and its relation to the state and national governments, and of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Three other counties in Wisconsin scheduled similar programs and celebrated "citizenship days."

The city of Columbus, Georgia, sponsored a parade of municipal services and equipment to create good will between the citizens and the city government and to inform the people how their tax money is translated into public services.

Citizenship Participation

Several cities have employed the public relations device of inviting selected citizens to participate in municipal activities. Civil service commissions in a number of local governments make it a practice to call upon citizens with specialized training and experience to assist in oral interviews in connection with recruiting for municipal employment.

The city of Pittsburgh had a thousand Boy Scouts make a traffic survey. Allentown, Pennsylvania, had 100 boys working an average of 20 days under the direction of the City Health Department in improving the appearance and sanitary condition of a stream that runs through the city. One hundred citizens of Louisville, Kentucky, were given a detailed cost analysis of the city's automotive equipment for the fiscal year and asked for their comments and suggestions.

Training Employees

Some first steps toward effective training of municipal employees in public relations were also evident during the past year. In Long Beach, California, conference training groups for public service foremen included several meetings devoted to the public relations problems of construction employees. Special training in handling clients was given to employees in Rochester's new license bureau. Police training schools and training programs conducted for other specialized municipal officers also included public relations instruction in many instances. As yet, however, there is little evidence of any city carrying on public relation training program for its employees at all comparable to those administered by a number of private corporations, such as public utilities and large department stores and hotels.

ELTON D. WOOLPERT

*International City Managers'
Association*

Who's Who in Government Publicity

WITH this issue, the QUARTERLY inaugurates a continuing "Who's Who" of public relations operating personnel, both governmental and private. The present installment pictures the publicity staffs of four federal departments: Commerce, Interior, Labor and State. It includes only staff members on the professional and administrative levels.

Governmental publicity staffs vary greatly in size and character. Though all departments have been required (not merely permitted) by Congress to disseminate information and promote the functions for which they were set up, the ways in which different staffs operate exhibit striking dissimilarities. Some view their work as primarily informational, some as interpretive, while only a few admit the necessity of persuasive devices. Ultimately, the amount of effort devoted to each of these functions is directly related to the problems of the agency and the character of the Secretary of the department. Moreover, the reader must bear in mind that in no two cases are the administrative structures incorporating the publicity function the same.

The following brief biographical sketches are presented with the sole objective of assembling reliable information about the men who handle publicity for four departments of the federal government.

Department of Commerce

Victor Sholis: Special assistant to the Secretary; age 29; born, Glasgow, Scotland; came as a child to Chicago, where he lived until he went to Washington; father's occupation, merchant; University of Illinois (chief subjects: journalism, economics, history); previously employed Southtown (Chicago) *Economist*, Chicago *Times* (covered 1936 campaign); has final responsibility for all information and publicity released by the department.

Frederick N. Polangin: Director, Division of Current Information; age 27; born, Farrell, Pa.; father's occupation, business; University of Michigan (chief subjects: political science, comparative government); worked for Toledo *Times*, Sharon *News-Telegraph*, International News Service (covered various government departments, Congress and 1936 campaign); coordinator of publicity staff and responsible for all regular information.

L. W. Cain: age 50; born, Medford, Mass.; father's occupation, chemist; Georgetown University (chief subject: foreign trade); has worked in Department of Commerce 16 years (formerly in Editorial Division; now in Division of Current Information); rewrites bulletins from foreign attachés.

Allan Miller: age 24; born, Duluth, Minn.; father's occupation, jeweler; University of Missouri, Georgetown University (chief sub-

jects: journalism, law); formerly employed New York *Journal*, Washington *Times*; handles general assignments.

J. T. Mooney: age 31; born, Boston, Mass.; father's occupation, dentist; Harvard University (chief subject: romance languages); previous employment, Washington *Times*; handles general assignments.

Alfred O'Leary: age 40; born, Washington, D.C.; National University (chief subject: law); in government for many years (pressman Geological Survey; Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce; Division of Current Information); handles all inquiries from newspapermen.

William Tate: age 29; born, Brooklyn, N.Y.; father's occupation, stockbroker; Gettysburg College (chief subject: English); formerly employed Washington *Post*; handles general assignments.

Department of Interior

Michael W. Straus: Director, Division of Information; age 42; born, Chicago, Ill.; father's occupation, grain commission merchant; University of Wisconsin (chief subject: chemistry), U.S. Naval Officer, Northwestern University; previously employed Madison *Journal*, Chicago *Evening Post*, New York *Evening Post*, Universal News Service (Washington correspondent), Director of Information Interior Department, Public Works Administration; responsible for all information issued by the department and formulates general policy for the publicity division.

Walton Onslow: Supervisor, Press Service; age 34; born, St. Paul, Minn.; father's occupation, auditor; University of Minnesota (chief subject: English); previously employed Minneapolis *Journal*, Washington *Post*; helps formulate policy and responsible for executing details of policy.

Harry B. Gauss: Assistant to the Director, Division of Information; age 49; born, Oil City, Pa.; father's occupation, newspaper editor; public schools, Washington, D.C.; Chicago *Daily News* (Washington correspondent for 28 years); special assignments: General Land Office, Division of Grazing, Office of Director of Forests.

Daisy D. Reck: Research and editorial writer; age 35; born, Brownsville, Minn.; father's occupation, business; University of North Dakota (chief subject: education); formerly employed as school teacher, research worker, Library of Congress, newspaper correspondent; responsible for information regarding Geological Survey, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration.

Shannon Allen: Acting Director, Radio Section; age 42; born, Fort Scott, Kan.; father's occupations, farming, mining; Fairmont State College, W.Va. (chief subject: English); previously employed Fairmont *Times*, Mannington (W. Va.) *Daily Leader* (editor and publisher), West Penn Utilities (director of public relations), National Broadcasting Corporation (production director, Washington), U.S. Office of Education

(assistant director, Radio Division); in charge of department's radio activities.

Department of Labor

DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION, *James FitzGerald*: age 50; born, Saratoga Springs, N.Y.; father's occupation, lawyer; New York University (chief subjects: literature, economics); previous experience, New York *World*, Washington *Post* (mg. ed.), motion picture newsreel editor, radio script writing, special writer for North American Newspaper Alliance; handles or passes on all information for the department, except for the Wage and Hour Division, which is autonomous; reviews information from the other bureaus.

WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, *Harold D. Jacobs*: age 50; born, Pawpaw, Mich.; father's occupation, musician; Pawpaw High School; newspaper work for 30 years, United Press (cable editor), Washington *News* (managing editor), Baltimore *Post* (editor), Pittsburgh *Press* (editor), New Bedford (Mass.) *Standard-Times* (managing editor), Santa Barbara *News-Press* (managing editor); responsible for all information released by Division.

CHILDREN'S BUREAU, *Mrs. Elizabeth Enochs*: civil service employee with "editor" classification; age 44; born, Indian Territory; father's occupation, lawyer; educated abroad (chief subject: international relations); former employment, National

Catholic Welfare Conference News Service, translator and editor for Military Intelligence at Army War College, writer on foreign affairs, Washington Bureau New York *Times* and United Press; prepares general information for the bureau.

WOMEN'S BUREAU, *Miss Mary V. Robinson*: civil service employee with "editor" classification; born, Anne Arundel County, Md.; father's occupation, business; Goucher College (chief subjects: English, German, economics); formerly instructor, Westhampton College; prepares general information.

Department of State

***Michael J. McDermott*:** Chief, Division of Current Information; age 45; born, Peabody, Mass.; father's occupation, leather worker; Burdette College (business school), National University (chief subject: law; degrees, LL.B., LL.M., M.P.L.); former employment, War Department, army field clerk, confidential clerk with American Mission to Negotiate the Peace; responsible for all department information to press.

***Sheldon Thomas*:** Assistant Chief, Division of Current Information; age 43; born, Rochester, N.Y.; father's occupation, newspaper supt.; University of Rochester (chief subject: chemistry), U.S. Naval Academy; formerly employed foreign sales manager, Office of Special Adviser to the President on Foreign Trade; shares responsibility for all press information.

BOOK REVIEWS

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS, *The Fine Art of Propaganda*. Edited by Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939. 140 pp. (\$1.50)

The sub-title of this volume is "A Study of Father Coughlin's Speeches" and that is exactly what it is. At the same time the editors have attempted to justify the first part of the volume's title by calling attention to the general propaganda and rabble-rousing principles, which constitute the stock in trade of the demagogues who thrive at this particular phase of our social evolution. Certainly the utterances and program of the would-be Theocrat of the Little Flower offer a tempting target for objective analysis and the editors have wisely aimed at a wider audience for their analysis than is envisioned by the current treatises on propaganda.

The scheme of treatment is simple. First we are supplied with a list of seven ABC's of Propaganda Analysis. These are marshalled in an order and given a treatment designed to inject a bit of life and sparkle into what is likely to seem like a dull

topic to all but a small fraction of the population. This sort of thing may well be effective in reaching wider audiences and is an attempt worth the making. One must admit that the authors manage to cram a lot into five pages on this topic. Next the editors reduce the arts of the propagandist to seven "tricks of the trade." These "tricks" are effectively named and cleverly symbolized with small but distinctive little figures that can be, and are, tucked in between words and phrases as needed, in quotations from the demagogue, to call attention to the particular device in use. As might well be expected, a quotation so treated begins to take on an appearance reminiscent of a frieze of Egyptian hieroglyphics. Each of the propagandists' tricks is given generous analysis and illustration. Full quotations are then broken down into their successions of tricks and fallacies. The authors go to some pains to check up on the truth of some of the good father's statements with results suggesting that a more careful reading of at least one of the Ten Commandments could be strongly recommended to our Michigan oracle, if

his anti-Semitism has not already put the entire Old Testament beyond the pale.

The volume should be put into the hands of such persons, otherwise literate, who yet feel they "see something in what Father Coughlin has to say." The shortcomings of the treatment are those inherent in a treatise of demagoguery that fails to illuminate the social scene that gives rise to the Hitlers and Coughlins. This the authors, perhaps wisely, did not attempt.

GEORGE B. VETTER
New York University

MOSCA, GAETANO, *The Ruling Class*.

Translated by Hannah D. Kahn,
edited by Arthur Livingston. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. 514 pp.
(\$4.50)

This volume now makes generally available a notable treatise which first appeared in 1896 under the title *Elementi di Scienza Politica*. This is a richly suggestive book compact with a wealth of historical illustrations and replete with insight into political behavior. It is a book that has much to say to the student concerned with the broader implications of public opinion and of irrational behavior in politics. Mosca deserts the oft-trod paths leading back to either Rousseau or Marx; he is closer akin to Machiavelli.

Mosca builds his theories on the view that the few always govern.

Even though men are moved by a "natural inclination toward struggle" they first form groups with leaders and followers. "This instinct of herding together and fighting with other herds is the prime basis and original foundation of the external conflicts that occur between different societies" (p. 163). In the happiest societies, we find a balance of such forces; here, too, the ruling class is refreshed and strengthened by the recruitment of able men drawn from the society it governs. It would be beside the point to attempt a summary of the brilliant analysis of the social forces in government that Mosca develops. His view of public opinion is more pertinent to our purpose.

Public opinion he defines as "the intellectual pressure that the ruling class as a whole exerts" and which forces "the politicians to suit their policies more or less to the views of those who represent the best that the political intelligence of a people can produce" (p. 452). In another place, the author seems to take a broader view of public opinion when he states that ". . . certain sentiments and passions of the 'common herd' come to have their influence on the mental attitudes of the representative"—and again: "echoes of a widely disseminated opinion, or of any serious discontent, easily come to be heard in the highest spheres of government" (pp. 152-157). Rule by

public opinion is still government by the ruling class but as this class responds to broader forces outside its own ranks.

Mosca has a grave distrust of the sentiments and passions of the "ill-informed majority." "The real juridical safeguard in representative governments lies in the public discussion that takes place within representative assemblies." Still there is danger of majority tyranny through dominance of the representative assembly over other branches of government. "Governing," Mosca states, "is not altogether a matter of allowing or prohibiting modifications in constitutions or laws. It is quite as much a matter of managing the whole military, financial, judiciary and administrative machine, or of influencing those who manage it" (p. 157).

"The great superiority and the main strength of modern political systems lie in the ingenious balancing that they admit of between the liberal principle and the autocratic principle, the former represented by parliaments and local councils, the latter by permanent bureaucracies" (p. 487).

The great interest of Mosca for students of public opinion lies in his frank acceptance of the irrational factors that must be dealt with in ruling men. Mosca's views may appear Bourbon to some readers and his neglect of economic considerations may seem extreme; yet the vitality

and freshness of his approach are extraordinarily stimulating.

PENDLETON HERRING
Harvard University

ABEL, THEODORE, *Why Hitler Came into Power*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938. 315 pp. (\$2.75)

To explain why Hitler came into power is also to explain the revolutionary changes in public opinion which took place in Germany during the closing years of the Weimar Republic, changes reflected in Reichstag elections and in the final selection of Hitler as Chancellor. Professor Abel quite properly emphasizes the inadequacy of explanations that stress the influence of only one factor, such as the oratorical skill of Hitler, the economic conditions in Germany following the World War, or the psychosis of the German people. As in all cases of public opinion changes a multiplicity of factors were at work. The author finds that the more important of these were (1) discontent largely due to the effects, economic and otherwise, of defeat in the War; (2) the ideology of the National Socialist party program which skillfully gave expression to widespread but unarticulated demands and aspirations; (3) the tactics and strategies of organization and propaganda; and (4) the charismatic character of Hitler's leadership. Even though students of public opinion have yet to discover satisfactory methods for

weighing the relative influence of opinion determinants, this list and classification of factors in a specific public opinion situation are of great value.

The author's conclusions are based very largely on an examination of 600 autobiographies voluntarily written by members of the National Socialist party in competition for prizes. The successful application of the life history method of social analysis in this case was ingenious and illuminating. Although critics may question the validity and adequacy of the sample thus obtained, and the author himself states that some of the data may be consciously or unconsciously misleading, Professor Abel is to be congratulated for the initiative and originality displayed in accumulating his illuminating library of personal histories. By focussing attention upon the formation of personal opinion the reader obtains a much more vivid and realistic picture of public opinion changes than *a priori* reasoning would give. The method employed might be used to advantage in analyzing public opinion changes in the United States as charted by some of our nationwide polling agencies. Doubtless a method could be devised for obtaining not only a sufficient quantity of case histories but a sample that is representative as well as adequate.

HARWOOD L. CHILDS
Princeton University

LASSWELL, HAROLD D., and BLUMENSTOCK, DOROTHY, *World Revolutionary Propaganda: a Chicago Study*. New York: Knopf, 1939. 393 pp. (\$4.50)

The authors propose this book as "a case study of revolutionary propaganda in action." Specifically, it deals with Communist propaganda in Chicago during the years 1930-1934. The political and economic background of the propaganda is briefly discussed, channels and techniques are described, an attempt is made to estimate its volume, and finally, to evaluate its influence. Throughout the book the authors maintain a scholarly and dispassionate attitude towards the subject.

The reader will find the intimate view that is given of Communist propaganda at work the most valuable part of the book. Data have been collected with considerable care and labor from police records, welfare and relief agency records, and similar sources, as well as from direct observation. To the reviewer, however, some of the quantification could be sacrificed for more thorough psychological analysis of propaganda.

On the basis of the number of converts made in the years studied, the authors conclude that Communist propaganda in Chicago was in general a failure. They attribute this not to lack of skill in practical applications of propaganda, but to general strategical errors and to obstacles inherent in the American en-

vironment. The Communists erred strategically in making their appeals primarily to the unemployed and to unstable personalities, and in antagonizing other left-wing and labor groups. They were rebuffed by American nationalism when they played up internationalism and the Soviet Union; and by American individualism when they attempted bureaucratic control over the lives of the individual party members. Although Communist activity appears to increase with conditions of deprivation and insecurity, the authors believe that it acts more as a safety-valve to let off steam than as an explosive force threatening to disrupt the present system.

DONALD V. McGRANAHAN
Harvard University

ALBIG, WILLIAM, *Public Opinion*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. 486 pp. (\$4.00)

SMITH, CHARLES W., JR., *Public Opinion in a Democracy*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939. 598 pp. (\$3.00)

As more and more colleges are introducing courses dealing with public opinion and propaganda, it is only natural that textbooks should make their appearance in this field. Public opinion and propaganda are claimed by several fields. Social psychology, political science and sociology each have vital contributions to make to the study of public opin-

ion, or rather they are all essential for a sound treatment of public opinion and propaganda. Perhaps no subject shows as clearly as this one the underlying need of unification in the social sciences. It is not so much a case of cross fertilization but rather one of the "fields" themselves evaporating.

The two volumes here under review are respectively written by a political scientist and a sociologist. Hence they implement Lippmann, and Doob and other psychological treatments of the subject. Professor Smith's is more elementary and makes easier reading, displays a marked ability for simplification. His chapter on Polls is a good example. But his book is occasionally marred by a penchant for rhetoric, as for example on page 31 where the author asserts ex cathedra, "If they (that is certain kinds of qualities he values) are not developed in the family, society rots at the core." But on the whole I should be inclined to say that this was a useful book to put into the hands of students just beginning to think about the problem of public opinion and propaganda.

Professor Albig shows greater awareness of methodological problems and difficulties. His treatment is more apt to satisfy the advanced student. Albig takes much better account of the problems of social psychology. His definition, or rather characterization, of public opinion is interesting. "Opinion," Albig says,

"is any expression on a controversial topic" and hence public opinion is "any expression on a controversial topic of public concern." This emphasis upon controversy has considerable value but perhaps for some purposes it is too limited. Presumably Albig's emphasis is dictated by the desire to free inquiry into public opinion from the vast mass of sociological and anthropological learning on habits, customs, and folklore. There is much to be said for limiting the subject to exclude consideration of these problems. There is, however, the danger that limitation upon the controversial establishes a too rationalistic conception. Another difficulty with Albig's characterization of public opinion and propaganda is that it does not bring out clearly the difference between public opinion, propaganda, and education. There are very difficult problems here which he has not sufficiently explored.

Obviously the two volumes are meant to appeal to rather different groups of students. There can be no question that Albig shows much greater familiarity with the special research in the field of public opinion. Smith's volume is the result of the considerable amount of general reading which he indicates in his bibliography; this bibliography he quite modestly admits to be no more than a list of books and articles which he happens to have read. It is perhaps unfortunate that there are so few articles from the scientific periodicals.

There are many from popular magazines, but with curious omissions; certain of the more significant articles even in these magazines, e.g. the *Atlantic* and *Harper's*, have not "happened" to come to the author's attention. Although Albig's bibliographical references are much more elaborate they are by no means exhaustive.

In my opinion both volumes are well done within the context set by their respective authors for their task and ought to be useful for teaching purposes. A really careful critical evaluation of Albig's significant theoretical discussion would, however, require a good deal more space than is available in a review such as this.

C. J. FRIEDRICH
Harvard University

BEALS, CARLETON, *The Coming Struggle for Latin America*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1938. 401 pp. (\$3.00)

WHITAKER, JOHN T., *Americas to the South*. New York: Macmillan, 1939. 300 pp. (\$2.50)

The evidence of these two volumes is that the outbreak of war in Europe has relieved the United States of an embarrassing and perhaps threatening situation in the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Beals, an old Latin American hand, began his investigation of German, Italian, and Japanese propaganda in a skeptical frame of mind—he had heard too many stories to the effect that if you

scratch a Japanese barber you will uncover an imperial army officer. Mr. Whitaker was new to the "Americas to the South" but came to them with his own qualifications; as a correspondent in Italy and Germany he had first-hand knowledge of totalitarian methods and was aware of the possibilities of "non-intervention" as a revolutionary political weapon. That both of these observers came to the conclusion that there was widespread and serious Fascist economic and political penetration in Latin America is of significance to students of American foreign relations.

It was to be expected, of course, that Italy and Germany would seek to control the press and the radio for the spread of totalitarian ideas in Latin America. It was also to be expected that they would utilize the large populations of Italian and German ancestry as a base of operations. It is not surprising that their propaganda should have had a pronounced anti-United States trend. Equipped with the devious devices of autarchy, they naturally enough used trade as a political instrument as well as a means of obtaining raw materials and foreign exchange. These are relatively old stories. What is new and portentous, however, and what alarmed both Mr. Beals and Mr. Whitaker and may well concern us all, was the use of the munitions trade and of military missions as the

centers of ideological agitation and political influence. Military missions have always been a favorite device of great powers in getting a stranglehold on the weak, and the munitions traffic has been intimately associated with the processes of imperialism. The friendship and influence of the army in a Latin American state are vital to the control of its destinies. Furthermore, the competitive munitions business (including, of course, the sale of aircraft) might well Balkanize the Western Hemisphere to a tragic degree; there are enough centrifugal forces at work as it is.

Events in Europe have relieved the United States of the responsibility for counter-propaganda, at least for the present. It is just as well, for there are differences as to the proper methods to be pursued. Mr. Whitaker recommends the fairly obvious and highly questionable device of capturing the markets of our neighbors by offering them generous loans, and he would displace German and Italian military missions with graduates of West Point and Annapolis. Mr. Beals sees clearly enough that the wiser, more difficult, and more long-drawn-out process is to do everything possible to strengthen the existing democratic forces within the Latin American countries themselves.

EDWARD MEAD EARLE
Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, N.J.

LERNER, MAX, *It is Later Than You Think*. New York: Viking Press, 1938. 260 pp. (\$2.50)

Mr. Lerner's is one of the most trenchant critiques of our present patterns of ideas about economics, culture, and politics. His premises are of the Left, but his diagnosis is objective, factual, temperate. He is concerned about the uses to which power, both political and economic, will be put. Will the traditional clichés of *laissez faire* and individualism continue to condition men's responses to the new controls over nature with which science has provided us but about which the social disciplines have been hitherto but little concerned? Or will a more tangible concept of "the general welfare" in terms of social security and the opportunity to earn a livelihood infuse the thinking—and the action—of the American voter?

Mr. Lerner begins by contrasting democratic theory and liberal practice, the positive concepts of free enterprise in the expanding economy of the 19th century and the negative attitudes of maintaining minority property rights in a contracting economy—itsself produced by free enterprise. Out of the economic dilemma of potential plenty and actual want, liberalism has at present no courage or power to lead the bewildered masses. It is out of the dilemma and the frustration of liberalism that Fascism is born, to challenge at once the

ideals and the practices of democracy. Where once the Marxist ideology, symbolized in action by the U.S.S.R., seemed to offer some hope of avoiding the economic impasse, the Left is now "in retreat." And the margin of time in which liberalism can revive its faith by action is narrowing under the pressure of the Right.

In his prescriptions Mr. Lerner is less precise and persuasive. His major proposal is for the creation in this country of a genuine and broadly-based labor party, committed to the assumption of power. He hopes to avoid the use of violence but bids us not blink its existence in our midst and its naked utilization by the minority today. Planning in the economic sphere is indispensable. The preservation of the democratic forms, with enhanced power for the quasi-independent administrator, is important.

As a chart of a positive program, it is deficient in detail concerning those "interstitial adjustments" which are the ultimate arbiters of the success of any *system*. Occasionally his judgments of the attitudes and practices of the economic minority seem myopic and unreflective. But as a challenge to complacency—while there is still opportunity to consider incentives toward action—it is a distinguished and timely contribution to current American thought.

PHILLIPS BRADLEY
Queens College

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Compiled by BRUCE LANNES SMITH

In each issue, THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY publishes a continuation of an annotated bibliography which appeared in 1935 in book form (Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography*. Minneapolis: Published for the Social Science Research Council by University of Minnesota Press, 1935. 450 pp.).

PART I. PROPAGANDA STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUE

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON PUBLIC RELATIONS. *Summary of Lectures and Discussions of the Short Course in Public Relations Conducted by American Council on Public Relations at the University of Washington, August 28 to September 9, 1939*. San Francisco, 1939. 124 pp. Under the direction of Rex F. Harlow, Assistant Professor of Education, Stanford University, a two-week summer course on public relations was offered for the benefit of business men, civic leaders and others at Reed College, Stanford University, and the University of Washington. Faculty included Edward L. Bernays, public relations counsel; Harwood L. Childs, political scientist; Harford Powel, public relations counsel; Don D. Lescohier, economist; Frank Munk, lecturer, Reed College. Proceedings were recorded and are here presented in condensed form.

Democracy Must Think (National Municipal League series). New York: Columbia University, 1939. 65 pp.

Round table discussion on public opinion in a democracy, at National Municipal League's forty-fourth annual conference on government. Participants were Carl William Ackerman (Dean of Journalism, Columbia), Sevellon Ledyard Brown (journalist), Lyman Bryson (adult education specialist, Teachers College), Franklin Dunham (educational director, NBC), Clarence Addison Dykstra (political scientist, civic leader, university president), Carl Elias Milliken (public relations head, Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America), and Elmo Roper (market research consultant who conducts *Fortune's* surveys). Much of the discussion was on the advisability of government-operated opinion polls, advocated by Mr. Roper as a means of showing "the overwhelming superiority of a democratic form of government."

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS. *The Fine Art of Propaganda: A Study of Father Coughlin's Speeches*, edited by Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Bryant Lee. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939. 140 pp.

Analysis in terms of the Institute's "Seven Common Propaganda Devices." Visual symbols for each "Device" are interpolated in the text of the speeches, together with comment. Annotated bibliography of leading works on propaganda, pp. 135-40.

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS.

"Let's Talk About Ourselves," issue of *Propaganda Analysis* (vol. 2, no. 13, September 1, 1939).

Continues the self-scrutiny by the Institute that began with an article in the issue of September 1, 1938. "The study program has developed tremendously since last year. The 300 cooperating high schools and colleges have grown to 550; the handful of adult groups has swelled to 300 . . . the Institute has been cooperating with many other educational organizations. . . . Its materials have been used in many newspapers and magazines . . . we had close to 5,500 subscribers in September 1938. We have about 7,000 now. . . . In addition, Institute subscribers (and non-subscribers, too) have bought thousands of copies of each issue of *Propaganda Analysis* to distribute. . . . More than 15,000 extra copies of *The Attack on Democracy*, the January 1, 1939 issue of *Propaganda Analysis*, were sold in this way . . . [so were] *Father Coughlin* (June 1, 1939), "*The Munich Plot*" (November 1, 1938), *War in China* (February 1, 1939), *Communist Propaganda, U.S.A.: 1939 Model* (March 1, 1939), and *Spain: A Case Study* (July 1, 1939). . . . total income in round numbers was \$50,600. Total expenditures as of September 1 were approximately \$44,800."

INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS.

Propaganda Analysis, vol. 2 (November 1938 to September 1939). 110 pp.

Volume 2 of this monthly newsletter featuring materials to aid student and adult groups in the analysis of propaganda. Titles of letters: "*The Munich Plot*," *The A. & P. Campaign*, *The Attack on Democracy* (deals with U.S. anti-

democratic pressure-groups), *War in China*, *Communist Propaganda, U.S.A.: 1939 Model*, *Propaganda in the News*, *Propaganda in the Schools*, *Father Coughlin: Priest and Politician*, *Britain Woods America, Spain: A Case Study*, *The Associated Farmers, Let's Talk About Ourselves* (an issue describing and evaluating the work of the Institute during the two years since it began). Each letter includes a "Propaganda Analysis Worksheet," consisting of exercises and questions for the student. "The Institute's Publications" are listed and described on p. 110.

MILLER, CLYDE R. *How to Detect and Analyze Propaganda* (Town Hall Pamphlet series). New York: Town Hall, 1939. 36 pp.

Secretary of Institute for Propaganda Analysis tells how he was swept off his feet by propaganda for the War of 1914-18, and describes the "Seven Common Propaganda Devices" which have been detected by the Institute.

MOCK, JAMES R.; and LARSON, CEDRIC. *Words That Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919*. Princeton: Princeton University, 1939. 372 pp.

Based on files of the Committee, "an historical source of the first importance." George Creel, Committee head, newspaper crusader and Wilsonian idealist, emerges as a "remarkable man, who in spite of having more than a fair share of mercurial temperament, carried his liberalism through the hatred and hysteria of war." Personnel, activities, and expenditures of each of the Committee's score of special divisions are traced in detail. Proposed blueprints for "Tomorrow's Committee" are reviewed. "If the record of the last war is to be taken, American resistance to repressive measures may not be great. The question arises whether, in the event of a new war, America would feel like indulging in the luxury of some 'Creel Committee' to stand as a buffer between military dictatorship and civil

life." Dr. Mock, seven years a Findlay College history professor, is on the staff of the National Archives. Mr. Larson is in the Library of Congress. Bibliographic notes, pp. 349-56.

NEVINS, ALLEN, "Propaganda: An Explosive Word Analyzed," *New York Times Magazine*, October 29, 1939, pp. 3 ff.

Columbia historian says: "America is the field in which propaganda operates on the most elaborately organized scale, and the Americans are the people who have the most constant practice in detecting and resisting it. Our supposed naïveté need not alarm anybody. . . . Another Bryce report would be read with so large a sprinkling of salt that few would stomach it."

Time magazine.

Since the beginning of the European war, a story on propaganda has appeared in nearly every issue.

Methods of Collective Management Closely Related to Propaganda

DEWILDE, JOHN CHARLES; POPPER, DAVID H.; and CLARKE, EUNICE. *Handbook of the War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1939. 248 pp.

Simply written, clear-cut data on factors conditioning the outcome of the European war and the neutrality of the U.S., by two staff members of Foreign Policy Association and an ex-writer for *Fortune*. Has a number of visual aids. Chapter 13 is on "Propaganda."

DUPUY, RICHARD ERNEST. *World in Arms: A Study in Military Geography*. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1939. 103 pp.

Essential facts about the armies, navies and air forces of the world, and about the terrain features, routes of invasion, and principal fortifications, further clarified by what the author calls "bombing time-ranges," or the distances in hours and minutes from the nearest foreign air

bases to key points. Has numerous visual aids. Major Dupuy is public relations officer at West Point.

HART, BASIL HENRY LIDDELL. *The Defence of Britain*. New York: Random House, 1939. 444 pp.

HULEN, BERTRAM D. *Inside the Department of State*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. 328 pp.

Detailed study of daily routine, of personnel, and of the handling of "incidents," by New York *Times* correspondent who has covered Washington for many years. Chapter on "The Press Conference System" views the conference as "a well-established government institution," "an effective substitute for the system of interpellation of Cabinet ministers."

SPROUT, HAROLD; and SPROUT, MARGARET. *The Rise of American Naval Power*. Princeton: Princeton University, 1939. 398 pp.

History of U.S. naval power and policy from 1776 to 1918, by Princeton political scientist and his wife, who promise a second volume to bring it up to date. Analyzes much material on pressures which led "to the failure of the American people, and their official spokesmen, right down to the war, to develop a sound, realistic opinion on the great question of naval defense." Bibliography in footnotes and pp. 382-86.

U.S. NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE. *The Structure of the American Economy: Part 1: Basic Characteristics*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939. 396 pp.

Comprehensive survey of economic organization and processes of the U.S., with numerous graphs and charts. Discusses farm, labor, and business pressure-groups. Includes elaborate new data on concentration of control and on price structure, prepared under the direction of Gardiner C. Means. Bibliog. footnotes.

PART II. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED BY THE NAME OF THE PROMOTING GROUP

Political Parties

"Democratic Party," *Fortune* (October 1939).

HAXEY, SIMON, pseud. *England's Money Lords: Tory M.P.* New York: Harrison-Hilton, 1939. 263 pp.

Survey of interlocking family relationships and interlocking directorates of conservative British M.P.'s, believed to have been written by a liberal group under a collective pseudonym.

Functional Groups

(Occupational, Religious, etc.)

CAYTON, HORACE R.; and MITCHELL, GEORGE SINCLAIR. *Black Workers and the New Unions*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1939. 473 pp.

History of the Negro in three U.S. industries (iron and steel, meat-packing, railroad car shops) and his relationship to unions. Includes a sociological analysis of the Birmingham area. Mr. Cayton is a University of Chicago sociologist; Mr. Mitchell is a Farm Security administrator. Bibliography, pp. 458-67.

CODE, JOSEPH BERNARD. *The Spanish War and Lying Propaganda*. New York: Paulist Press, 1938. 48 pp.

By Catholic historian.

COLE, GEORGE DOUGLAS HOWARD, and others. *British Trade Unionism Today: A Survey, with the Collaboration of Thirty Trade Union Leaders and Other Experts*. London: Gollancz, 1939. 501 pp.

History and survey, said by the editor to be the most comprehensive since the work of Sidney and Beatrice Webb (*History of Trade Unionism*, 1894; *Industrial Democracy*, 1897).

DAHL, JOSEPH OLIVER. *Advertising and Promotion for Hotels and Restaurants: A Reference Book for Hotel and Restaurant Executives, Sales Managers, Advertising and Publicity Directors, etc.* Stamford, Connecticut: The Dahls, 1939. 242 pp.

By a prolific writer on hotel and restaurant management and advertising. Bibliography, pp. 232-4.

GREEN, WILLIAM. *Labor and Democracy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1939. 194 pp.

By A.F. of L. president. Contains autobiographical data.

KINSEY, DON JACKSON. "Training Employees in Public Relations," *Public Management*, 20: 171-74 (June 1938).

LEBENSBURGER, MYRON M. *Selling Men's Apparel Through Advertising*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. 310 pp.

LIEBERMAN, ELIAS. *The Collective Labor Agreement*. New York: Harpers, 1939. 233 pp.

Manual for labor leaders and business executives, describing history, legal status, and methods of labor negotiations. The author has been counsel for International Ladies' Garment Workers Union for some 25 years.

MCCORMICK, CHARLES PERRY. *Multiple Management*. New York: Harpers, 1938. 175 pp.

President of the firm reports on experiences of McCormick and Company (spices, etc.) in sharing managerial responsibility with employees, through a "Junior Board of Directors" (young executives), and through committees of shop and sales employees.

MCGRAW-HILL BUSINESS PAPERS.

The 25 or 30 trade journals in this group include occasional surveys on public relations in each industry covered. Described by Glenn Griswold, former editor of *Business Week*, in this *QUARTERLY*, 3: 704-9 (October 1939).

MARQUAND, HILARY ADAIR, editor.

Organized Labour in Four Continents, 1920-1937. New York and

London: Longmans, Green, 1939. 518 pp.

Text in 11 chapters by well-known scholars, on organized labor in Australia (by Lloyd Ross); Canada (Leo Warshaw); France (André Philip); Germany (Erich Roll); Great Britain (H. A. Marquand); Italy (J. P. Van Aartsen); Japan (I. F. Ayusawa); Mexico (William E. Zeuch); Russia (Maurice Dobb); Scandinavia (Halvard M. Lange); U.S.A. (Selig Perlman). Bibliographic footnotes.

PART III. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED BY THE RESPONSE TO BE ELICITED

ARONOVICI, CAROL. *Housing the Masses*. New York: Wiley, 1939. London: Chapman and Hall, 1939. 291 pp.

Comprehensive study of U.S. housing problems and housing education by a well-known U.S. specialist. Chapter 9 is on "Housing Education." Pp. 277-86 are a bibliographic essay on "Housing Literature."

BREYCHA-VAUTHIER, ARTHUR CARL DE. *Sources of Information: A Handbook on the Publications of the League of Nations*, preface by James T. Shotwell. New York: Columbia University, 1939. 118 pp. Standard work which has appeared in German and French in its earlier editions.

COADY, M. M. *Masters of their own Destinies: The Story of the Antigonish Movement of Adult Education through Economic Cooperation*. New York: Harpers, 1939. 170 pp.

Story of consumers' and producers' cooperative movement in Nova Scotia, by Director of Extension, St. Francis Xavier University, Nova Scotia.

MENDENHALL, PAUL. *Bibliography of Studies on Scouting*. New York: Research Service, Boy Scouts of America, December 1938. 25 pp. mimeo.

About 110 titles of research materials on the Boy Scout movement, mostly published since 1927.

MILLER, J. C. "Japan Turns Back the Clock," *Amerasia*, 2: 396-404 (October 1938).

On the "New People's Association," an organization for "intellectual mobilization" in China.

NOBLE, JEAN DUNCAN. *Rôle of Social Attitudes in the Adjustment of an Occupational Group* (M.A. thesis, sociology, Michigan, 1938).

OSTRYAKOV, S. *20 let V.L.K.S.M. istoricheskaya spravka*. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardia, 1938. 126 pp.

"Twenty years of the Young Communist League of the U.S.S.R."

"Propaganda Purge," *Time*, July 10, 1939, p. 42.

Advertising Federation of America's campaign against a social studies text (*An Introduction to Problems of American*

- Culture*) by Professor Harold Rugg of Teachers College, Columbia University.
- STEWART, MAXWELL S. *Cooperatives in the United States: A Balance Sheet* (Public Affairs Pamphlets, no. 32). New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1939. 32 pp.

WARBASSE, JAMES PETER. *Co-operation as a Way to Peace*. New York: Harpers, 1939. 108 pp.

Restatement of the case for the consumers' cooperation by a prominent leader in the movement (president of Cooperative League of the U.S.A.).

PART IV. THE SYMBOLS AND PRACTICES OF WHICH PROPAGANDA MAKES USE

BAKER, OLIVER EDWIN; BORSODI, RALPH; and WILSON, MILBURN LINCOLN. *Agriculture in Modern Life*. New York: Harpers, 1939. 303 pp.

Part 1, "Our Rural People," by Dr. Baker, Senior Agricultural Economist, U.S. Department of Agriculture, deals with the impacts upon agriculture of inventions, mechanization, low incomes, migrations, declining birth rates. Part 2, "A Plan for Rural Life," by Mr. Borsodi, author of many books on farm economics and founder of various self-sustaining home projects, explores conflicts between traditional and modern concepts of agriculture. In Part 3, "Science and Folklore in Rural Life," a careful study of culture patterns and folk-lore is presented by Dr. Wilson, Under-secretary of Agriculture, who also submits a plan for rural reeducation. In Part 4, "A Dialogue: The Future of Rural Life," the three authors attempt in informal fashion to integrate their several points of view. Bibliographic footnotes.

BARNES, HARRY ELMER. *Society in Transition: Problems of a Changing Age*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939. 1,034 pp.

General survey of recent and current social conditions by well-known U.S. sociologist. Scientific propaganda is dealt with in chapter 14, mental hygiene in chapters 10 and 19. Bibliography, pp. 970-99.

BEERS, HENRY PUTNEY. *Bibliographies in American History: A Guide to Materials for Research*. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1938. 339 pp.

A general bibliographic guide for research in American history. See such sections as: Public Opinion, Negro and Slavery, Social Reform, and Religious History.

BERNARD, LUTHER LEE. *Social Control in its Sociological Aspects*. New York: Macmillan, 1939. 711 pp.

College text by U.S. social psychologist. Includes passages on public opinion, propaganda, and advertising. Bibliography in footnotes and ends of chapters.

BROWN, FRANCIS JAMES; HODGES, CHARLES; and ROUCEK, JOSEPH SLABEY. *Contemporary World Politics: An Introduction to the Problems of International Relations*. New York: Wiley, 1939. 718 pp.

College text consisting of thirty-five chapters by thirty-five well-known authors. Includes material on "Diplomacy" (DeWitt Clinton Poole); "International Labor Organization" (William Lonsdale Tayler); and three chapters on "World Opinion" contributed, respectively, by Robert W. Desmond ("The Press and World Affairs"); O. W. Riegel ("Mo-

bilizing Propaganda"); Will Irwin ("Moral Disarmament"). John Eugene Harley's chapter surveys agencies promoting "The Study of World Affairs." A novel feature of the volume is its use of "Fact Pictures," visual aids designed by Professor Hodges. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

CALVERTON, VICTOR FRANCIS. *The Awakening of America*. New York: John Day, 1939. 474 pp.

Marxist social history of U.S. from earliest settlements to eve of Revolution of 1776. Bibliography, pp. 439-56.

CARR, ALBERT. *Juggernaut: The Path of Dictatorship*. New York: Viking, 1939. 531 pp.

Economist and sociologist describes twenty dictators who have flourished from the seventeenth century to the present day.

CHAMBERLIN, WILLIAM HENRY. *Japan Over Asia*, revised and enlarged edition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1939. 463 pp.

Standard work by U.S. journalist.

CHAMBERS, FRANK PENTLAND. *The War Behind the War, 1914-1918: A History of the Political and Civilian Fronts*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939. London: Faber and Faber, 1939. 620 pp.

Economic and social history, in which "the entire subject of finance is left alone" (p. vii). Propaganda and censorship are treated briefly. Bibliography, pp. 568-86.

CLOUGH, SHEPARD BANCROFT. *France: A History of National Economics, 1789-1939*. New York: Scribners, 1939. 498 pp.

By Columbia University historian who has written a number of books dealing with public opinion and civic training. Bibliography, pp. 369-487.

DEXTER, LEWIS A. "The Legend of William Lloyd Garrison," *Social*

Studies, 30: 56-60 (February 1939).

"The *Encyclopedia Britannica* and the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* both give the impression that Garrison was the outstanding leader responsible for the growth and success of the abolitionist movement." This article examines half a dozen reasons for the legend.

Germany Speaks, "by 21 leading members of party and state." London: Butterworth, 1938. 407 pp.

Twenty-one essays on objectives of National Socialism, including one on "The Essence of Propaganda in Germany" by Dr. G. Kurt Johannsen, Managing Director of the Hanse Press, and one on "The Press and World Politics" by Dr. Dietrich, Secretary of State, Reich Chief of Press.

GILL, CORRINGTON. *Wasted Manpower: The Challenge of Unemployment*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1939. 312 pp.

By statistician and economist who is assistant commissioner of the Works Projects Administration. Analyzes factors which have combined to produce the unemployment problem. Describes PWA, WPA, FWA, NYA and other government relief agencies and compares this country's handling of the situation with methods used abroad. Bibliography, pp. 299-302.

GRATTAN, CLINTON HARTLEY. *The Deadly Parallel*. New York: Stackpole, 1939. 210 pp.

Study of parallels between current events and those which drew the U.S. into the World War, by the author of *Why We Fought* (1929) and *Preface to Chaos* (1936), a well-known U.S. writer on politics and economics. Analyzes British propaganda as embodied in Sidney Rogerson (*Propaganda in the Next War*), Nicholas Murray Butler, President Franklin Roosevelt, and others.

GRATTAN, CLINTON HARTLEY. "The Future of the British Empire,"

Harpers, 179: 485-97 (October 1939).

This essay was reprinted in *The Deadly Parallel*, cited above.

GUMBEL, E. J., editor. *Freie Wissenschaft: Ein Sammelbuch aus der deutschen Emigration*. Strasbourg: Sebastian Brandt, 1938. 283 pp.

Symposium by eminent German scientists now outside Germany. See especially Theodor Geiger on the coming tasks of the intellectual; Julius Lips on public opinion among the Indians of Labrador; Arthur Rosenberg on the task of the emigrant historian.

HERRON, IMA HONAKER. *The Small Town in American Literature*. Durham: Duke University, 1939.

477 pp.

Scholarly study of small-town influences in U.S. literature from colonial days to the present. The author is assistant professor of English in Southern Methodist University. Bibliography, pp. 433-4, 439-68.

HORNEY, KAREN. "What is a Neurosis?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 45: 426-32 (November 1939). Psychoanalyst undertakes to look at the neurosis from the point of view of a social scientist.

JOHNSON, JULIA EMILY, compiler. *U.S. Foreign Policy: Isolation or Alliance?* New York: H. W. Wilson, 1938. 307 pp.

Debate manual.

KARDINER, ABRAM. *The Individual and his Society: The Psychodynamics of Primitive Social Organization*, with a foreword and two ethnological reports by Ralph Linton. New York: Columbia University, 1939. 503 pp.

U.S. psychoanalyst interprets recent findings of Columbia University anthropologists and contributes a methodological statement.

KENNEDY, E. D. *Dividends to Pay*. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939. 288 pp.

Former editor of *Time's* business and finance section, now on the staff of *Fortune*, surveys data on concentration of U.S. wealth and economic control, concluding that "depression is our normal state" under the present economic system. He does not propose an alternative system. Chapter 4, "Multiple Monopoly," is a clear statement of reasons why public opinion finds it difficult to detect monopolism.

LASSWELL, HAROLD DWIGHT. "The Contribution of Freud's Insight Interview to the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, 45: 375-90 (November 1939).

LENGYEL, EMIL. *The Danube*. New York: Random House, 1939. 482 pp.

History, legends, folk-lore, politics; by well-known correspondent.

LIN, MOUSHENG HSITEN. *Anti-Statism: Essay in Its Psychiatric and Cultural Analysis* (Ph.D. thesis, political science, Chicago). Washington, D.C.: William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1939. 87 pp.

Psychiatrically trained political scientist investigates social and psychological conditions under which theorists develop opposition to symbols of the state. Taoist, Cynic-Stoic, Liberal, Communist, and Anarchist theories of the "stateless society" are examined, and the theorists' personality structures are related to their theories. Conclusions: Antistatistism generally rises from a social class that is frustrated; antistatist theorists are generally individuals whose self-esteem has been wounded through deprivations and discriminations, and who discharge their energies in ways that are familiar to the psychiatrist. Dr. Lin is on the staff of China Institute in America.

MASON, MARY GERTRUDE. *Western Concepts of China and the Chinese, 1840-1876*. Durham, N.C.: Seeman Printery, 1939. 288 pp.

Scholarly study based on a mass of books and magazines, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, *Journals of the California Legislature*, etc. Newspapers were not sampled. Extensive bibliography, pp. 20-63 and in text.

MOLEY, RAYMOND. *After Seven Years*.

New York: Harpers, 1939. 446 pp. Personal history of the New Deal by one of President Franklin Roosevelt's influential advisers. Contains many anecdotes on promotional efforts of the New Deal.

NIXON, LARRY, editor. *When War Comes: What Will Happen and What To Do*. New York: Grey-stone Press, 1939. 290 pp.

Five New York City newspapermen write on "steps each individual can take toward personal preparedness." W. W. Chaplin of International News Service predicts virtually complete suppression of civil liberties. "The next time you march off to fight for democracy, you may be marching off not for democracy's victory but to its destruction." Communications and censorship are dealt with in chapters 4 and 5.

QUEEN, STUART ALFRED; and THOMAS, LEWIS FRANCIS. *The City: A Study of Urbanism in the United States*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. 500 pp.

By two U.S. sociologists. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

RADIN, MAX. *The Law and Mr. Smith*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1938. 333 pp.

A concise history, for laymen, of the rôle of law in various stages of western civilization, the technique of judicial interpretation, and certain fundamental legal categories. Dr. Radin is professor of law, University of California.

The Soviet Comes of Age, by "28 of the foremost citizens of the U.S.S.R.," foreword by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. London: Hodge, 1938. 337 pp.

Symposium covering numerous aspects of Soviet life, including press, communications, theatre and cinema.

URBAN, WILBUR MARSHALL. *Language and Reality: The Philosophy of Language and the Principles of Symbolism* (Library of Philosophy). New York: Macmillan, 1939. 755 pp.

Idealist philosopher's theory of signs and symbols. Postulates a "mutuality of mind" or "transcendental self" common to all who seek to communicate. Author is Professor of Philosophy, Yale.

U.S. NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD (formerly NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE). *Suggested Symbols for Plans, Maps, and Charts*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1938. 12 pp.

A guide to those who employ graphic presentation, with the aim of encouraging uniformity of practice in the use of symbols and in other details of map preparation. Bibliography, pp. 9-10.

WELLS, HERBERT GEORGE. *The Fate of Man*. New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1939. 263 pp.

Mr. Wells, surveying world events anew, again recommends formation of a "World Brain"—the few thousand men with sufficient intelligence and integrity to rescue mankind from imminent catastrophe.

YBARRA, THOMAS RUSSELL. *America Faces South*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1939. 321 pp.

General survey of Latin-American affairs by *New York Times* correspondent. His father was Venezuelan, his mother Bostonian.

You Americans, by fifteen foreign correspondents. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1939. 348 pp. Impressions of America, through the eyes of U.S. correspondents of foreign newspapers. Guenther Reinhardt, Swiss journalist, discusses U.S. papers and foreign propaganda.

YUAN, T. L., Compiler. *Japan's Aggression and Public Opinion*. Kunming, China: National Southwest Associated University, 1939. 498 pp. Collection of articles on Sino-Japanese relations by U.S., British, and German journalists, publicists, and professors.

PART V. CHANNELS OF PROPAGANDA

Agents Who Specialize in Managing Propaganda

BAKER, GLADYS. *The County Agent*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1939. 225 pp.

Story of the rise of the county agent from itinerant teacher of better farming to his present position as local representative and administrator of a vast federal adjustment program. Discusses his rôle in conducting educational activities, elections, referenda, and enforcement campaigns. Bibliography, pp. 214-15.

BENT, SILAS. *Newspaper Crusaders: A Neglected Story*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. 313 pp.

U.S. newspaperman's story of editors, publishers and reporters who have sought to promote social justice, from colonial times to the present. Bibliography, pp. 297-98.

BUTLER, NICHOLAS MURRAY. *Across the Busy Years: Recollections and Reflections*, vol. 1. New York: Scribners, 1939. 451 pp.

CRAWFORD, KENNETH G. *The Pressure Boys: The Inside Story of Lobbying in America*. New York: Messner, 1939. 308 pp.

Lobbyists, especially those of the private property interests, are described by Washington correspondent of the *New York Post* and the *Nation*.

DE LA MORA, CONSTANCIA. *In Place of Splendor*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939. 433 pp.

Autobiography of Spanish aristocrat who became head of the Loyalist foreign press service of Spain during the Franco revolution. Touches upon many aspects of Spanish history during the eight years of the Republic.

FILLER, LOUIS. *Crusaders for American Liberalism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939. 422 pp.

History of the "muckrakers," from about 1900 until the World War. Bibliography, pp. 403-07.

"Green Felt and Gold C," *Time*, October 16, 1939, p. 58.

British War Office authorized 12 U.S. correspondents at the front, 17 British, 3 Australian, 1 South African, 1 Canadian. Officers' uniforms with green and gold insignia were prescribed. Article lists authorized U.S. correspondents.

HAMBURGER, ESTELLE. *It's a Woman's Business*. New York: Vanguard, 1939. 300 pp.

Reminiscences of successful New York department-store advertising woman.

HAMLIN, CHARLES HUNTER. *Educators Present Arms: The Use of the Schools and Colleges as Agents of War Propaganda, 1914-1918*, introduction by Harold E. Fey. Zebulon, N.C.: Record Publishing Company, 1939. 47 pp.

By professor of history, Atlantic Christian College, Wilson, N.C. Contains a number of minor inaccuracies, but presents the picture more adequately than pre-

- vious publications. Bibliography, pp. 43-47.
- LIEF, ALFRED. *Democracy's Norris: The Biography of a Lonely Crusade*. New York: Stackpole, 1939. 546 pp.
Senator George William Norris of Nebraska. Bibliography, pp. 529-38.
- LUNDY, MIRIAM, editor. *Writing Up the News*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1939. 254 pp.
Nineteen U.S. newspaper luminaries write about their jobs.
- MACMAHON, ARTHUR WHITTIER; and MILLETT, JOHN D. *Federal Administrators: A Biographical Approach to the Problem of Departmental Management*. New York: Columbia University, 1939. 524 pp.
Life-history data on high federal administrators, collected by two Columbia political scientists. Comparable in some ways with E. Pendleton Herring's *Federal Commissioners: A Study of their Careers and Qualifications* (1936).
- PRINGLE, HENRY FOWLES. *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939. 2 vols.
Based on letters to which the author was given access by Taft's family. Bibliography, pp. 1083-87.
- SOULE, GEORGE HENRY. *Sidney Hillman: Labor Statesman*. New York: Macmillan, 1939. 237 pp.
U.S. journalist's biography of labor leader who has been president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers since 1914. Today he is an intimate adviser of the President of the United States, the second in command of the CIO, and a prime mover of Labor's Non-Partisan League.
- WILE, FREDERIC WILLIAM. *News Is Where You Find It: Forty Years' Reporting at Home and Abroad*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1939. 505 pp.
Reminiscences of U.S. correspondent who has covered Washington and Europe for *Chicago Daily News*, *New York Times*, *London Daily Mail*, and many other publications.
- YOUNG, ART. *Art Young: His Life and Times*, edited by John Nicholas Beffel. New York: Sheridan House, 1939. 467 pp.
Autobiography of a U.S. leftist cartoonist.

Agencies Used in Disseminating Propaganda

- ACHESON, SAM HANNA. *35,000 Days in Texas: A History of the Dallas News and its Forebears*. New York: Macmillan, 1938. 337 pp.
History of the Dallas, Texas, *News*, by one of its editorial writers.
- "Air Lion," *Time*, November 20, 1939, p. 80.
Review of *The Lion Has Wings*, movie-drama of army aviation, allegedly the first official British Government propaganda film of this war.
- CARTER, JEAN; and OGDEN, JESS. *Everyman's Drama: A Study of the Non-Commercial Theatre in the United States* (Studies in the Social Significance of Adult Education, no. 12). New York: American Association for Adult Education, 1938. 136 pp.
- CASEY, RALPH D. "America's Press and the War," *Ohio Newspaper*, 20: 1, 11-15 (November 1939).
Address by Chairman, Department of Journalism, University of Minnesota, at a symposium on propaganda held at the 12th annual "Ohio Journalism Hall of Fame" dinner at Ohio State University. Examines political use that has recently been made of "war scares," and concludes that a shift to domestic affairs would be "good politics." Also examines various means of keeping a balance between Allied and German propagandas in the papers.

CHARNLEY, MITCHELL VAUGHN; and CONVERSE, BLAIR. *Magazine Writing and Editing*. New York: Cordon, 1938. 352 pp.

By two U.S. professors of journalism. Bibliography at ends of some chapters.

ELSBREE, WILLARD SLINGERLAND. *The American Teacher: Evolution of a Profession in a Democracy*. New York: American Book Company, 1939. 566 pp.

Nationwide survey of U.S. teachers from colonial times to 1937, by Teachers College Professor of Education. Chapter 34 is on "Public Attitude toward the Teaching Profession"; Chapter 35 on "Social Composition of the Teaching Population." Bibliography at ends of chapters.

HUBBARD, FRANK W.; and MODLEY, RUDOLF. *Instructions for Chart-makers*. New York: Pictorial Statistics, Inc., 1938. Pamphlet.

Simple technical directions for those who want to make their own pictorial graphs and charts.

JACOBS, LEWIS. *The Rise of the American Film: A Critical History*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939. 585 pp.

Bibliography, pp. 541-64.

MACK, EDWARD CLARENCE. *Public Schools and British Opinion, 1780-1860: An Examination of the Relationship between Contemporary Ideas and the Evolution of an English Institution* (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia). New York: Columbia University, 1938. 432 pp.

Bibliography, pp. 405-22.

NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES. *Utilization of Community Resources in the Social Studies (9th Yearbook)*, edited by Ruth West. Cambridge, 1938. 229 pp. Symposium. Includes "Building Public Opinion in a Community," by R. O.

Hughes, director of curriculum study of the Pittsburgh schools. Bibliography in text and ends of some chapters.

NOBBE, GEORGE. *The North Briton: A Study in Political Propaganda*. New York: Columbia University, 1939. 274 pp.

Eighteenth-century British political newspaper. The author is Associate in English, Columbia. Bibliographic footnotes.

OVERSTREET, HARRY ALLEN; and OVERSTREET, BONARDO WILKINSON. *Town Meeting Comes to Town*. New York: Harpers, 1939. 268 pp. Account of well-known radio forum, America's Town Meeting of the Air, by two U.S. specialists in adult education.

RIEDEL, OSCAR W. "Nationalism in Press, Radio, and Cinema," *American Sociological Review*, 3: 510-15 (August 1938).

SCHWARZ, DANIEL. "Television from Backstage," *New York Times Magazine*, October 1, 1939, pp. 8ff. Vivid description and photographs of current techniques in the television studio.

"\$6.50 Broadcast," *Time*, December 25, 1939, p. 50.

"Already released to 5,000 schools throughout the U.S., as well as to a scattering of record shops," is *Then Came War*, a set of three double-faced twelve-inch records of speeches by Hitler, Daladier, Chamberlain, with commentary by Elmer Davis. Cost: \$6.50. Set is first of a proposed series entitled *The Sound of History*.

UNITED STATES FILM SERVICE. *Directory of United States Government Films* (revision). Washington, D.C., October 1939. Pamphlet.

U.S. NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD. *The Future of State Planning*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1938. 117 pp.

WHIPPLE, JAMES. *How to Write for Radio*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938. 425 pp.

The author is in the Radio Department, Lord and Thomas advertising agency. Bibliography, pp. 415-16.

WISE, HARRY ARTHUR. *Motion Pictures as an Aid in Teaching Amer-*

ican History. New Haven: Yale University, 1939. 187 pp.

Statistical analysis of methods and results of educational experiments with the "Chronicles of America" series of photoplays. Evaluates earlier studies of motion-picture effects. Bibliography, pp. 144-46.

PART VI. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA

GANDY, JOHN MANUEL. *Racial Attitudes of Negro College Students* (M.A. thesis, sociology, Ohio State, 1938).

LEWIN, KURT. *The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces* (Contributions to Psychological Theory, no. 4). Durham: Duke University, 1939. 247 pp.

Aims to define and characterize a set of concepts that will facilitate investigations of the dynamics of behavior; "it is concerned less with developing specific theories than with providing a conceptually strict language which can be used by many psychological theories." The utility of the language is demonstrated by applications to experimental work. The author is a well-known psychologist, now at University of Iowa. Bibliography, pp. 229-33.

MENEFEE, SELDEN COWLES. "Teaching Sociology and Student Attitudes," *Sociology and Social Research*, 22: 545-56 (July-August 1938).

Student's attitude changes after a quarter of sociology instruction.

MURRAY, HENRY ALEXANDER, and others. *Explorations in Personality: A Clinical and Experimental Study*

of Fifty Men of College Age by the Workers at the Harvard Psychological Clinic. New York and London: Oxford University, 1938. 761 pp.

Of high methodological interest because of the elaborate battery of investigational techniques and the multiple-variable form of analysis.

ROSANOFF, AARON J. *Manual of Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene*, 7th edition. New York: Wiley, 1938. 1091 pp.

Revision of a standard work, enlarged by some 400 pages since the last edition. The author's earlier classifications of mental disorder have been extensively modified. Freudian contributions are stressed, while those of Adler, Jung, Eugen Kahn and even Kretschmer are ignored or omitted. The many case descriptions are of value to students of public opinion who have not yet familiarized themselves with the insights of the guidance clinic and the mental hospital.

SIMS, VERNER MARTIN. "Factors Influencing Attitudes Toward the TVA," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 33: 34-56 (January 1938).

Using a Thurstone scale, it was found that southern adults, southern students, and northern students were in general

more favorable to the TVA than northern adults. Persons of business and industrial affiliation were less favorable than laborers, farmers and professionals. Exposed to printed experimental propaganda, pro and con, matched groups changed their attitudes according to definite patterns.

STUDENSKI, PAUL. "How Polls Can Mislead," *Harpers*, 180: 80-83 (December, 1939).

New York University economist examined results of a poll conducted by "a national organization of employers," and conducted an experimental poll of his own upon "the same questions," using the phrasing of the original poll and also

alternative phrasings which he believed to be "more concrete, definite, and, above all, as free of any bias as I could make them. The results on the second poll were remarkably unlike those obtained in the first poll." Conclusion: "Certainly the public opinion poll, as an instrument, needs very wary watching."

WAEELDER, ROBERT. *Psychological Aspects of War and Peace* (Geneva Research Center publication). New York: Columbia University, 1939. 56 pp.

Brief outline of major problems of mass psychology, with suggestions for further research.

PART VII. PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP IN MODERN SOCIETY

CLARK, GRENVILLE. "The Limits of Freedom of Expression," *United States Law Review* (June 1939).

COREY, HERBERT. "Radio is Censored," *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, 23 : 588-96 (May 11, 1939).

Claims that licensing requirements make editorial judgment of broadcasters less free than that of newspaper publishers.

FENWICK, CHARLES GHEQUIERE. "Use of the Radio as an Instrument of Foreign Propaganda," *American Journal of International Law*, 32: 339-43 (1938).

By U.S. professor of international law.

LOEWENSTEIN, KARL. *Contrôle législatif de l'extrémisme politique dans les démocraties européennes*. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1939. 136 pp.

How "democratic" European governments have sought, by legislation, to safeguard themselves against the dissemination of rival ideologies. This study by an

Amherst College political scientist appeared first in *Columbia Law Review*, 38: 591-622, 725-74 (1938) and in *American Political Science Review*, 31: 417-32, 638-58 (1937). French edition contains some additional paragraphs on events since Munich. Topics considered include excesses of political propaganda, curtailment of freedom of assembly and of press, legislation against disloyal public officials, and institution of political police.

U.S. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION. *Report on Social and Economic Data pursuant to the Informal Hearing on Broadcasting, Docket 4063, beginning October 5, 1936, by the Engineering Department of the Commission, July 1, 1937*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938. 197 pp. Survey of the radio industry and of "steps necessary to preserve the American system." Includes the "Hettinger Report" on social and economic pressures and pressure-groups.